



Research Paper

Martin Heidegger's Concept of Fallenness: An Expository Analysis

Evaristus Chimaobi Mmadudiri

Pope John Paul II Major Seminary Okpuno, Nigeria

&

Ignatius Nnaemeka Onwuatuegwu PhD

Philosophy Department, Faculty of Arts
Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The reference to “Existentialism” as a set of issues and a sensibility more than a philosophical movement evidences in Martin Heidegger. His concept of “Fallenness”, though among his minor set of existential issues, makes simple the understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity. As one of the elements of the care—the being of Dasein – structure, Fallenness refers to our mode of being-amidst entities within-the-world. This, thus, gives a two-fold interpretation to Heidegger’s analysis of Fallenness: upside and downside. In its upside interpretation, ‘Fallenness’, as an essential ontological feature of Dasein, constitutes the ontological quest for knowing one’s being or realizing one’s being, which essentially belongs to Dasein as Being-in-the-world. On the opposite, it connotes negativity when mirrored from the perspective dimensions of ‘conformity’ and ‘absorption’ into the ‘they’, where Dasein not only falls from itself but loses itself in that which could have contributed in actualizing its being. Furthermore, he analyzes Fallenness as characterized by “idle talk”, “curiosity”, and “ambiguity” and posits “tranquility” as the mood that goes with falling being. For this reason, in exposing Heidegger’s claims, this work adopts the analytic method and then, the critical approach of philosophy.

KEYWORDS: Concept; Fallenness; Expository; Analysis.

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I. LITERATURE REVIEW

The important and influential status of Heidegger in the twentieth century remains arguably true especially when the controversial nature of his thought is taken into consideration. Sequel to this, “students and scholars alike have a wealth of new material to explore and appropriate, yielding diverse perspectives from which to address the unifying thread and path of inquiring of Heidegger’s thinking”(Schalow; 2010). On this note therefore, it is the concern of this chapter to review some notable literatures on Martin Heidegger’s analysis of Fallenness/Falling for a broader view and for its easy comprehension.

Taking for instance the view of B. Shaw in his Dissertation entitled, “Authenticity and Death in *Being and Time*,” B. Shaw sets out to offer a critique of Heidegger’s concept of inauthenticity. In his description of an inauthentic person, he writes: “an inauthentic person is one who is anonymous – not ‘anonymous’ insofar as he is, so to speak, ‘unknown by others’, but anonymous in the sense that he can neither grasp himself as the individual that he is, nor play an originating role in respect to himself” (Shaw; 2012).

Having given his account of an inauthentic person, he presents Fallenness as the culmination of Heidegger’s discussion on the concept of inauthenticity. Simply put, ‘falling’ for him, describes a person’s inauthenticity. Quoting him, he says: “what we called the inauthenticity of Da-sein may now be defined more precisely through an interpretation of falling prey”(Shaw; 2012). In his interpretation, he argues that falling describes a condition in which a person’s abilities are understood to be limitless, and non-factual and in which a person is perpetually acting; and this results in a person’s anonymity(Shaw; 2012). What is evident in this account is that by this, B. Shaw gives a logical account of how inauthenticity culminates in the concept of

Fallenness, that is, for the onerous claim of constituting the source of the inauthentic person's anonymity (Shaw; 2012). B. Shaw views Fallenness as involving a perpetual activity or restlessness of Dasein. The downside of this is that it deprives Dasein of the ability to make his own, individual choices (Shaw; 2012). Hence, Dasein is plunged into an impulsive, constant activity. B. Shaw is of the view that this suggests that the fallen Dasein loses his capacity for deliberate choice or attaining 'mineness' (Shaw; 2012).

Besides this, C. Wen in his article, "What is the Meaning of the Concept of 'Care' (Sorge) in Heidegger's Philosophy?" agrees with Heidegger that Fallenness is one of the care structures of Dasein. Thus, he treats Fallenness in relation to the other care structures – existence and thrownness. He lumps these three concepts together as the driving force in Heidegger's philosophy (Wen; 2019). Highlighting their inseparable nature from each other, he describes them as the components of Being-in-the-world. However, he interprets Fallenness as "fascinated-with-the-world" (Wen; 2019). Moving further from Heidegger's terms, he submits that Fallenness "implies some sort of agency" (Wen; 2019). By *agency*, he is only saying that among the three structures, Fallenness disposes Dasein to the tendency of choosing to fall. Heidegger designates this as 'temptation.' C. Wen's notion of Heidegger's Fallenness predominantly tilts towards the downside interpretation of Fallenness. He argues that this tendency of Dasein to fall, and thus, become lost in the 'they' is innate (Wen; 2019). He comes to this summation from the point of view that "as much as we like to individuate ourselves from the 'crowd', we still tend to do things that are agreeable with the crowd" (Wen; 2019).

Going a bit further from C. Wen, E. Iwuagwu in his article, *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Being*, discusses Fallenness and the other two care structures in relation to Dasein's temporality. That is to say, as Fallenness connotes Dasein's now (present), existence and thrownness connotes the future and the past, respectively. Interpreting these tripartite structures, C. Wen describes them as the components of Being-in-the-world. But then, going beyond this interpretation, E. Iwuagwu submits that Heidegger's use of 'care' (*sorge*) points to how man cares and authenticates his own existence (Iwuagwu; 2017). This authentication of the self does not happen in the blues, it is through Dasein's being-in-the-world. As a Being-in-the-world, Dasein is essentially temporal in nature. The necessary implication is that "temporality is the primordial meaning of Dasein's being-in-the-world...and its temporal character is derived from the tripartite ontological structure" (Iwuagwu; 2017). Now, not only that the care structures are the components of being-in-the-world as C. Wen avers, E. Iwuagwu affirms this but gives us additional information that they signify temporality, which is the primordial meaning of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Having given us this background, he delves into the discussion of Fallenness as one of the ontological structures. In his view, Heidegger's Fallenness denotes falling captive to the world. Thus, according to him:

Fallenness designates man's tendency to disown himself in the world. In his self-projection and self-transcendence, man understands his world and becomes himself. In his practical concern, he views everything in terms of its serviceability. But as man shapes his relationship to the things he has made, he can fall captive to them and forfeits his self (Iwuagwu; 2017).

By this idea, E. Iwuagwu points out that Fallenness is not only a forfeiture of the self but also an inauthentic manner of living. Again, he mirrors Fallenness as deterioration, that is to say, "a falling away from what is most central and distinctive in existence" (Iwuagwu; 2017). To forestall ambiguity, E. Iwuagwu holds that Fallenness as deterioration has two-fold explanations: "on the one hand, it means being absorbed in the world of material objects through preoccupation with the tasks and concerns of the everyday instrumental world. On the other hand, it designates the loss of oneself to the impersonal social forces in collective existence" (Iwuagwu; 2017). By this submission, he makes case for Heidegger's assumption that Fallenness is a downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic everyday life of the 'They' (Heidegger; 1962).

Furthermore, D. R. Cerbone in his book, *Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed*, argues that though Fallenness has two-fold interpretations: positive and negative, it is more of the latter. Thus, he writes: "...there is such a 'dark side' to Heidegger's explication of this concept, but it would be a mistake to treat this aspect as more than just one side" (Cerbone; 2008). Fallenness can be said to be positive in the sense that it involves action that dovetails into a possible way to be of Dasein. In his own words: "it is positive in the sense that I could not be...acting for-the-sake-of some possible way to be if I were not acting" (Cerbone; 2008). In its negative dimension however, D. R. Cerbone is of the view that "falling, as the term itself suggests, is more directly connected to Dasein's inauthenticity, i.e. to Dasein's failing to be anything other than a man-self" (Cerbone; 2008). Still on its negative perspective, D. R. Cerbone interprets falling as "Dasein's absorption in its present situation" (Cerbone; 2008). Having been absorbed, Dasein becomes distracted from its ontological task of confronting its own being as an issue. His account appears deeper in the sense that Fallenness of Dasein does not only end at Dasein's forfeiture of the self in the world as E. Iwuagwu opines, but makes a flashlight on the attitude of the world on Dasein that keeps the latter ever forfeited. According to him, "in falling, there is the risk of the world becoming an arena of distraction, wherein we become absorbed in what surrounds us as more of a spectacle, rather than an arena for active participation" (Cerbone; 2008).

More so, M. King in his book, *Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought*, was explicit in his own account of Fallenness. According to him:

Fallenness, or as it might be more fully paraphrased, 'falling captive to the world' (*Verfallen*), is a trend towards the world which is basic to man's being, and which has already been mentioned as man's tendency to give himself away to things, to scatter himself in his occupations in company with other people, literally to disown himself (King; 1964).

A cursory look into M. King's explanation of Fallenness would reveal an inherently three dimensional implications, namely; falling captive to the world, man's tendency to scatter himself in his Being-with, and finally, Dasein's disown of the self.

Furthermore, J. Kelly in his journal article entitled "Heidegger's Analysis of 'Fallenness' and 'Authenticity': A Kantian Account?" undertakes to examine some parallels of coincidence between Heidegger's concepts of Fallenness, authenticity and inauthenticity, and Kant's ethical theory. He would later focus on Fallenness for according to him, "Heidegger's discussion of Fallenness fills out his account of inauthenticity and even has a lot of resonance" (Kelly; 2019). In other words, Fallenness is the culmination and precise account of Heidegger's inauthenticity. In drawing the parallel line of coincidence, J. Kelly opines that Heidegger's conception of Fallenness as rooted in Dasein's factual being-in-the-world, particularly in relation to 'being-with-others' to which he is tempted to slide into, bears similarity to what Kant says about the propensity to evil being a fact about human nature lying in our 'unsociable sociability,' that is, our social nature (Kelly; 2019). Paraphrasing Kant, J. Kelly writes that "in frailty, out of ordinary human weakness, human beings conform to adopted maxims, maxims drawn from outside their autonomous, legislating wills but that have been derived from elsewhere, probably from the agent's culture" (Kant; 1793). From this analysis, J. Kelly interprets Fallenness as rooted in Dasein's social nature in the same manner as Kant's radical evil connotes a human propensity rooted in our social nature.

Proceeding further, J. Kelly criticizes Heidegger of being a social critic in his discussion on Fallenness. From his lens of vision, Heidegger's account of Fallenness includes a large dose of social criticism for he holds that falling prey to the 'they' and to the world is Dasein's flight from itself. Thus, in reaction to this, and in providing credible evidence for his criticism, he argues that Heidegger's Fallenness implies that "in getting too caught up in being-with-others and the they, one is not only failing to fully be oneself, one is fleeing from oneself and clinging to the they" (Kelly; 2019). The alienation from the self and conformity to the 'they' explain the social criticism that J. Kelly identifies as inherent in Heidegger's Fallenness. W. Blattner holds this same view of Heidegger, as a social critic, when he writes: "immersion in the social world also involves a certain abdication (sic) of selfhood. Immersed in the social world, I do not own myself, but rather am, in Heidegger's language, 'dispersed' in the public" (Blattner; 2007). Flowing from his critique, J. Kelly submits that Fallenness is synonymous with "falling, disownedness (inauthenticity), irresoluteness, lostness in the Anyone" (Kelly; 2019). But then, he observes that there is an underlying common implication of all these terms, namely, "that we do not embrace the sort of entity we are, namely Dasein, and live as if we did not have the possibility to gather ourselves out of our lostness in the Anyone and resolutely choose an owned life" (Kelly; 2019).

From the foregoing review, it is very clear that Heidegger's analysis of Fallenness engenders numerous contentions among scholars. A good number of them agree with Heidegger that the concept connotes two-fold interpretations. While some focus on the positive dimension of the interpretation, others pitched their tent on the negative dimension. Taking a glance of the review, one observes that a good number of the scholars dwelt more on the negative dimension of Heidegger's Fallenness. Some came from the viewpoint of conformity, others from that of inauthenticity. One singular denominator is that they are both directed towards the negative slide of the view. From this therefore, the evident *lacuna* in these reviewed scholars is the inability of any of them to strike a balance between the positive and negative side of the story since they both play vital roles in the realization and actualization of Dasein. It is this gap, *inter alia*, that this study (in the subsequent chapters) attempts to address while first of all exposing both dimensions and then threading in their light of vision to investigate neo-paganism (religion).

The Concept of Fallenness as a Motion

Heidegger initiates this from his discussion of the three ontological structures – the Care Structure – of *Dasein*: Existence, Thrownness and Fallenness. A detailed analytic exposition of these is not necessary considering the limit of my study. However, for a proper comprehension of the concept of "motion" in relation to Fallenness, some notes on them are worthwhile.

EXISTENCE

Existence does not in any way signify 'Being-present-at-hand' or what an entity is – whether table, chair, book, etcetera. – rather to exist, ontologically, connotes the 'who', 'mineness' of an entity (Heidegger; 1962). This means that *Dasein* is its own possibility, its own issue to be in one way or another. "And because

Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so ... any *Dasein* whatsoever is characterized by mineness"(Heidegger; 1962).

THROWNNESS

As an existent Being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is being placed in certain historical, spiritual, biological, etcetera environment. These constitute the facticity of its Being(Heidegger; 1962). They are not, however, the products of choice made by *Dasein* in its Being-with.

FALLENNESS

Having been thrown into the world, – the 'there' – *Dasein* undertakes constant actions and reactions towards those facts of its Being. In any case, such actions are neither in self-loss nor groundlessly directed rather they are actions towards self-realization.

Consequently, it is upon this setting that Heidegger introduces the concept of motion in relation to Fallenness. Thus, through this, "a basic kind of Being of the "there" will become visible – a kind of being which we interpret as *falling*; and this 'falling' shows a movement [*Bewegtheit*] which is existentially its own"(Heidegger; 1962). By 'motion,' Heidegger does not express a temporal displacement of an object – kicking a ball, moving from point A to point B, and the likes – rather "a motion of a Being whose Being is care"(Shaw; 2012). For B. Shaw, Heidegger expresses a motion that is characteristic of a person's very care. Hence, a person's pursuit, exercise and use of his abilities are therefore in motion in a peculiar way that is constantly exercised for the purpose of self-realization, mineness(Shaw; 2012). This is the movement characteristic of 'Falling.' J. B. Steeves observes that Heidegger uses the expression 'movement' several times throughout section 38, in the sense that falling, as well as establishing worldliness, can also be a 'movement' away from the self(Steeves; 1997).

Fallenness Not as a Fall from a Higher State

Generally, the word 'fall' signifies a downward connotation, as in to drop down from a higher level to a lower level or to hand down from an elevated angle. This in no way reflects Heidegger's perspective. His perspective here – which I denote as the upside interpretation of Fallenness – is not negatively directed "but used to signify that *Dasein* is proximally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of its concern"(Heidegger; 1962). It is alongside the world of its concern and not yet itself, a consequence of the fact that it has not ontologically attained the full state characteristic of *Dasein* as the Being of an entity but not the 'what'(Heidegger; 1962). According to W. Lawhead, Heidegger's notion of "concern" seeks to describe "how we are related to the world"(Lawhead; 2002). In Heidegger's term, this indicates "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something...undertaking, accomplishing...and can mean to carry out something"(Lawhead; 2002). All these ways of Being-in-the-world stand to say that *Dasein* has the world as its object of concern. Therefore, it is this Being-alongside-the-world-of-its-concern that Heidegger considers as *Fallenness*, the not-Being-itself that is closest to *Dasein* (but not yet *Dasein*) and in which *Dasein* maintains itself for the most part until its Being is fully attained(Lawhead; 2002). Thus, on this one-fold interpretation of the concept, Heidegger maintains that Fallenness of *Dasein* must not be conceived as a fall from a purer and higher 'primal status'(Lawhead; 2002). The reason for this is rooted in the fact that as factual Being-in-the-world, it is something before and after the 'fall'. After the fall, it is that which itself belongs to its Being. Hence, "falling is a definite existential characteristic of *Dasein* itself"(Lawhead; 2002). Alluding to this same interpretation of Fallenness as Being-alongside-the-world-of-its-concern, J. M. Shields opines that "it is a dialectical and not a strict lapsarian sense of falling"(Shields; 2013), which I had noted earlier. For him, Fallenness in this sense "is in fact a necessary condition for *Dasein*'s awakening to authenticity through its relation to the world"(Shields; 2013).

Fallenness as Essential to *Dasein*

Still making claims to the positive conceptual understanding of 'falling,' Heidegger posits that "falling reveals an essential ontological structure of *Dasein*"(Heidegger; 1962) and not its night view or its nocturnal side – what could be interpreted as Fallenness towards conformity. It is essential to *Dasein* in the sense that as being-in-the-world, it constitutes the disclosedness which essentially belongs to *Dasein*. In other words, Fallenness constitutes the ontological quest for knowing one's Being, realizing one's being, which essentially belongs to *Dasein* as being-in-the-world. Referring to this ontological quest, B. Shaw notes that it is an anonymous force that dominates everyday existence of the individual (Heidegger; 1962). In this process of disclosedness, Heidegger eludes every evidences of corruption or incorruption –moral value – of human nature. In his own judgment, this belongs to the ontic and not the ontological character of *Dasein*. By ontic character, as B. Shaw observes, we refer to what a Being is in terms of its particular properties – a particular table has four

legs, is rectangular, is brown, and so on – while the ontological character of Being refers to how it is insofar as it is(Heidegger; 1962).

Fallenness that Characterizes Inauthenticity

A superficial analysis of what Heidegger states here would reveal a contradiction of what have been heretofore, elucidated. Here, Heidegger introduces the second-fold interpretation of “Fallenness,” which flows from the perspective dimensions of *conformity* and *absorption* into the ‘they.’ According to Heidegger, “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [*abgefallen*] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the world”(Heidegger; 1962). By ‘inauthenticity,’ Heidegger posits a distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world (also referred to as our dealings in the world and with entities within-the-world) that is completely fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the “they.” Hence, inauthenticity does not in any way denote ‘really not,’ as in the case of Being-no-longer-in-the-world but has possessed the character of being-lost in the publicness of the “they”(Heidegger; 1962). This state of existence is therefore characterized by *idle talk*, *curiosity* and *ambiguity*. According to B. Shaw, these characteristics, better still, these everyday ways in which a person cares, render a person inauthentic(Heidegger; 1962).

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FALLENNESS

IDLE TALK (GEREDE)

By ‘Idle talk,’ Heidegger refers to a kind of Being that characterizes Dasein’s art of *understanding* and *interpreting* in its everydayness. Generally, understanding and interpretation would make reference to ‘language.’ However, here, Heidegger connotes language “as a way things have been expressed”(Heidegger; 1962). In whatever is expressed, there lies an *a priori* understanding – in the sense of the genuine appropriation of what is expressed towards which Dasein can comport itself in accordance with its essential possibilities of Being(Heidegger; 1962)– and interpretation. These therefore, constitute the fundamental inherent factor in whatever is expressed as they enhance its proper signification and disclosedness, that is to say, a grasp of the Dasein with of Others and of one’s own Being-in(Heidegger; 1962). But then, in its everyday Being-in-the-world, Dasein does not so much understand the entities which are talked about, in the sense that, “what is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially”(Heidegger; 1962). In idle talk, Dasein lacks sufficient and grounded knowledge of whatever is expressed. In other words, it remains in a carefree state in relation to entities in the sense of what Heidegger describes as “groundless floating;” taking things to be because one says so(Heidegger; 1962). This crystallizes in his definition of idle talk as “the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own”(Heidegger; 1962). With this, idle talk falls prey to Heidegger’s interpretation of Fallenness as conformity. Most often than not, idle talk establishes itself in Dasein that the latter becomes closed-off. By being closed-off, Dasein is made to remain in its ignorance and is entirely cut off from the whole truth. This is because, “by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it leaves undone”(Heidegger; 1962). Writing further on this, Heidegger gives a résumé of idle talk as a character of Being in its everyday falling;

...when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is – as Being-in-the-world – cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in. such a Dasein keeps floating unattached [in einer Schweben]; yet in so doing, it is always alongside the world, with Others, and towards itself(Heidegger; 1962).

CURIOSITY (NEUGIER)

As characteristic of Heidegger, he goes beyond the layman’s understanding of ‘Curiosity’ as a kind of ‘inquisitiveness’ in his application of the word. He expresses ‘Curiosity’ as “the tendency towards the peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception”(Heidegger; 1962). He simply describes this as the tendency towards ‘seeing.’ Seeing, not in the context of vision but cognition. This is deducible from the Greek philosophical tradition where cognition is conceived in terms of the desire to see. This interpretation gives credence to Aristotle’s submission that “all men by nature desire to know”(Heidegger; 1962). If sight is synonymous with cognition, which is characteristic of Dasein in its everyday Being-in-the-world, Heidegger thus defines Being as “that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being gets discovered”(Heidegger; 1962). Dasein in its nature inquires into what is far away for the sole purpose of bringing it close to itself in the way it looks, for “primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding”(Heidegger; 1962). However, as a characteristic of Fallenness, this tendency towards seeing – Curiosity –“concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen ...but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty”(Heidegger; 1962). This kind of seeing is different from the pure perception which he earlier identified with Dasein. In the test of validity, this mode of seeing lays no claim to the truth of what is the issue. Its *raison d’être* finds explanation in the restlessness; the

character of never dwelling anywhere, that characterizes curiosity(Heidegger; 1962). Sequel to this, such Dasein is distracted from the truth. It is everywhere and nowhere. We can therefore surmise that curiosity “concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known”(Heidegger; 1962).

AMBIGUITY (ZWEIDEUTIGKEIT)

In Dasein's everyday Being-with-one-another, it encounters situations of *ali alia dicunt* (some say this; others that) in which it becomes difficult to disclose what is and what is not. This situation is what Heidegger refers to as ‘Ambiguity.’ Thus, he writes: “we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not”(Heidegger; 1962). This situation, just like in the case of curiosity, creates in Dasein the character of “never dwelling anywhere”(Heidegger; 1962). Heidegger puts this right when he expresses this situation as that in which “everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is”(Heidegger; 1962). Ambiguity not only affects Dasein's disclosedness, it stifles its possibilities. Because Ambiguity concerns Dasein's everyday Being-with-one-another, Heidegger projects the “they” as the progenitor of ambiguity. To buttress this, he writes:

Thus Dasein's understanding in the “they” is constantly going wrong (versieht s?where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep ‘things moving’, where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at bottom nothing) is happening(Heidegger; 1962).

CHARACTERISTICS OF FALLING BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Having detailed the characteristics of Fallenness, Heidegger loosely explains certain phenomena that characterize the specific kind of Being which belongs to falling. They are as follows:

TEMPTATION (VERSUCHERISCH)

Heidegger relates ‘Temptation’ to idle talk because *ipso facto* fallen Being maintains a kind of Being-in-the-world of its existence, it is characterized by a kind of understanding and interpretation that less emphasize self-appropriation/mineness of what is understood. Therefore, Dasein's tendency/disposition to this in its everydayness is what Heidegger refers to as temptation. Thus, he writes: “But if Dasein itself, in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the ‘they’ and falling into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling”(Heidegger; 1962).

TRANQUILLIZING (BERUHIGEND)

Falling Being-in-the-world is also tranquillizing, albeit pejoratively construed. In this context, Heidegger expresses ‘Tranquility’ as a supposition in Dasein. Due to Dasein's inability to make ‘mine’ what is understood (idle talk) and the difficulty to disclose what is and what is not (ambiguity), it “develops a supposition that...can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine, and full.” Tranquillization is used in the pejorative sense because it refers not to a mood of emotional relaxation but to a mood of carefreeness in which a person enjoys only those abilities in which an undisturbed, full life consists(Heidegger; 1962). Tranquility does not bring about rest/inactivity in fallen Being, rather it drives one into uninhibited ‘hustle,’ which B. Shaw further explains as a mode in which life guards itself, and protects itself against anything that would threaten it in any form(Heidegger; 1962).

ALIENATION (ENTFREMDUNG)

Alienation, according to Heidegger, “cannot mean that Dasein gets factually torn away from itself”(Heidegger; 1962) as in the feeling of losing self-belonging either to the self or to a group. Instead, Heidegger's alienation translates Dasein's drift towards the understanding or ‘exaggerated self-dissection’ of its limitless/infinite abilities that “its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it”(Heidegger; 1962).

ENTANGLEMENT (VERFANGT)

This is the last character of falling Being. Dasein, having been closed-off by alienation from its authenticity and possibility, it is been forced into its inauthenticity, that is to say, “into a possible kind of Being of itself”(Heidegger; 1962). This is what Heidegger refers to as Dasein getting in itself.

III. CONCLUSION

The major preoccupation of this research is majorly on Martin Heidegger's analysis of *Fallenness* especially on the view that it is one of the ontological structures of Dasein, essential to it as a Being-in and a Being-with and again, on the view that it constitutes Dasein's lost of itself and absorption into the world of its

concern. Therefore, this research is restricted to Heidegger's metaphysics. In his metaphysics, this study focuses on his three ontological traits of Dasein's care but is limited, still, to his analysis of *Fallenness* as the third structure.

Man, not out of his own choice and desires found himself in the world with all the circumstances and limitations surrounding man's existence in his world. Meanwhile, the circumstances and limitations are meant to facilitate man's realization and actualization of himself in the world. This accomplishment result into authenticity of life. However, when the individual man surrendered himself and allows the circumstances and vassitude of life to swallow him, his existence will, nevertheless, geared to nothingness; and this, Martin Heidegger termed inauthenticity of life.

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