



Research Paper

The Assessment of *Kalare* Eradication Policies in Nigeria: A Study of Anti *Kalare* Squad and Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES)

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ABSTRACT: Government or public policies are policies that are made at different times and in most cases by different governmental organizations. This can be at the federal, state and at the local levels through which the governments advance and make meaningful economic and human developments. Gombe state government in Eastern Northern Nigeria in its response to the numerous complaints by its citizens over the political violence activities perpetrated by youth groups known as *Kalare* in the state has formulated two policies with the intention to eradicate these violence activities. These policies include Anti *Kalare* Squad and Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES) but unfortunately these policies achieved limited success especially in eradicating the violent activities perpetrated by the youth. Hence, this paper assessed the factors responsible for the limited success of the two policies. The findings of this paper revealed that the implementation of these policies was marred by political interference influenced by personal interest and political sentiments. The study recommends that a monitoring and evaluation and mediating committees should be set up which will function as mediator among the different *Kalare* groups to ensure proper implementation of the policies.

Keywords:- Assessment, *Kalare*, Eradication, Policies, Gombe state

I. INTRODUCTION

Government or public policies are made at different time and in most cases by different governmental organizations. This can be at the federal, state and at the local levels through which the governments advance and make meaningful economic and human developments. Therefore, it is well known that public or government policies are made to solve a particular problem or problems so as to improve on the living conditions of its citizens. In its attempt to respond to the numerous complaints made by its citizens over the political violence activities perpetrated by youth groups known as *Kalare*, the Gombe state government has formulated two policies which aim to eradicate these violence activities. These policies include Anti *Kalare* Squad and Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES), unfortunately both policies have achieved limited success. Hence, this paper will attempt to analyse factors that hinder the successful implementations of the said policies. However, before I go any further, I would like to discuss the conceptual framework used throughout this paper.

1.1 Conceptual clarification

‘Public policy’ is mostly applied to formal decision or a plan of action that is/are put in place that have to do with state or federal government organisations” (Richards and Smith, 2002). Furthermore, policies are made to improved or discourage certain situation which may be targeting the whole population or a segment of its population (Cairney, 2015). However, Nwagboso, (2012), perceived public policy as the action of the government intentionally planned and adopted to resolve issues of public concern. The issues of public concern must have benefits or implications on the lives of the majority of the population. This means policy may be made to ban, for example, importations of both new and used vehicles through the land borders as introduced recently by the federal government of Nigeria in December 2016. The ban which was to take effect in January 2017, was aimed to enhance the auto policy of 2013 which ordered the charging of 70 percent tariff on imported vehicles into Nigeria as well to enforce the presentation of roadworthiness certificate of the cars from their countries of origin (Okon, Punch Newspaper, 2016 Dec. 5th). This means policy can be both for the benefits of the government and its population.

II. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC OR GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Policy is an important step towards meaningful programmes however; policies alone cannot guarantee the success of those programmes no matter how noble their intentions are. Policies need support from many aspects, such as, from the government or non-governmental organizations, the peoples or the participants of these programmes and many others. As such according to Anderson, (2003), policy being a course of action needs to be followed by an actor or actors who will deal with the problems faced at the course of implementing the policy. But most developing countries like Nigeria, policies are not followed up with percussion measures which in the end lead to failures of government policies.

The failures of governments or public policies is a common problems faced by many governments particularly in developing countries and even the developed countries are no exception (Hill & Hupe, 2013). As soon as the important components that is required for the success of that policy or policies are abuse or poorly implemented, failure will be the end destination (Makinde, 2005; Ugwauanyi, Bartholomew Ikechukwu, & Emma, 2013). This is because policy requires much to enable it success, such as provision of funds monitoring and insuring that the implementation track are maintains and etc (Makinde, 2005). Whenever there is a problem or malfunction of any of the basic components that is required to insure the success of a policy, then that policy will fail to achieve the desired goals.

However, the problem do not lies with the policy itself but with the implementation. Policy may be well proposed with good intentions but if it is not properly implemented it will not make any positive impacts on the target population which render it as a waste of time and resources (Makinde, 2005). Government's policies may also fail as a result of the inability of policy makers to differentiate between policy formations and policy implementation of which the two are independent (Hill & Hupe, 2013). Furthermore, policy involves behaviours as well as intentions which can be achieved through proper actions or fail as results of inaction. Similarly policy may have unexpected outcomes because of some unforeseen reasons (Anderson, 2003). The expectation of any public policy is to achieves the required goals intended and achieving the policy objectives depend on the implementation which is the factor that determine the success and effects of any public policy (Stephen; Gray & Evans, 2015).

In Nigeria so many policies and government programmes were made by various Nigerian government agencies at various levels over the years but most failed when it comes to the implementation or transforming those policies into reality (Ejere 2011). Previous policies that were made in Nigeria includes, Better Life for Rural women, Family Support Programmes, vision 2010, 2020, 7 Point Agenda, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) of 1976, National Agricultural Land Development Agency (NALDA) in 1989, Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Developments (DFRRI) of 1986, National Directorates of Employments (NDE) of 1986 etc (Effiong, 2013; Obamwonyi, Samso and Aibieyi, 2014; Stephen, et al., 2015). However, due to lack of good policy implementation, the policies unintentionally further widening the gap between these policies formulation and the expected goals.

These failures were also attributed to what Okoroma (2006), called lack of commitments, political determination for continuity of government programmes by successive governments. Stephen, et al., (2015), further asserts that policies fail in Nigeria because of the attitudes of civil service who sometimes creates obstacles when it's come to policy implementation that are formulated by political government particularly policies that are not in their interest. This shows that political differences or interests can hinder the success of policy implementation in a democratic system of governance. In other words politics are also factors that hinder proper policy implementation especially when the implementers believe that the successful of the policies does not serve his personal interest (Stephen, et al., 2015).

However, the way public policies, programmes and project are perceived varies from how policy success and failure are assess thereby making it dynamics (Bovens & Hart, 2016). Particularly during political regimes that is why Bovens and Hart, (1996), identify a methods of evaluation as "progammatic" which deals with facts and social balance sheets, where the cost and benefits plus original intentions of the policy and the end results are the medium of evaluations of public policies. In other words there is no sentiment attach to the evaluation but base on facts and figures. David further maintains that (1979) policy evaluation is part of policy making unfortunately this aspect of the policy are not being paid due attention.

The inability of the third world countries like Nigeria to adopt the culture of incorporating policy evaluation strategies as part of their policy making and implementation may have negative consequences on their policies outcomes. Notwithstanding, could Gombe state policies of eradicating *Kalare* violence be experiencing similar situations? This paper provides answer to this question.

III. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research population and sample

The method implored for this study was qualitative and the selection of the respondents was purposive because the study deals with those who are tasked with responsibilities of implementing the policies such as the policies makers and the target population which is the *Kalare* youth. Consequently, Face to face indepth interview was conducted with the two senior official of Anti *Kalare* squads and 43 *Kalare* members from three major violence local governments of Gombe state which includes 26 *Kalare* youth from Gombe -- being the largest in population of the *Kalare* youth 7 from Akko and 4 from Yamaltu Deba local government (the smallest in the population of *Kalare* youth). Others are Funakaye and Billiri with three *Kalare* youth each who are representing the remaining eight local governments with low *Kalare* violence. Data was also collected from the two state political party leaders ie PDP representing the government and APC the opposition. Finally indepth interview was also conducted with two political stakeholders in the state where the information provided was used to crosscheck the informations obtained from the opposing parties.

4.1 Reasons for the Limited Success of Government Policies on Kalare Violence

This sub section will be divided into two sub sections and each sub section discussed thoroughly on individual policy where the pros and cons of each are explained and why does it failed to achieve complete success.

4.2 Anti Kalare Squad Policy

The policy of Anti *Kalare* Squad can best be understood from its conceptualization to implementation where achievements and shortcomings were indentified.

4.2.1 The formation of Anti Kalare Squad

In an attempt by the then administration of Muhammad Danjuma Goje to find a lasting solution to the menace of *Kalare* youth violence, based on the series of complains received from the people of Gombe state. It is apparent that government need to come out with a policy that will address the transformation and escalation of violence in the state. To this end, government after careful study of the situation, decided to form a Special Task Force known as Anti *Kalare* Squad. To further probe from the in-depth interview as to why the government in its ingenuity decided to form the group, an officer of the Squad explained,

The Governor sat with the Security Agencies and came up with memorandum of understanding. The memorandum led to the creation of Joint Task Force of special operation which was coded as "Operation Anti Kalare". The manpower source of the Task Force was drawn mainly from the 301 Artillery Regiment of the Nigerian Army Gombe, The Mobile Police Force, the State Security Service and the National drugs Law Enforcement Agency Gombe state commands (IDI with Anti Kalare official) Field work, 2015.

The formation of the Squad that comprises the above Security personnel was followed by an operational order that will guide the operations of the Task Force to achieve its main goal.

4.2.2 Operational Orders of the Anti Kalare Squad

After the formation of the squad, strategies and standard operational procedure were developed to guide the operation of the squad. The state has eleven local government areas where the squad is expected to cover, but the operation order headquarter is domiciled in the state capital being the epicentre of the onslaught and it was divided into "sectors" for identity and easy operations. However, in the event that anything happens in one of the local governments outside the state capital, the squad will respond from the center. Vans were allocated to the sectors to enable the squad maintains easy patrol and to man their sectors respectively. Military Barrack served as the sector headquarters and saddled with the responsibility of maintaining critical roles of command, coordination, welfare and monitoring aspect of the operation.

The Operational Orders have several features:

1. To perform twenty four hours (24hrs) vehicular patrol within their jurisdiction
2. To immediately respond to any distress calls, within their jurisdiction or as commanded
3. To serve as timely counterforce against the incessant political thuggery, banditry and hooliganism
4. To detect the den of the youth, apprehend and hand over to conventional police (CID) for investigation, arraignment and prosecution in the court.

4.2.3 Achievement of the Anti Kalare Squad

Anti *Kalare* official and a police officer highlighted the achievements of the squad as follow:

many criminals were arrested and others find it extremely difficult to wreak havoc or continue with their onslaught. The crimes rate has also reduced to some extent and so many culprits were arraigned, prosecuted and incarcerated.

The police officer further lamented:

Though, the youth den were disbanded and dispersed into hiding, intelligent report gathered that the groups resort to drugs peddling in order to maintain their existence incognito. Nevertheless, the politicians also withdraw their allegiance and support given to Kalare youth to avoid pockmarks on their political career. As a result of the Anti Kalare operations, normalcy was restored within the state capital (Senior Police officer of Anti Kalare).

However, the Anti Kalare squad had made an impact towards controlling the escalations of Kalare violence as mentioned by the police officer because politicians withdrew their support given to Kalare youth which invariably reduced the amount of crime perpetrated by the Kalare youth. Similarly, the manner in which the culprits are handled and punished by Anti Kalare Squad which is in many occasions witnessed by their group. Additionally, those tried by a court of law and found guilty, were given a prison sentence which is also suppose to serve as lessons and deter others from engaging in similar activities. Despite these attempts, Kalare activities could not be stamped out.

5.3 The Challenges and Shortcomings of the Anti Kalare Squad

Though, the Anti Kalare had recorded some achievements in their efforts to eliminate Kalare violence in the state, it failed to achieve complete success due to some shortcomings. The shortcomings are the factors militating against the achievement of the goal of the policies in question.

Based on the interviews with two senior officers of Anti Kalare squad, they attributed the shortcomings of the squad to the following factors:

1. Most of the sectors find it difficult to operate effectively due to lack of vehicles,
2. Those available are too old due to wear and tear as a result of long term usage,
3. Lack of permanent operational sector headquarters for prompt action and response,
4. Lack of off duty schedule to alleviate stress due to erratic operations,
5. Irregular payment of allowances and incentives had reduced the morals of the squad,
6. Many sectors were dilapidated due to lack of renovation,
7. Interference by both government officials and politicians when their thugs are arrested, through demand for their release,
8. The youth whom were employed by the Government under “Marshals” to assist the security resorted to use of violence in solving social upheavals or crime,
9. The Kalare members whom were converted to Marshal’s takes undue advantages of the conversion, used their new found job to commit all sort of crime under the purview of augmenting the work of the Squad by settling dispute, arraigning offenders without recourse to established norms which is against the constitutional provision of the country,
10. The activities of Marshals gave rise to hostility between them and the security agencies because of their proximity to the politicians as well as government functionaries,
11. Some of the Marshals camouflage their identity to commit crimes, and
12. Introduction and integration of Marshals into security formations led to clashes of interest and general misunderstanding.

However, a political stake holder who was the former gubernatorial aspirant in Gombe state also identified some of the loopholes of the Anti Kalare Squad that led to their inability to completely flush out Kalare violence in the state. The elder statesman commented on the attitudes of some of the overzealous Anti Kalare members who instead of arresting all Kalare youth, they ended up apprehending the opposition Kalare members who hitherto belongs to different political standing with the ruling party in order to impress the government in power. He further lamented:

The overzealous Anti Kalare Squad who want to impress the ruling party started to pursue the opponents, instead of pursuing the “Kalaré” generally. They start to, you know, become selective in their operation. All happened here in Gombe (IDI with 66 years political stake holder 1).

Furthermore, the elder statesman attributed the shortcoming of the Anti Kalare policy to the inability of the squad to perform their duties because of the interferences of the government in power who are the sponsors of the Kalare violence. Thus, some of the ‘big shots’ among the Kalare youth are unassailable by the Anti Kalare squad. In other words, there are some Kalare who by their position and closeness to those in authority became

untouchable. They are not bound to be arrested and even if they got arrested they will be released almost immediately. This is clearly illustrated by the words of the elder below:

Because sometimes there are some of the leaders of "Kalore", who are untouchable because the moment you arrest them, somebody from the ruling party will approach the governor and inform him of the arrest. The governor will then direct the Commissioner of Police to release the culprit or entrust the work to the relevant commissioner for further action which is of course monumental release. So with this in minds of the Kalare, how do you think their activity cannot continue? (IDI with 66 years political stake holder 1).

Furthermore, the evidences given above were further supported by the political stake holder 2 who was also a former gubernatorial aspirant, an entrepreneur and a former civil servant. He commented on the attitudes of the government in supporting the activities of the *Kalore* violence where he said that the government provides solace to the *Kalore* youth whenever they committed any violence that favours the ruling party particularly between the years 2003 to 2011. According to the elder statesman 2:

It was very well known in Gombe state that the same, "Kalore" who perpetrated violence by killing and maiming innocent citizen to satisfy the interest of their political god fathers were given preferential treatment to the extent of hiding them in government house after they committed heinous crime. They went further to feed them and will be giving medical attention to those who sustain injuries. They will be kept there, very well fed, and.... Government will be taking care of them (IDI with 76 years political stake holder 2).

He further added that:

So, whenever an issue of "Kalore" comes, the government will say, oh! We are "Anti-Kalore", we are against "Kalore" but they never demonstrated that, neither do they apprehend any erring member. Those people who were in the forefront of killings, and threatening of lives of innocent citizens and doing all sort of negative things were very well known in the town (IDI with 76 year's political stake holder 2).

Conversely, A Ruling PDP Party Leader In His Defence Has Stated That:

No it's a lie as we are now in Buhari regime, so if any offender who committed a crime and is apprehended will never be given any bail as the party has no any stake but rather [it] is tackled on an individual basis and not [by] PDP as a party...[in fact] the bailing condition will be difficult because of the differences of the parties that controlled the state and that of the federal (IDI with PDP party leader).

However, in trying to cross examine the claims made by the Anti *Kalore* about the interference by the politicians particularly with regards to the demands for the release of any *Kalore* that is under their sponsorship, some of the PDP *Kalore* members who are victims of arrest by the Anti *Kalore* squad had further confirmed that the politicians are those who bailed them out from the police custody. These are their responses when they were asked "who bailed them after being arrested by the police or Anti *Kalore* squad."

According to Area Boy, who was a victim of Anti *Kalore* arrest: "Yes, but I was bailed out by my sponsor who is a member of the State House of Assembly Gombe state". This respondent conceded that he was arrested but then he was freed by his sponsor as stated above. In congruent with that, Lagagio 8, also shared similar views with other respondents where he stated: "Yes, but I was bailed out by the Aspirant". In addition, Lagagio 12 and Lagagio 15 both admitted that they too also bailed out by party officials: "I was bailed out by the party chairman". Similar claim was also echoed by another *Kalore* youth, Lagagio 15, when he said that: "Yes, but then I was in PDP as such i was bailed out by the PDP youth leader". These responses by the *Kalore* youth are in line with the claims put forth by the Anti *Kalore* Squad officials as one of the militating factors responsible for the shortcomings faced while discharging their duties.

5.4 Youth Employment under Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES)

The administration of his Excellency Ibrahim Hassan Dan Kwambo, the Executive Governor of Gombe State who inherited the *Kalore* violent group from the then Governor of the state, Alhaji Muhammad Danjuma Goje who supported the groups financially under state youth leader for his political interest. The incumbent understands the problems the youth posed to the society if not gainfully employed and as a result of that decided to introduce a scheme known as Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES) that will cater for the well being of the teeming youth and curtail the web of violence envisaged from the youth. The TES was meant to complement the existing Anti *Kalore* squad in the areas of crime reduction by employing the youth who are redundant. In addition this will make the work of the Squad easier as this will invariably reduce the crime perpetrated by the youth because of unemployment.

6.1 Achievement of TES Scheme in Gombe

Early January 2015, the state's Governor, Ibrahim Hassan Dan Kwambo presented his administration Score – Card at the government house where he enumerated the achievements of the TES scheme. According to the Governor, the introduction of the scheme has provided employment to the violent *Kalore* group, empower

them and alleviated poverty to some extent, thereby reducing the web of crime perpetrated by the youth as a result of unemployment. The scheme has within the short life span of its creation has achieved the following;

- Training of 320 youth in various vocational and skill acquisitions programme
- Recruitment of 1200 Marshals to empower the youth
- Training and retraining of 330 youth at the Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre, Shere hills, Jos to supervise the 1200 Marshals recruited.
- Training of 150 youth on renewable source of solar energy.
- Recruitment and training of 1500 youth as traffic, Environmental health supervisors and security agents.
- Training of four officials of Nigerian Automobile Technicians Association (NATA).
- Training and retraining of ten youth from the state in arts, tailoring and embroidery at Adhama Garment Industry in Kano for the period of seventh months.
- Training of 1000 youth in welding, fabrication, plaster of Paris (POP) and tiling in 2013.
- Purchase of 65 Jama –tricycles for use in rural areas, and
- Purchase of 550 *Keke Napep* (tricycles) for distribution to clubs and associations within the state to alleviate poverty.

Subsequently, many Marshal Offices were opened within Gombe metropolitan in different wards for easy identification and for the running of their daily activities. The researcher in the course of conducting this research decided to visit some of the offices of the Marshal for on the spot assessment to verify the claims of the officers. Of the six offices visited, only two were found to be operational and the remaining either were locked or not in operation. It is apparent that some offices were used to garner political support. For example, the only things visible were billboards but the offices were empty and not operating. While, commenting on the achievement of the scheme, during an in depth interview (IDI) with the PDP party's state leader, stated:

Kalare is a thing of the past and even if they exist they have less power, as the Governor has employed most of the youth who were originally in Kalare group to be Marshals. The essence of creating the Marshals is to empower the youth and punish erring Kalare members. This makes Gombe state a little bit peaceful as you hardly see them in groups as it is used to be. This is because the previous administrators did not engage the youth in worthwhile ventures. Unnecessary fighting and killing were reduced, as the Governor always advises the youth on the danger of fighting or killings and if any found guilty will be made to face the wrath of the law (IDI with PDP party leader).

The state PDP leader further argued that in the last six months, there were no much cases of *Kalare* violence. In his response he pointed out that:

Let me tell you, long time ago, have you seen Kalare in the olden days, you can ask your parents if there is, since six month ago... have you seen or heard of how violent they are? And if there is any, they will be caught and dealt with (IDI with PDP party leader).

Additionally, he claimed that the activities of *Kalare* violence in the state were reduced to its barest minimum compared to before Dankwambo became the governor in 2011. Similarly, the political stake holder 1, in his own views on the policy of the TES scheme, while reflecting on how the menace of *Kalare* violence became a serious nuisance to the society, also conceded that the state is doing something to engage the youth in order to reduce the effect of the *Kalare* violence to the minimum. According to the elder statesman1:

When this government came into power, the governor took a bold step in order to bring sanity and reduce the menace of "Kalaré". So, he decided to engage the youth into productive venture thereby empowering them. The governor created "Marshals", and in fact many things, which the youth are benefiting (IDI with 66 years political stake holder 1).

The above responses are evident that TES has recorded some achievement in the life span of its existence thereby creating employment and empowering the youth. It is fair to conclude that, to some extent, TES has managed to reduce the menace of the violent youth in the state. Despite its success, like the previous policy, TES also is facing some challenges.

6.2 Challenges and Shortcomings of the TES Policy

The TES scheme like the Anti *Kalare* squad has its own challenges or shortcomings. Nevertheless, most of the government policies come with good intentions of alleviating either the suffering of its citizens or with the view to improve the living standard of its citizenry. In an interview with the officials of the Anti *Kalare*

squad in order to extol the challenges faced by the operators of the scheme, a senior officer of the Squad has this to say:

The Marshals were expected to assist the Anti Kalare Squad in detecting, arresting recalcitrant youth being an ex-members of the group who are conversant with the workings of the Kalare crime network with a view to expose them and their activities in the state (Anti Kalare officer).

However, the employment of *Kalare* youth into Marshals which was supposed to complement the efforts of the security agencies in crime detection, the youth were found to be engaged or perpetrated many crimes themselves. This resulted in the clashes between them and the security agents, thereby compounding the situation by not exposing the culprit. These malice actions of the Marshals have created fracas between the Anti *Kalare* Squad and other security agencies. This is further illustrated by the statement made by the Anti *Kalare* officer below:

The "Gombe Marshal" resorted to the use of violence in solving public or social disorder. The Marshals were given unnecessary power by the politician's capable of operating independently. This created dispute between the established security formations as against the constitutional provision of the Country (Anti Kalare officer).

The Marshal were empowered by the political office holders who acting independently especially in matters that affects the Police by punishing offenders of traffic related offences. Moreover, separate offices were allocated to them which are making it easier for them to commit crimes as their activities were not monitor by other security operatives in the state. Similarly, in a related response on whether the Marshals Project has succeeded in eradicating politically related crimes as orchestrated by the *Kalare* youth, one of the All Progressive Congress (APC) state leaders is of the view that the Marshall project was not able to lower the numbers of violent activities of *Kalare* youth in the state. The APC leader makes reference to the just concluded elections of in the state. In his response he stated that:

He lamented that:

Really! In the just concluded election we have seen the so called Marshals being used carrying the boxes, scaring people away. The unfortunate part of it all is that they are in their uniforms and they used it to scare the opposition party (APC Party Leader) Field work 2015.

Though, the Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES) is aimed at providing job opportunities to the youth and redirecting their violent activities to help the society, it has several limitations. Firstly, TES was not able to cater to the needs of all *Kalare* youth. According to the elder statesman 1, the government will not be able to employ all the *Kalare* youth in the state due to their huge number and limited resources. As such he opined:

The state cannot afford to employ all the Kalare youth because of its limited resources. The state has to prioritize and not channel all resources to employing Kalare youth as there are other sectors like health and education (IDI with 66 years political stake holder1).

Based on the above responses, state government only claimed to have recruited the *Kalare* youth despite that the political stakeholder were selective in recruiting the *Kalare* youth and those who weren't lucky were left to their own devise. The recruitment procedure was bedevilled by biased sentiments because only *Kalare* members who identified themselves with the ruling party were recruited. This is further compounded by the fact that the distribution of recruitment forms were given to the political stakeholders who then given it to their *Kalare* youth who support them. The implication of this action is that those left unemployed continue with their violent activities. Thus, many *Kalare* members are of the view that that the inability of the TES to accommodate them as the reasons for their continuous stay in *Kalare* violence activities. Moreover, some of the *Kalare* members are of the view that the TES was not able to employ many of them either because they do not belong to the PDP or the scheme is yet to cover the large population of the *Kalare* members. Thus, when Cash Money 1, a member of the *Kalare* group was asked as to why he still belongs to *Kalare* violence group he claimed that: *Because I was not employed under the TES, even those who are employed still participate in Kalare activities during campaign.* Nonetheless, some of the *Kalare* members accused the TES scheme of selective recruitment. Hence, those from the opposition party are either not recruited from the beginning or to be identified later and removed from the payroll get dismissed. This view was substantiated by Lagagio 1, who is one of the opposition *Kalare* groups where he stated that:

All the Marshals from Inuwa Yahaya camp were dismissed because he belongs to the opposition party. Similarly Marshals who trained under Jos trainee were made to face the same music because of the believed that they also belong to the opposition party. The policy need to be all inclusive by not segregating among its citizen as all of us has right over him since he is now the governor of the state and not the governor of PDP (IDI with Lagajo, 1).

Similarly when Vmobile 1 was asked, why he was not recruited under the TES he responded as follow: “...this is because the recruitment was selective as not all of us were selected because of party differences”. Therefore, based on the above statements it is apparent that the scheme is saddled with administrative problems which have deviated from the TES main objectives. The accusations and counter accusations levelled against the scheme makes it impossible to end the menace of the *Kalare* youth violence. The opportunity the scheme presented could have major impact on reducing the level of crimes in the state. However, the involvement and the attitude of political stakeholder in the process, to a larger extent, have stalled the success of the policies. In congruent with that, one of the key informant and elder statesman 1, also observed that all *Kalare* members are nuisance to the society as such all of them should be treated equally. In other words, the government should find way of engaging them like those in the Marshals. Hence, he holds that:

“Kalare” is “Kalare” irrespective of his party affiliations. Any young man who engages himself in the act of violence becomes a nuisance to the society. But the society cannot do away with him because he belongs to that society. The government need to definitely find a way of integrating them and empowering them to become useful members of the society (IDI with 66 years political stake holder 1).

Hence, the need to be fair in selection, recruitment will help vehemently in the reduction of crime in the state as the youth deserves equal treatment irrespective of the party they belongs to. Moreover, all the youth are citizens of the state as such it is the government responsibility to provide them with better job opportunities and by so doing the scheme could have achieved the maximum impact it so desired. However, despite the fact the policy did not achieve complete success due to bureaucratic lapses. Another factor which contributed to the difficulty of quitting violence activities among the *Kalare* youth is related to fear of revenge from the opposing *Kalare* group.

6.2.1 Fear of Revenge by the Opposition *Kalare*

The most worrisome problem that hindered some of the *Kalare* members from quitting the *Kalare* violence groups is the fear of revenge from the opposition *Kalare* groups. This is as a result of fights that ensued between the opposition groups mostly due to competition, money sharing, party differences and host of other factors. The action left majority of the members lose some part of their bodies or died which they tend not to forget even after they have renounced their membership. The consequential effect is love for revenge became a personal retribution. This information were also corroborated by many of the *Kalare* members as one of the major reasons why they find it difficult to leave *Kalare* violence particularly those who knows that they have inflicted pain or killed their opponents. The view of the respondents was captured by PDP Straight 1, where he stated:

I want to leave but my fear is that my opponents may find it easy to deal with me because if i leave, i will not be covered by any group and this will makes me to become vulnerable and susceptible to attack (IDI with PDP Straight) Field work, 2015.

Similarly, other *Kalare* members use *Kalare* membership as a protection against attack by the opposing group. In other words, the membership shields someone from possible attack by the opposing as put forth by Lagajo 10:

The problem is that if you leave, you will lose protection. Because if you are a member nobody can strike you easily but when you leave it is easy for the opponent to strike you considering the fact that we have gone deep into this activities and to leave has to be gradual (IDI with Lagajo 10) Field work, 2015.

Furthermore, Vmobile 6 substantiated on the reasons why *Kalare* members seem to be at risk when they want to quit *Kalare* groups despite the attempts made by the state government – in the forms of policies mentioned before. In this regards, Vmobile 6 explains:

... another problem is our opponents may use that opportunity to revenge what our group did to any of their members. Because you may have no security again if you leave, your group members may not support you again. Instead you will be an enemy as they may think you will expose them. So i have to stay until government find us something to do (IDI with Vmobile 6).

By and large those who advanced the fear of revenge as their main impediment toward leaving the Kalare violence group have significant numbers of the populations. Therefore, this factor will affect the TES policy which was tailored towards eradicating the brutality among the Kalare youth. Moreover, many of the members interviewed also confessed to be afraid of leaving Kalare unless God intervene by letting the Kalare die a natural death before they can naturally leave.

Additionally, there are few members who stated that they find it difficult to abandon Kalare because they are used to it. Just like the “Black Star” who also holds that: *we find it difficult to leave Kalare activities because we are used to it.* This invariably means that he cannot do without Kalare violence because of the benefit he derived from it, coupled with the way they are used to drugs. On the contrary, Vmobile 9, stated that Kalare violence is still ongoing most probably due to the attitudes of the Nigeria political class who perpetually wanted to remain in power; thus, he contend that:

It is the fault of those in leadership positions because of the way they assume power and wanted to retain the power at all cost. Basically the Kalare group lacks home training where during politicking, the youth used that as an avenue to look for money anyhow. This is notably an African ideology of clinching to power through illegal means and the desire to remain on power /God knows when he may want to leave. This is more so the reason why they forgot about home training just to satisfy their selfish ego (IDI with Vmobile 9) Fieldwork, 2015.

The politicians are the major patrons of Kalare youth are doing so, for their personal reasons by indoctrinating their upbringing as well as manipulating them to engage in violence. The continued involvement of Kalare youth in violence can be seen in the Table 6.1, Table 6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 below.

6.1 Criminal Statistics of Cases Involving Kalare Youth

The tables below represent the statistics of crime perpetrated by the kalare youth from 2008 to 2014 in Gombe state respectively.

Table 6.1: Statistics of Criminal Cases that involved Kalare youth in Gombe State in 2008

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	31	20	30	20
2	Armed robbery	Nil	19	20	19
3	Rape	Nil	17	17	17
4	Theft	Nil	30	19	30
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	2	3	2
Grand Total	5	31	88	89	88

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015.

Table: 6.1 show the statistic of crimes that involved Kalare youth in Gombe state in the year 2008. During the period under review, 20 cases of culpable homicide were reported involving 30 Kalare members. 31 people were killed out of the 20 cases reported, 30 people arrested and all the 20 cases reported were charged to court by the police. However, in the same year, 19 cases of armed robbery were also reported and out of the 19 cases 20 Kalare youth were arrested and all 19 cases were charged to court. Nonetheless, some of these Kalare youth were also found to be guilty of rapes where 17 cases were reported involving Kalare members and among the 17 cases reported, 17 Kalare youth were arrested and all of them were charged to court. Furthermore, 30 cases of theft were reported and out of the 30 cases 19 Kalare members were involved and charged to court. Finally in the same year, there were two cases of criminal conspiracy and assault documented while three Kalare members were arrested and charged to court. Therefore, during the year under review, 88 cases were

recorded involving 89 *Kalare* youth out of the 88 cases 31 people were killed and all the 88 cases were successfully charged to court. Unfortunately the record of 2009 could not be found at the time of this study.

Table 6.2: Statistics of Criminal cases that involved *Kalare* youth in Gombe State in 2010

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	30	30	30	30
2	Armed robbery	Nil	16	16	16
3	Rape	Nil	22	22	22
4	Theft	Nil	28	28	28
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Grand Total	5	30	96	96	96

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015.

Table 6.2 above shows the statistics of the cases that *Kalare* youth were found guilty and charged to court during the year 2010. During the year, 30 cases of culpable homicide were recorded and out of the 30 cases 30 *Kalare* youth were involved and all were arrested and charged to court. While, in the same year 16 cases of armed robbery were reported involving 16 *Kalare* members and subsequently all of them were brought before the court of law. Consequently, out of the total of 96 cases 30 victims were killed. Nevertheless all the 96 accused persons were charged to court respectively.

Table 6.3: Statistics of Criminal Cases that involved *Kalare* youth in Gombe State in 2011

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	29	10	15	10
2	Armed robbery	Nil	4	3	4
3	Rape	1	19	20	19
4	Theft	Nil	18	18	18
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Grand Total	5	30	51	56	51

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015

Table 6.3 above indicates that in the year 2011, 51 cases were reported to the Police out of which 10 were culpable homicides which claimed the lives of 29 people. Hence, 15 *Kalare* members were arrested out of which 10 were charged to court. The above records also show that among the 51 cases four were cases of robbery even though this time it did not involve any loss of lives. However, among the four cases reported three persons were arrested and charged to court. Similarly, in 2011, 19 cases of rapes were also recorded one of the victim was killed in the process, while the other 20 accused were arrested after investigation and all the cases reported were successfully charged to court by the police. Furthermore, 18 cases of theft were also brought to book where 18 people were involved and charged to court following investigation and substantial evidences. The record for 2011 showed a decrease in the number of cases from 96 in the year 2010 to 51 cases in 2011. However, the total numbers of lives lost was 30.

Table 6.4: Statistics of Criminal Cases that involved *Kalare* youth in Gombe State in 2012

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	102	57	88	57
2	Armed robbery	Nil	22	22	22
3	Rape	9	23	50	23
4	Theft	Nil	219	252	219
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	6	12	6
Grand Total	5	111	327	424	327

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015.

Table 6.4 above shows that 57 cases of culpable homicides were reported and out of which 102 people were killed, 88 people were arrested. After due process of law all the cases were charged to court by their prosecutors. The cases of robbery that year also increases from 4 in 2011 to 22, in all the cases 22 persons were arrested and charged to court. However, number of victims of rapes in 2012 also has showed dramatic increased

from one in 2011 to nine in 2012, while cases of death jumped to 111 out of the 23 cases reported during the same year -(2012). As such 50 people were arrested and 23 were found guilty and charged to court. Consequently, cases such as theft, criminal conspiracy and assault were also at alarming rate compared to the previous years, where 219 cases of theft involving *Kalare* youth were documented out of which 252 persons were arrested and 219 were successfully found guilty of the offence and charged to court. Finally out of the six cases of criminal conspiracy and assault, 12 people were arrested out of which six were freed and six found guilty and charge to court. This was the year TES was introduced but it seemed that year has the highest cases. This is because 111 cases of death were recorded out of 327 cases reported involving 424 *Kalare* youth.

Table 6.5: Statistics of Criminal Cases that involved *Kalare* youth in Gombe State in 2013

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	41	37	52	37
2	Armed robbery	Nil	17	17	17
3	Rape	3	22	47	22
4	Theft	Nil	223	300	223
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	3	3	3
Grand Total	5	44	302	419	302

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015.

Table 6.5 above shows that number of cases involving death has dropped significantly in the year 2013, but in terms of the numbers of cases involving *Kalare* youth it showed a significant increased. The record indicated that in all the 37 cases of culpable homicide, 44 people were killed and 52 persons arrested and charged to court. However, this year none was killed as a result of robbery despite the 17 cases of robbery reported. Hence, 17 people involved and arrested were charged to court. However, cases of death as a result of rape have dropped from 9 in 2012 to 3 in 2013. Among the 22 cases reported, 47 people were arrested and all the 22 cases of rapes were brought before the court of law. The year recorded 223 different cases of theft out of which 300 people were arrested and finally charged to court. Also three cases of criminal conspiracy and assaults that involved three people and the cases were successfully charged to court after due investigation by the police. In summary, there were 302 cases that involved *Kalare* youth in 2013 where 44 lives were loss and 419 *Kalare* arrested and charged to courts for different offences committed.

Table6.6: Statistics of Criminal Cases that involved *Kalare* youth in Gombe State in 2014

S/N	Offences	No of persons killed	Cases	Persons arrested	Cases charged to court
1	Culpable Homicide	40	30	40	30
2	Armed robbery	Nil	6	10	6
3	Rape	Nil	31	45	31
4	Theft	Nil	24	51	24
5	C/ C and Assault	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Grand Total	5	40	91	146	91

Source: Police CID report Gombe State Command, 2015.

Table 7.6 above shows a decrease in the number of cases reported from 302 cases in the year 2013 to 91 cases in 2014 that involved *Kalare* youth. 146 people involved were arrested out of which 40 were killed. However, during this year out of 30 cases of culpable homicide 40 people were arrested and all the 30 cases were charged to court. Furthermore, six cases of robbery were reported and 10 persons were arrested and all the six cases were brought before the court. Even though, there was a decreased in cases in 2014 in general, conversely, there was an increased in the cases of rapes to 31 from 22 in 2013 even though there was no loss of live. While the cases of theft dropped to 24 cases in 2014 as compared to 2013 which has 223 cases and no criminal conspiracy and assault case was reported during 2014. In summary there were total of 91 cases in 2014 involving 146 *Kalare* youth leading to the death of 40 victims. This shows that the two policies could not stamp out the *Kalare* violence completely, because if you look at the reported cases in 2014 the number of cases involving death were 40 in Gombe state.

VII. DISCUSSION

The Anti *Kalare* squad policy which was introduced by the then Governor Muhammad Danjuma Goje to eliminate or reduce the activities of *Kalare* violence in Gombe state but the policy could not meet the

expectation of the people of the state. As after swearing in of His Excellency the incumbent Governor Ibrahim Hassan Dan Kwambo introduced another policy known as Talba Empowerment Scheme (TES) which aimed towards changing the mind and the activities of *Kalare* youth so that they can be useful to the society. The new scheme was welcomed by the people of the state. This is more so in view of the fact that the policy objective is to alleviate the sufferings of the youth who were considered a menace to the society and invariably improve the lives of the people like other policies of governments (Abah, (2010); Ejere (2011) and Ikelegbe, (2006). But the implementation of the policies suffered many setbacks due to unnecessary interference from the political god fathers and government officials with the sole aim of achieving personal interest and that of the ruling party.

The Anti *Kalare* squad was not given the freedom to enable it to perform its duties without fear or favour due largely to political interference by the ruling party and political stakeholders. This interference ranged from protecting the *Kalare* youth that were working for the interest of the ruling party from being arrested, while those arrested the squad are ordered to release them unconditionally. The Anti *Kalare* squad has no objection to the demands of the ruling party being the source of financing the squad as such the relationship between Anti *Kalare* squad and ruling party becomes that of resource power relationship as maintained by Blood, & Wolf, (1960), where the ruling take position of power while the Anti *Kalare* squad being dependent on the ruling party for their daily allowance, hence change the direction of their operations due to the benefit drives from the ruling party. This was also possible due to the imbalance in exchange of access to resources between the Anti *Kalare* and the ruling party (the politicians). The obstruction cause as a result of this imbalance in resources included but not limited to compelling the squad to look the other way and sometimes overlook when *Kalare* are operating in either polling booth or when they strike an opponent whom they believed is a threat to their political victory. The squad were forced to look the other way when the *Kalare* are destroying bill boards meant for other parties. Furthermore the Talba empowerment Scheme (TES) which is purposely meant to recruit the unemployed youth particularly the *Kalare* youth was marred by selective recruitment based on party sentiments. This goes to explain the reasons why policy failure are common among the third world countries which were attributed to the lack of commitments by relevant government agencies to embark on thorough monitoring and evaluation of policies put in place (Nwagboso, 2012). Similarly, civil service officials sometimes create obstacles especially when it's come to policy implementations that are formulated by politically elected government especially policies that do not support their personal interest (Stephen, et al 2015). Policies were meant to re-direct the behaviours and improve the living conditions of certain population, yet a significant number of the targeted population are still being deprived from certain things which are the responsibilities of the government to handle but could not do so due to the reasons mentioned above (Obamwonyi, Samson & Aibieyi, 2014). This is because many *Kalare* members who are supposed to be beneficiaries of the TES scheme were not recruited due to political sentiments and interference of political stakeholders who were more interested in serving their own interests.

Even though, 'success' or 'failure' is not natural attributes of policy, but rather labels are made base on the results which will determine whether the policy was a success or failure through the stakeholders or observers (McConnell, 2011). The two policies which were responsible to eradicate the *Kalare* violence activities in the state could not do so as *Kalare* violence still exist even during the last general election in 2015. This was not only perpetrated by those who were not recruited but also those who were recruited youth as Marshals. This evidence was confirmed by political stakeholder and APC party leader during the interview with him. The policies also failed to provide security to those who wanted to denounce their membership of the violence group particularly those who were not recruited under the TES scheme. As such the youth preferred to maintain their membership for the fear of being vulnerable to attack by their opposing groups, which consequently contributed to the failure of both policies.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, the two policies suffered from political interference that hinders the total success in implementation of the policies. The Anti *Kalare* squad were found to be selective in their arrest as such they were compelled by the politicians to release *Kalare* belonging to the ruling party. This has hindered the Anti *Kalare* to deal with the issues of *Kalare* objectively and with certain degree of independence.

The *Kalare* youth recruited to Marshal under the TES was also found to be biased which portray the fact that they favour the ruling party to the detrimental of competence and professionalism. The study found that most of the *Kalare* youth do not want to denounce their membership particularly those who were not recruited into Marshals for fear attack by their opposing groups. In addition, lack of political will and funding also lead to the failure of both policies. The study recommends that monitoring and evaluation to ensure the implementation of the policies. While the mediating committees should be set as mediator among the different *Kalare* groups who want to denounce the *Kalare* group without being vulnerable to attack by opposition groups.

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