



Research Paper

## “Soldier of Fortune”: From Intellectualist to Strategist in the Establishment and Consolidation of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty in Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century

Shettima Bukar Kullima, Abdullahi Garba and Ibrahim Alhaji Modu  
*Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Maiduguri*

### ABSTRACT

*Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi's ascendancy to throne was to some extent opportunistic in the sense that he capitalised on a dwindling power of once a mighty kingdom led by great warriors - the Saifawa Mais. He succeeded in re-establishing the Kingdom of Borno for the Saifawa rulers which later provided him a fertile ground to portray himself as a soldier of fortune which consequently enabled him to exercise leadership through intellectualism. Even though, he did not claim full authority, he was literally the de facto ruler of Borno, a great kingdom which he bequeathed to his successors. This chapter examines the role of al-Amin al-Kanemi in restoring the Saifawa rule in Borno and setting the pace for the emergence of the al-Kanemi dynasty. The methodology adopted in writing this chapter is qualitative method which uses primary and secondary data which is critically analysed. Resulting from this research, the strategies employed and deployed by al-Kanemi in establishing his dynasty were highlighted. He used his vast knowledge and pedigree in scheming aspects of military, administration, diplomacy and integration which made him tactician in the realms of affairs of Borno. This chapter concludes that al-Kanemi was the greatest ruler in the history of Borno who could only be compared with rulers like Mai Ali Ghaji who founded the Borno Empire and Idris Alauma whose reign helped Borno to reach its nadir.*

**KEYWORDS:** *al-Kanemi, de facto ruler, dynasty, Fulani and Saifawa.*

*Received 26 April, 2021; Revised: 08 May, 2021; Accepted 10 May, 2021 © The author(s) 2021.  
Published with open access at [www.questjournals.org](http://www.questjournals.org)*

### I. INTRODUCTION

The concluding parts of the 18<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries precipitated the Saifawa to a position of decline. These periods witnessed array of problems ranging from decline in economic prosperity, political supremacy, maladministration, emergence of weak successors to the throne and docile military policy (Cohen: 1967; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974). These circumstances exposed Borno to an unprecedented vulnerability in the Central *Bilad al-Sudan* system. It occasioned former dependencies and vassal states to stage a rebellion against the Saifawa overlordship (Clarke: 1982). This culminated in declaration of independence by states like Baghirmi, Wadai and Mandara among others (Trimingham: 1962; Clarke: 1982). Similarly, as a result of this development, the military became overstretched, and its efficacy declined. Worst still, the accession to the Saifawa throne by Mai Ahmad Ibn Ali who was aged, blind and feeble coupled with the rising of powerful and ambitions internal and external rivals (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Clarke: 1982).

With the economic down-fall and the weakness of the armed forces in place, the resident Fulani elements in Borno's western dependencies quickly capitalized on the situation to receive flag from Uthman Ibn Fodio and waged a rebellion in form of Jihad against the Saifawa in 1808 (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980; Clarke: 1982). Consequently, the capital of Borno, Birni Ngazargamo was sacked and the Mai, Mai Ahmad Ibn Ali was forced to become a fugitive (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980; Clarke: 1982). Later, he was succeeded by his son, Mai Dunama Ibn Ahmad Ibn Ali who himself suffered the gun boots of the Fulani under the leadership of Gwoni Muktar and latter Ibrahim Zaki in 1811 (Trimingham: 1962; Sa'ad: 1980). Incidentally too, Mai Dunoma fled the capital, Ngazargamo and took refuge in the territory of Muhammad al-Kanemi, a Kanumbu scholar resident in Ngala (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973).

Furthermore, on both occasions of the Fulani attacks, al-Kanemi offered to assist in repelling the “Fulani invaders” and consequently reinstated the Saifawa Mais on throne. Despite his power and influence up to this period, al-Kanemi was literally the “*de facto*” ruler of Borno in that he did not assume full position of leadership but had stuck a seal for himself as an insignia of authority in 1814 (Brenner: 1973). His rise to prominence reduced the power of the beleaguered Saifawa rulers in Borno and enshrined the preparatory grounds for al-Kanemi focusing more attention on consolidation and expansion of Borno’s power so as to attain its lost glory and supremacy in the Central Sudan balance of power (Cohen: 1967; Brenner: 1973). The major pre-occupation of his administration was central on establishing a formidable military organisation which is well equipped and motivated. In order to achieve this feat, he entered into diplomacy with militarily powerful states such as the Ottomans, Fez, Wadai, Baghirmi, Murzuk and the local sedentary communities such as Buduma, Kwoyam, Shuwa Arab etc ((Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa’ad: 1980). The idea behind this was to develop and solidify the military might of the kingdom and to have effective allies who could support his course whenever the need arises. The reason for this his action was probably not unconnected with his experiences of the Fulani attacks under the defunct Saifawa dynasty where he was contacted for support on three occasions.

### **Emergence of Al-Kanemi in Borno Politics**

By the opening of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, events started speeding up for Borno as the military machine of the Saifawa dynasty began to crumble. This is as a result of the confusions that existed within the military establishment after the most-scotching defeat Borno suffered in the hands of the Mandara forces in 1781 (Clarke: 1982). Further to that, the vassal states of Baghirmi and Wadai among others started to cause troubles in the face of crack and disarray in the military and administrative edifices. Such interludes, undoubtedly must not have been untouched the military supremacy of Borno in the Central Sudan system.

The Jihad uprising in Hausa land provided a fertile grounds for those Fulani resident in Borno that were disenchanted with the administration of the Saifawa especially its economic policies to revolt against the overlordship of the feudatories (Benisheikh: 1983). Quickly, the Fulani in Borno received flag from the purveyor of the jihad movement in Hausa land, Usman Ibn Fodio (Brenner: 1973; Sa’ad: 1980). The head of the Fulani in Southern Borno, Goni Muktar after receiving the flag carried out hijra from Gujba to Wurobokki just as his mentor Usman Ibn Fodio did from Degel to Gudu in accordance with the prophetic tradition (Sa’ad: 1980). However, earlier on, the Fulani in the Western dependences of Borno such as Auyo, Teshena and Nguru led by Ardo Abdure and Ardo Largema had in the same vein paid allegiance to Usman Ibn Fodio (Sa’ad: 1980).

At Warobokki, Gwoni Muktar and his followers stormed Borno’s capital, Ngazargarmo in 1808 (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa’ad: 1980; Clarke: 1982). The ruler, Mai Ahmad Ibn Ali who was old, blind and feeble took up to his heels and became a fugitive in Ngala where a Kanembu scholar of great repute, Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi resides. Describing the unceremonious exit on the throne of Mai Ahmad Ibn Ali, Brenner (1973) said “the once mighty kingdom was in a state of chaos and on the brink of collapse.” Similarly, the incident of the Fulani attack on Borno, by and large, checked the credibility of the military on one hand and efficacy of the Saifawa administration and hegemony on the other hand.

While at Ngala, the embattled Mai Ahmad sought the support of al-Kanemi in order to retake the lost capital in the hands of the “imperial Fulani”. The combine forces of Borno army and the al-Kanemi’s Kanumbu and Sugurti spear men attacked, defeated and killed Goni Mukhtar (Brenner: 1973; Sa’ad: 1980). This consequently resulted in the reinstatement of Mai Ahmad Ibn Ali to the throne. As a matter of fact, the Mai rewarded al-Kanemi handsomely for his support with gift of cows, slaves, etc (Brenner: 1973). In 1811, the second attack was launched by the Fulani against Borno. This time led by Ibrahim Zaki, son of the Imam of Shira who established his capital at Katagum (Sa’ad: 1980). The Mai at that time, Dunoma Ibn Ali succeeded his father to the throne and could not also survive the onslaught of the Fulani as he himself was whisked away from the capital and took refuge in Ngala area under al-Kanemi (Brenner: 1973; Sa’ad: 1980). For the second time, al-Kanemi became a saviour as he offered to assist Borno with pre-conditions. The conditions among others were his request to have a track of land ranging from Ngala to Ngurno (Brenner: 1973). The embattled Dunoma could not have but accepted the request. Hence, al-Kanemi’s forces with that of the remnants of Borno attacked Ibrahim Zaki consequently deposed and killed him (Brenner: 1973; Sa’ad: 1980).

With the re-enthronement of Dunoma, he rewarded al-Kanemi who was himself a soldier of fortune with cows, slaves, money and the land he earlier requested (Brenner: 1973). Again, for the third time the Fulani onslaught was launched against Borno. This time, led by Muhammad Manga Ibn Goni Muktar but was repelled by al-Kanemi (Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa’ad: 1980). Manga’s attack could be interpreted as vengeance over his father’s assassination by the Borno warriors. Following these three incidences, al-Kanemi’s intervention in the time of needs of Borno’s survival had apparently indicated that his influence in the political terrain of Borno kingdom had undoubtedly began to wax stronger. However, controversies started in the

political arena of Borno which led to the dethronement of Dunama Ibn Ali and replaced him with Muhammad Ngileruma who eventually transferred the capital from Birni Ngazargamo to Birni Kafela or Birni Jadid (Brenner: 1973). Ngileruma's reign in Borno was quite brief. He was dethroned by the king makers for whatever reason and reinstated the deposed Dunoma again (Brenner: 1973). This political drama was probably not without the consent of the *de facto* ruler of Borno, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi.

### **Al-Kanemi's Military Strategy and Tactics**

Al-Kanemi having assumed power as the *de facto* ruler of Borno in the second decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, ruling side-by-side with the Saifawa rulers, he was more or less compelled to be pragmatic on the issue of establishing a formidable military organisation. This was possibly informed by his experience from the Saifawa rulers who came to seek for his support on several occasions. Al-Kanemi's first pre-occupation was to re-organise the military formations and personnel in the system (Cohen and Brenner: 1974).

In the defensive frontier, al-Kanemi made some administrative reforms to ensure absolute loyalty and allegiance from the provincial areas of Borno. He sacked the Galadima in Nguru which was the headquarters of the western frontier of Borno and also, the centre of command and control and transferred to Bursari in the north. The essence of this shuffle was to bring the command and control centre to relatively closer to his newly established capital, Kukawa for effective administration and supervision. With the changing influence, the office, power and the nomenclature of the Galadima; governor of the western frontier of Borno and Kaigama who was hitherto the Commander in-Chief of the imperial army ceased to exist (Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974). The reason for this was that some of the Galadimas who emerged after the Fulani rebellion appeared to have been recalcitrant to the administration. For instance, Galadima Umar, the son of Galadima Mai Dunoma was in conflict with al-Kanemi over the execution of Sarki Dan Hauwa, the ruler of Gumel, a vassal state of Borno (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Sa'ad: 1980). It could be that, that led to the introduction of the office of the Kachallah as the Commander-in-Chief of the imperial army. Although, Brenner (1973) has observed that the change took effect during the reign of Shehu Umar, but it could be recalled that Kachallah Bilal used the title of Kaigama instead of Kachallah. The reason for this summersault was not clearly pointed out by Brenner. This view was supported by Alkali (1983) who asserted that the office of Kaigama survived during the al-Kanemi dynasty. It could be that Bilal used the opportunity of his close relationship with the Shehu, hence, the latter overlooked it. Conversely, it might be that Bilal preferred to use the title of Kaigama so as to preserve the sanctity of the position which had attributes of effectiveness, efficiency and successfulness in warfare.

During the al-Kanemi era, issues of defense and administrative responsibilities were serious issues of state concern taken care of by the “council”. The councilors or the principal advisers to al-Kanemi were; Mallam Tirab, Mallam Tatali, Haji Sudani, Ahmad Gonimi, Ibrahim Wadama and Shettima Kubri (Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Tijani: 2010). These council members were not ordinary men but sagacious scholars who took part in al-Kanemi's strategic designs to become a prominent person in Borno. They were part of major state decisions relating to military appointments, postings and the conduct of war. Importantly, these council members participated in wars themselves (Brenner: 1973).

Closely associated to this was the intellectual warfare adopted by al-Kanemi. As a matter of fact, he did not directly confront his enemies without their prior knowledge (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973). Al-Kanemi as a learned person communicated by correspondences to most of his neighbours he was at war with, justifying the legality or illegality of the action that might or must have been taken (Brenner: 1973). For instance, several correspondences ensued between Borno and some of her neighbours like Sokoto and Gumel (Brenner: 1973; Sa'ad: 1980). Physical confrontation was seen as al-Kanemi's last resort when intellectual diplomacy failed, and has exhausted all avenues toward peace. He did not allow sentiments, empty rivalries and envy to influence his actions against his foes (Cohen and Brenner: 1974). Such qualities enabled al-Kanemi to painstakingly assessed issues that were capable of causing trouble among kingdoms. This was evident in various correspondences between Borno and other polities especially with Sokoto Caliphate, Fezzan, Gumel, Wadai among others (Tijani: 2010). This clearly manifested the use of intellectual maturity in dealing with his subjects and other communities. The analysis here infers conformity with Tijani's quotation where he cited Brenner (1973):

“Al-Kanemi himself is reputed not for the depth of his scholarship, but also for his sterling qualities of honesty, sincerity and fear of God- qualities which recommend one for leadership in a Muslim community”.

Mysticism was part of the strategy used for military fortune in wars that ensued between Borno and the Fulani forces. In confronting the Fulani Jihadists, al-Kanemi employed spiritual means by secluding himself in prayers for forty days for the fortune of Borno soldiers against the Fulani Jihadists. According to Brenner (1973), a certain formula was written on a calabash and was smashed down when the two warren troops were about to engage one another. It was believed that the smashing of the mystified calabash gave the Borno warriors an unprecedented advantage over the Fulani Jihadists in all their encounters (Brenner: 1973). It is generally observed that divinity in the execution of warfare was seen as an integral part of Borno's system.

Diplomatic intercourse played an immense role in Borno's defense policy. As a person with lot of experiences who traversed across many borders, he understood the dynamics of international politics. As a result of this, he actively made Borno to be inclusive in the political arena of the *Bilad al-Sudan* and beyond particularly with the Maghreb, Murzuk and Egypt, not only for Islamic scholarship but for military purposes. The *raison d'être* for this was because of his belief that no nation is an Island of its own and he also appreciated the theory of comparative advantage of nations. Conduct of war requires military training, preparation in mental, practical and spiritual realms, arms and ammunitions. It was against this background that al-Kanemi effectively utilized the existing diplomatic relationship with his neighbours and allies to obtain the needed weapons and support (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973). He used the Ottoman influence in acquiring weapons and personnel in subduing threats from his immediate rival neighbours such as Wadai, Baghirmi, Mandara, Ngizem etc (Trimingham: 1962; Brenner: 1973; Sa'ad: 1980). His policy was akin to that of America's "no permanent friend no permanent enemy but permanent interest" as evidenced in wars in Hausa land and Wadai where his arch-enemy Baghirmi's support war sought for.

Undoubtedly, it is worth noting here that, like his predecessors who ruled Borno before the dynastic change, particularly Mai Idris Alauma who took Borno to its zenith, al-Kanemi had established a standing army with an elaborate regimental hierarchy of command and established new military outposts (Sa'ad:1980). For instance, as the spates of threats to Borno's overlordship in the western dependences became acute following the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate, al-Kanemi initiated a policy of establishing military outposts or garrisons at Bursari, Gujba and Biriri as from 1835 to check the adventurous interest from the western and southern dependences (Sa'ad: 1980). These garrisons were headed by regimental commanders to check the excesses and possible invasions from the western and southern frontiers of Borno (Cohen: 1967; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980). The army was headed by an official called Kachalla who had trappings of servile origin (Cohen: 1967; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980). The office of the Kachalla who was the Commander in-Chief of the imperial army was hereditary. He was appointed based on competence, bravery and personal loyalty to the authority. The Kachalla issued command subject to the approval of the Shehu and his council. He was assisted by sub-ordinates who took care of the garrisons located at different quarters. It is possible to suggest that al-Kanemi had decided to continue with Sayfawa tradition of titles of some sub-commanders such as Zanna, Chima-Kura, Chima-Gana and Zarma among others.

#### **Al-Kanemi's Wars and Military Alliances**

Al-Kanemi's wars were relatively defined according to the circumstance of the time. Some of his wars were for defensive, expansion and enforcing the suzerainty and ideals of Borno on her vassals. When al-Kanemi assumed power in Borno he brought old royalty and nobility under his control and went further to concentrate his effort in ensuring Borno's dominance in the Central Sudan (Trimingham: 1962; Cohen: 1967; Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Clarke: 1982). Quiet naturally, he faced the problem of external threats from all directions in order to safeguard Borno's frontiers and to restore the lost glory (Sa'ad: 1980). Earlier on, he succeeded in removing the Fulani threat in Borno which caused the regime change from Saifawa to al-Kanemi dynasty in the second decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and also led to the demographic shift of the capital of Borno from Birni Ngazargamo to Kukawa (Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980).

Al-Kanemi like the Saifawa Mais and particularly Mai Idris Alooma (571-1603) entered into friendly relations with foreign partners for the purpose of military and trade among others. In North Africa al-Kanemi's first concern was with Tripoli under Pasha Yusuf Karamanli who had annexed Fezzan and appointed Mukni as a governor (Brenner: 1973). Al-Kanemi's strategy in winning over Yusuf Karamanli to his side was the use of his personal ties with Fezzan in a well prepared letter in which al-Kanemi requested Karamanli to recognize al-Kanemi's proprietary right over some family property he owns in Fezzan, the land of his mother's birth. In the same letter, al-Kanemi also asked for military assistance to deal with the military problem facing Borno i.e. the threat posed by Baghirmi, Wadai and Mandara. Al-Kanemi obtained the support of Yusuf Karamanli who dispatched to Borno a military detachment from his Fezzan base under the command of his governor, al-Mukni. It was with these forces according to Brenner (1973) and Tijani (2010) that al-Kanemi subdued Kotoko City State of Ngulfai in 1819. Al-Kanemi further requested an additional force of 2,500 troops to pacify the south eastern frontiers of Borno. It was by this time that he subdued the rest of the south eastern frontiers (Tijani: 2010).

Sheikh Yamnuk the Shuwa Arab leader who rebelled against Borno was attacked by al-Mukni and his allies, the Dagana Arabs but the Borno forces were routed in the encounter (Tijani: 2010). In addition al-Kanemi's forces engaged Baghirmi on three separate occasions in 1822, 1824 and finally subdued kingdoms of Baghirmi, Gulfai and Gawi (Cohen and Brenner: 1974). Al-Kanemi made use of two cannons carried by Major Denham, a 19<sup>th</sup> century European explorer ensued the victory of al-Kanemi over Baghirmi in 1824 (Brenner: 1973; Tijani: 2010).

Wadai again, to the east, has been causing sleepless nights to Borno particularly under its ruler Sultan Abdal-Karim Sabun. It could be recalled that in 1810, Wadai under its ruler Caliph Mele Kura seized Kanem from Borno. Thus, in order to reassert Kanem from Wadai, al-Kanemi resorted to the use of diplomacy. His alliance first with the Fezzanis in 1820's and latter with the Aulad-Sulayman Arab in the 1830's was aimed at checking the activities of Wadai in Kanem and neutralising its threats to Borno (Sa'ad: 1980). With these alliances, Borno secured large cache of arms and ammunitions, military experts and mercenaries from Fezzan to silence Wadai.

Having conquered Baghirmi and Wadai in the east he turned his attention to the western part of the empire al-Kanemi turned his attention to his arch rivals, the Fulani whose emirate of Hadejia, Katagum, Gombe and Gombina?; that surrounded Borno to the west and south. Although there seemed to be no Fulani incursion into Borno since 1811, but the possibility of such cannot be ruled out since there was no any formal treaty reached between Borno and the Fulani; either as a group or on a wider perspective under the auspices of the Sokoto Caliphate. Al-Kanemi had to embark on campaign against the western dependencies in order to avoid such emirate owe allegiance to the newly established Sokoto Caliphate. By doing so, he stopped the possibility of these territories to be claimed by the Sokoto since the area remained “no- man's land” since the outbreak of the “Fulani rebellion”. Al-Kanemi drove Muhammad Manga to Kano (Brenner: 1973; Tijani: 2010; Sa'ad: 1980). He then pushed his army towards Damaturu where he dealt with the forces of the ‘Black Shuwa’ and killer their leader, Lawan Kwana (Brenner: 1973; Cohen and Brenner: 1974). Al-Kanemi encounter with Sarki Yakubu of Bauchi ended in a deadlock (Sa'ad: 1980). The resistance of Mallam Fannami, the chief of the Manga community was silenced by the use of prayers and canons brought by Major Denham (Cohen and Brenner: 1974). Thus, by 1824, Al-Kanemi regained control of these territories and established his own authority over them (Sa'ad: 1980).

In the northern frontier, al-Kanemi focused his attention on the dependences of Damagaram, Munio and Gumel which were hitherto under the control of the Galadima (Sa'ad: 1980). He succeeded in regaining Borno's control in the north except Gumel where it ruler Sarki Dan Hauwa who declared independence from Borno with the collapse of Nguru. Consequently, in 1828, Sarki Dan Hauwa capitulated to the forces of Borno (Cohen and Brenner: 1974; Sa'ad: 1980)). He was apprehended and sent to the Galadima as captive. Gumel under Muhammadu Dan Tanoma, who succeeded the former, became directly answerable to the Shehu in Kukawa (Sa'ad: 1980).

## II. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we can say that Borno under the Al-Kanemi dynasty survived up to 1893 on account of her sophisticated military organisation headed by the Kachellas under the authorities of the Shehu. It is notwithstanding that military alliances entered into by al-Kanemi with friendly neighbors; the Turks and other communities such as the Arabs dwelling in Borno yielded positive results. The training of Borno troops by foreign experts in addition to sophisticated weapons that were imported and administered ensured victory in Borno's military encounters with the enemies of the kingdom. Introduction of mercenaries was also a factor to reckon with in the success of the imperial army. It could as well be added that the strategy employed by the rulers of Borno ensured success in her military encounters with the enemies of the kingdom. However, the application of spiritual means for the fortunes of the army and volunteers in their various encounters contributed immensely in the execution of the kingdom's wars. The efficacy of the military machine nurtured and developed by the Saifawa Mais was adapted to some extent, though with few modifications in terms of nomenclature and role of officers by the al-Kanemi dynasty found to be effective. But in the cause of time, the military might of the kingdom suffered catastrophic setbacks as a result of the emergence of weak rulers, succession disputes, dwindling economic conditions and foreign invasion in 1893 onwards. Finally, it was the splendid military organisation and might of the kingdom that actively guaranteed Borno's position as a dominant power in the Central Bilad al-Sudan in the period covered by this paper.

## REFERENCES

- [1]. Abdulkadir Benisheikh, (1983), “The Revenue System of the Government of Borno in the Nineteenth Century”, in Bala Usman and Nur Alkali (eds.), *Studies in Pre-Colonial History of Borno*, Zaria; Northern Nigerian Publishing Company.
- [2]. B. G. Martin, (1962), “Five letters from Tripoli Archives” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 2, No. 3.
- [3]. Louis Brenner, (1973), *The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the Al-Kanemi dynasty of Bornu*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- [4]. Hamidu Bobboyi and John Hunwick, (1995), “Borno Wadai and Adamawa”, in J. O. Hunwick and R. S. O'Fahey (eds.), *Arabic Literature of Africa: The writings of Central Sudanic Africa*, Vol. 2, London, Brill Academic Publishers.
- [5]. J. S. Trimmingham, (1962), *A History of Islam in West Africa*, London, Oxford University Press.
- [6]. M. N. Alkali, (2013), *Kanem- Borno Under the Sayfawa: a Study of the Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty (891-1846)* Maiduguri, Borno Sahara and Sudan Series, Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- [7]. Peter B. Clarke, (1982), *West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, London, Edward Arnold.
- [8]. Ronald Cohen, and Louis Brenner, (1974), “Borno in the Nineteenth Century”, in Ajayi, J. F. A., and Crowder, M., *History of West Africa*, vol. II, London, Longman.

- [9]. Ronald Cohen, (1967), *The Kanuri of Bornu*, New York, Reinhart and Winston.
- [10]. Sa’ad Abubakar, (1980), “Borno in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century” in Ikime, O., (ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Ibadan, Heinemann.
- [11]. Kyari Tijani, (2010), *Dynamics of Administrative Change in Pre-Colonial Borno: A Comparative Study of the Sayfawa and al-Kanemi Dynasties*, Maiduguri, Borno Sahara and Sudan Series, Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences.