



Research Paper

## The Battle of Alcácer-Quibir in the African Perspective

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**ABSTRACT:** This study was carried out for the attainment of a postdoctoral and its main objective is to study the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir, which took place on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1578, in Morocco, between the Portuguese and Moroccan Armies. For this purpose, the research established a methodology that allowed for drawing up a theoretical framework of the concepts about war, strategy, battle and combat. From the findings of the theoretical framework, emanates the collective memory of Morocco that imbued with the spirit of solidarity, which was consolidated after the victory against the Portuguese Royal Army. Since then, the Moroccan state has consolidated its sovereignty, which only came to lose it in 1912, before the French Army. However, Morocco retook its sovereignty after a prolonged fight against the foreign occupant - French Colonial State – for 44 years, of which from 1921 it began to act with tactics of guerrilla war. Finally, in 1956, Morocco succeeded in restoring its independence from the French and Spanish states. In 1961, the City of Casablanca hosted the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies - CONCEP - which subsequently caused the emergence of liberation movements in Africa, where Mozambique was present, through nationalist movements that were flourishing and consolidating in the national territory. This research is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter contains the introduction; the second chapter covers the theoretical and conceptual framework; the third chapter presents the structure and analysis of the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir; the fourth chapter analyzes the National Liberation Struggle of African countries, taking into account the experiences and organization of FRELIMO; the fifth chapter presents the research methodology used in the study; the sixth chapter presents the contours of the field study carried out in Alcácer-Quibir and Lisbon; the seventh chapter analyzes and discusses the findings of field research. Finally, the eighth chapter presents the final considerations, conclusion, and recommendations.

**KEYWORD:** Alcácer-Quibir; King Dom Sebastião; African Perspective; and FRELIMO.

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### I. INTRODUCTION

This study is a research on the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir which took place in 1578, from an African perspective. In the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, African countries were involved, especially Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria, as well as Portugal, the then country with expansionist tendencies. The battle of Alcácer-Quibir occurred, in the summer of 1578, between the Portuguese State led by King D. Sebastião and Morocco.

A relevant element that makes the battle of Alcácer-Quibir important in the literature on Military History has to do with repercussions that it had in the European continent, in that period, mainly due to the participation of mercenaries contracted by the Portuguese entities of that period. According to the book “Battles of the History of Portugal, Loss of the Independence of Alcácer-Quibir 1578-1783” of Prof. Dr. Carlos Margaça Veiga, the foreign mercenaries had come to thicken the Portuguese royal forces.

The mercenaries came from Spain, Germany and Italy. The Battle of Alcácer-Quibir was a military event that left a significant collective memory both in Portugal and in Morocco, as it was a defeat for Portugal. The death of king D. Sebastião, in Alcácer-Quibir, created a crisis of succession of the throne and led Portugal to finally lose the independence for the Kingdom of Spain. Thus, the period that goes, from 1580 to 1640, Portugal was under the dominion of the kingdom of Spain. The research sought to make an academic contribution to further expand the knowledge of the reasons and motivations of the European incursions to the north of Africa that culminated with the conquest of Tangier and Ceuta, until the battle of Alcácer-Quibir.

We seek to find out whether there are, and what are the connections that can explain the Political-Military situations that occurred in 1578, and the subsequent battles as well as the role of countries such as

Algeria in the defeat of France. The research seeks to study the Arab military strategies that defeated Europeans in different battles, and their influence in the Liberation Movement of Mozambique, which culminated in the victory over Portuguese colonialism in 1974.

The object of this study was to analyze the battle of Alcácer-Quibir that took place in the summer of 1578. It is a military historical event that involved Portugal and Morocco. It was about the involvement of a Portuguese Christian army and a Muslim, on the side of the Moroccans; An army with expansionist and colonial intentions and another with nationalist resistance. In this context, the battle of Alcácer-Quibir ended up being a military event with repercussion throughout Europe due to the participation of mercenaries who came to support the Portuguese army. All these conditions make the battle of Alcácer-Quibir one of the most important events in the history of military studies and wars.

The research objectives of this research are: Establish a theoretical framework of the main reasons for the Portuguese defeat in the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, and from an African perspective, using the classic theorists of military studies; Contribute for the understanding of the reasons behind the Portuguese defeat in the National Liberation Armed Struggle in Mozambique from 1964 to 1974, after winning the colonial occupation combats during the secular national resistance; ascertain the relationship between tactical and technical military action in the war for independence in Mozambique between 1964 -1974 and the Portuguese defeat in Alcácer-Quibir in 1578, considering the military training of Frelimo guerrillas in Algeria.

The battle of Alcácer-Quibir brought a series of catastrophic consequences for the Portuguese national economy, politics and sovereignty, as previously mentioned. This military event left deep and significant marks in the Portuguese and Moroccan collective memory. The Portuguese defeat against the Arabs brings to the fore a series of strategic mistakes that happened again in future military events in which the Portuguese state was especially involved with actors who had contact with the parties involved in the battle of Alcácer-Quibir. The saga of defeats mentioned above is repeated before other European powers that had military confrontations with actors of the north of Africa who were involved in the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, such as the case of France in Algeria in 1962.

The Mozambique Liberation Front had contact and training with one of the actors who participated in the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, and successfully managed in carrying out a successful armed national liberation struggle against Portugal. Based on the aspects presented above, the problem of this study focuses on the following question: how to establish the theoretical framework of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, from an African perspective, focusing on the influence of this military event on the struggle for liberation of nationalist and national resistance movements that had contact with it?

The main motivation for carrying out this study lies firstly on, the need to discover the motivation and contours of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir of 1578, between the Portuguese and Moroccan armies; secondly, the need to systematize the impact of this event, in Europe and in the African countries; and thirdly, to analyze the influence that this event had on the processes of independence struggles in Africa, taking as an empirical case the process of armed struggle for liberation in Mozambique.

The research and dissemination of findings of this nature will contribute to the expansion of a more objective knowledge and closer to the reality of the phenomena and the contours of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, and can constitute a useful theoretical and informational instrument as well as a set of strategic and educational lessons, for future generations, when confronted with the possible situations of military conflicts and strategic decision-making needs.

From the scientific, academic and pedagogical point of views, this research aims at inspiring future researches for deepening and broadening the political, historical and military knowledge of the regions and the contours of national liberation struggles, in non-Arab African countries, but which had political, military and diplomatic support, as in the case of Morocco and Algeria, which supported the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), in the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial system, between 1964 and 1974.

This research is organized into eight parts. The first one is the introduction, which includes the objectives of the research, the research problem and the organization of the study. The second chapter deals with issues related to the strategies and modes of war, as well as the description of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir. The third chapter presents the structure and analysis of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir. The fourth chapter presents and discusses the intrinsic aspects of the national liberation struggles of African countries. The fifth chapter presents the procedures, clippings and questions of research methodology. The sixth chapter reports the contours of field research, incorporating preliminary considerations and analyzes. The seventh chapter presents the analysis and dimensions of field research findings. The eighth chapter presents the final considerations, conclusions and recommendations for future studies. In each of the chapters a preliminary conclusion is presented. At the end, the alphabetical form, the complete list of bibliographic references and the following annexes are presented: List of documents studied in the research; Examples of data analysis process by analysis category, in matrix model; Case study protocol; Analysis model

## II. CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual framework that guided this study. The theoretical and conceptual framework aim fundamentally at studying the phenomenon of war and of the strategy that was related to the research object and the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir. It directly reflects war theory and presents theoretical contextualization, the main classical, modern and contemporary theoretical contributions, and the preliminary conclusions of this chapter.

There is a considerable scholarly production framed in the efforts of theorizing the wars throughout the classical, renaissance, modern and contemporary periods. Much of this theoretical production focuses on the search for “interpretation about the nature of the war, its causes, its political and social framework, and of course, its conduct which is a specialized subject of the military area” (Correia, 2018: 49)

The focus on the field of military studies and strategies in order to find mechanisms to overcome wars, reflection on the study of wars passed from political sciences, social sciences, international relations and other related areas. The contributions of these studies enabled the creation of theoretical tools and a grammar of its own, to deal with the phenomenon of war in its various dimensions. The theory is one “nothing more than a systematic reflection on the phenomena intended to explain them and to show how they are related to one another in a meaningful and intelligent pattern” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997: 15). In this case, war theory is an intellectual and systematic effort to explain the phenomenon of war. It is a social and political phenomenon that accompanies the process of evolution of humanity, that is, “wars are a recurring phenomenon, it seems to be inherent in the system of states” (David, 2001: 109). Thus, its study is important for the understanding of all processes of construction, promotion and maintenance of peace. “The abundant literature is not consensual about a definition of war” (David, 2001: 110).

The war has been the object of study by several authors; this work presents the developers of modern strategy. The discussions on the concept of warfare are rather vast. According to Gaston Bouthoul (1991: 32), “war is a bloody armed struggle between organized groups”. In the perspective of this theoretician the war is carried out for political reasons where open violence and weapons are used effectively. In a narrow conceptual perspective, war is an armed conflict between enemies with irreconcilable or incompatible political goals where brute force is used to achieve victory and destruction of the adversary (Moreau Defarges, 1990: 233-235).

In objective conception, according to Boulding, in his book “Conflict and Defense” published in 1962, conflict is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the possible positions in which each of them wants to occupy a position that is incompatible to the one that the other party wants to occupy. In subjective conception, according to John Burton, in his book “Conflict and Communication” published in 1969, conflict is “the result of a misinterpretation of an objective situation, understood in terms of incompatible situation.”

According to Dinstein (2004: 21), “war is a hostile interaction between two or more states, whether in a technical or material sense. The war in the technical sense is the formal status produced by a declaration of war. The war in the formal sense is generated by the use of armed force that must be extensive and carried out by at least one of the parties in conflict”. Another theoretical contribution to the understanding of the war phenomenon is found in Ned Willmot (1979). For this theorist, the strategy of war first concerns the formulation of politics, that is; involves the relationship among war objectives, maintenance of establishments, maintenance or connection with alliances at the political level, and use of resources to achieve the military objective. On the other hand, war tactics is a method of fighting, employing and maneuvering, to ensure an immediate goal that is part of the strategic plan.

The strategy of war as a whole has not changed over time, but the tactic with the great dependence on methods and meaning has changed (Willmot, 1979: 10). There are several ways of presenting war typologies. According to David (2001: 111-112, wars can be intentional when they occur among several countries. Intrastate wars, when they occur within a country among non-state actors such as the cases of revolutionary wars, wars of national liberation or guerrilla warfare; wars may be short, long or indeterminate, according to their duration; wars can be total or limited according to the strategy of facing and defeating the enemy and the geographical dimensions; wars can be classic or modern according to the methods used.

Sun Tzu (544 a.c.-496 BC) Sum Tzu (544 BC) is one of the Chinese general’s strategist and philosopher who is inescapable in the study of war and military strategy. Many see Sun Tzu as the “precursor of military strategic thinking” (Correia, 2017: 30). In his work *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu presents an interesting discussion of war as art and advances the foundations and assumptions of the conceptualization of war by modern theories.

Some extracts from Sun Tzu:

The art of war is of vital importance for the state; it is a matter of life or death, a path that can lead to survival or destruction. Thus, the study of this matter cannot be neglected, in any way; the art of war is governed by five constant factors, which must be considered when governing, determining the achievements to be

achieved on the battlefield; these factors are (1) The moral law; (2) Time, (3) ground, (4) Commander, (5) Method and discipline.

Nicolau Maquiavel (1469-1527) was a renaissance historian and diplomat from the Florence region of Italy. He was known for his famous work “The Prince”, originally published in 1532. However, the author has a reference work for war studies entitled “The Art of War”, written in 1520, focused on issues of military and civil life. According to Parete (2015: 241), Maquiavel is regarded as having been the introducer of a new era of the modern age, in the development of political thought, his conviction that the military organization of contemporary Italian states needed change, was driving force; a central force that was behind all his reflections on the world of politics.

According to Pilbert (2001: 28), Maquiavel occupies an exceptional position in the field of military thought because his ideas are based on an acceptance of the link between the changes that have taken place in military organization and the new revolutionary events in the social and political sphere. The discovery of gunpowder and the invention of firearms and artillery reduced the importance of cavalry and knight armor. Nicolau Maquiavel is also one of the most modern theorists in the history of war.

His analysis of the phenomenon of war led to the introduction of the idea of imperious war, which in the renaissance and modern period “first promoted the defense of the state in anarchic context” (David, 2001: 174). This position led the political and military leaders of that time to be impelled to create and maintain national armies and adopt military recruitment and service, and to hire mercenaries to account for wars with other states or state coalitions. In addition to the idea of resorting to permanent armies, Maquiavel argued that “the end of war must be the total destruction of the adversary” (David, 2001: 175).

Carl Von Clausewitz (1870-1831) the third major contribution to war studies is found in Carl Von Clausewitz (1870-1831), a military man, a general of the kingdom of Russia, considered as one of the leading modern military strategists and war theorist. In his book “Da Guerra” [Of War] Clausewitz presents the famous concept of war, related to politics, which states that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” It is an operational and contextual conceptualization that must be framed in the author’s efforts to characterize war as an act of violence to tell a certain enemy that must be defeated. Thus “war is an act of violence in which we intend to force our opponent to obey our will” (Clausewitz (1832), 2014: 7). This author stresses that there are two reasons that lead men to war:

First, instinctive hostility; and second the question of hostile intent. Hostility is a dominant element in all cases of war between the parties. The author goes on to explain the phenomena of war and points to the goal of any “war as being to disarm the enemy” (Clausewitz (1832), 2014: 10). In the book “War and Society” of Pedro Pezarat Correia (2017), the essential of the thought of Clausewitz on war consists of three main pillars: first, “war is the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz (1832) , 2014: 27), in other words, war is a desire to fight and the victory goes not by physical destruction of the other’s will to continue the fight, second, war is an act of violence aimed at forcing the opponent to do our will, Clausewitz (1832) 2014: 9); and third, “war is a marvelous trinity composed by the original violence of its elements: by the hatred and animosity which may be considered the blind instinct, by the play of chance and misfortune, which makes it an activity free from the soul, and by the subordinate nature of political instrument, through which the reason belongs” (Correia, 2017: 36).

Revolutionary and guerrilla war theorists constitute the school of revolutionary strategy. It is a school of thought of war and strategy that was developed after the consolidation of three schools of strategy (David, 2001: 174-180): first the school of the earth strategy, supported by Sun Tzu, Maquiavel, Clausewitz, Jomim, Liddell-Mart and others; second, the Naval Strategy School, represented and supported by the American Admiral Alfred Maha (1840-1914); (1869-1930), the American William Mitchel (1579-1936), the British Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956) and the Russian Alexandre Deseversky (1894-1974).

Thomas E. Lawrence (1885-1935), British secret agent, promoted the strategy school, in the Book “Guerrilla in the Desert”. Mao-Tse-tung, (1893-1976) later promoted the school of revolutionary strategy, Che Guevara (1928-1976) and Vô Nguyễn Giap (1911-2013). These theorists developed their perspective of war in the text of the revolutionary struggles in the People’s Republic of China, Cuba and Vietnam, as referred by the theorist like Spanier (1986: 398-402). For example, for Mão Tsé –Tung “war is not an invitation to dinner but, for serious business.”

Guerrilla wars succeeded in replacing the traditional war models of classical theories. The theorists of the school of revolutionary strategy disseminate the idea that war is an instrument of political struggle where it is essential to “win the hearts and spirits of the population” (David, 2001: 179-180), so that it is possible to overcome the enemy, and this tactical dimension of war was used by Frelimo during the armed struggle for national liberation against the Portuguese colonial system in Mozambique. Frelimo guerrillas succeeded in integrating the populations of the Mozambican villages in the process of armed struggle, and obtained support from them.

### **III. THE STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS OF ALCÁCER-QUIBIR BATTLE**

This part presents a series of discussions about the structure, dynamics and consequences of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir. The chapter starts with the systematization of the backgrounds of the battle and follows with the presentation of the Portuguese expedition of 1578 and its developments. It analyzes the battle in the Portuguese perspective, the tactical devices and the role of the political leadership and the Portuguese strategy in the battle. The chapter concludes with the preliminary conclusions. This study is part of a context marked by military events that occurred at different times. The first is the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir occurred in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, while the second is the National Liberation Armed Struggle led by FRELIMO in Mozambique, occurred in the 1960s. The sixteenth century was marked by many events in Europe. The highlight goes to Portugal, in the Reign of Dom Sebastião who inherited the crown very young. This country faced an economic crisis in spite of the previous conquests, such as Aljubarrota, Tanger and Ceuta, in North Africa. The Portuguese monarch in order to face the economic crisis decided like his ancestors did, to embark on an expedition to Africa in the circumstance, Alcácer-Quibir that in Arabic means Great Palace.

The King, to assess the demographic crisis, chose to recruit mercenaries, Spaniards, Italians and Germans to swell the ranks of the Portuguese army. Thus, in 1578 an armada with nearly 25,000 Men sailed until Alcácer-Quibir after landing, in Arzila. In Alcácer-Quibir, the battle was fought that culminated with the defeat of the Portuguese Army and the death of the King, that later and at the request of King Filipe II, was transferred to the Monastery of Jerónimo, in Portugal. This battle marks the end of the medieval period.

The Portuguese King assumed that the conquest of Alcácer-Quibir could mitigate the internal crisis and affirm the sovereignty of Portugal over Castile (Spain). On 4<sup>th</sup> August of 1578 the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir took place between the Portuguese and Moroccan Armies and the Arabs defeated and liquidated D. Sebastião in the battle. In this context, the Portuguese Court was worried about the future, with the possibility of the King not returning from the expedition, which came to happen without leaving an heir. The Battle of Alcácer-Quibir is a remarkable event for the collective memory of the people of Morocco. For Moroccans, this military event is important because they succeeded in defeating an invading and expansionist army.

Four centuries after the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir (1578), an African National Liberation Army (FRELIMO) led a process of struggle against a colonial and occupationalist regime (Portugal), with similar contours to those of Alcácer-Quibir. It is the National Liberation Struggle of Mozambique that occurred between 1964 and 1974, following the creation of the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, as the consequence of Portugal's refusal to recognize the right to self-determination and independence, as embodied in the United Nations' Resolution No.1514 of 14 December 1960.

Portugal occupied the Mozambican territory between 1498 and 1975, according to several books of Universal History and History of Mozambique (Serra, 1988; Newit, 1997; Cabaço, 2010). The expansionist, occupational and colonialist initiatives of the Portuguese Colonial Regime and the centuries of domination and suffering submitted to the Mozambican people are the source of the foci of resistance that have taken place in Mozambican territory, such as the Battles of Coolela (1895), Marracuene (1895), Mataca and Malapende (1896-1897) and Barué (1917-1918), among others.

The colonial oppression machine was of such effectiveness that the Liberation Movements emigrated to neighboring countries such as Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Malawi, and Tanganyika. This is where the UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI movements came into being, the merger of which took place on 25 June 1962 and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) was established in Dar-es-Salaam. This Front set its strategy, under the direction of Eduardo Mondlane, the elected President. And it directed the expedient for Independence that Portugal refused. The Front had no other resource than the armed struggle. This was the reason to seek help from African countries which could offer military training. The guerrillas trained in Algeria report that they were transported by Air Ethiopia, others by the Egyptian Air Force.

According to Selassius Teodoro Nalyambipano, the training was very hard; they used to run at dawn, daily, for many kilometers. Then they went for tactics and the weaponry. The main weapon was Mauzer of German manufacture, from the time of the World War II with a range of 7 km. In his interview with the author, Selésio (2019) reported that when they returned they went to Kongwa – A Military Political Preparatory Center located in Tanganyika - where they received many Mozambicans who were trained for the Guerrilla War.

There is a set of similarities in relation to the Algerian and Mozambican theater of war, with respect to the use of natural objects, for the continuation of military operations. From the tactical point of view, the Algerians took advantage of the stones in the desert, when they heard airplane noise, to camouflage themselves. They stood still, simulating stones, and when seen from above (air) they actually looked like stones. The Mozambicans made good use of forests and mountains in their theater of war, in order to camouflage themselves.

Portuguese colonialism fits into a context similar to that of the real expansionism of the sixteenth century. This fits in the context of the discoveries that occurred in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. According to France Fannon (1964) after the Meeting of Berlin in 1894, Africa was divided and

distributed among the Powers, so Portugal remained with Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau among other territories. In this context, Portugal considered Mozambique its territory and the people its slaves, later the people workers in the service of the Portuguese Crown.

Therefore, the Portuguese invasion to Morocco that culminates with the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir has the logical occupationist table that occurred during the colonization of Mozambique, despite having happened in different periods. Just as happened with Alcácer-Quibir, it was only after an armed struggle that the Portuguese colonialism could be removed. Like in Alcácer-Quibir, in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, during the National Liberation Armed Struggle led by FRELIMO, in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, there was despair and dissatisfaction within the Portuguese soldiers, as well as within the Mozambicans incorporated into this colonial military service.

The analogy that occurs is that just as Portugal was defeated in the medieval war in Alcácer-Quibir against an Arab army, the same thing happened again four centuries later, against an army that had contact with Arab strategy and tactics of war. This is the contact that the FRELIMO guerrillas had with Algerian military instructors, where they had their first military training. The Arab military strategy, as some of the earliest FRELIMO guerrillas trained in Algeria and interviewed by the author reported, constitute the first cell or embryo of the Popular Liberation Forces of Mozambique (FPLM).

The collective memory of Morocco led this country to support the Liberation Movements of Africa among them FRELIMO. It is in this context that Joel Maduna (former FRELIMO guerrilla) left Morocco for Algeria to swell the group that was already there, going from 73 to 74 guerrillas in training (Salésio, 2019). An important fact to note in the military historiography of Europe and Africa is that in different times, Alcácer-Quibir in 1578 and the National Liberation Struggle in the 1960s, it is worth mentioning that Europe has not always won African armies: 1578, Portugal is defeated in Alcácer-Quibir; in 1956, France is defeated in Morocco; 1962 France is defeated in Algeria, and finally, in 1974 Portugal is defeated in Mozambique.

It can be noted that there is a dominant element in the military confrontations between European states and the states using Arab military strategy and tactics. In the military events mentioned above, it can be seen that the Europeans were almost always defeated with armies that resorted to the Arab military strategy. An important element that stands out in this context is that while in Alcácer-Quibir the Arab military strategy and tactics were used for a situation of affirmation of sovereignty, in Mozambique it was used to conquer the sovereignty and self-determination of the Mozambican people subjugated for centuries by the Portuguese Colonial Regime.

#### **IV. BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE OF ALCAZAR-QUIBIR**

In the text “Revisiting the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir” written by Luís Filipe Guerreiro da Costa e Sousa (2017: 111-159) and published in the strategy magazine, a description is made, of the battle, as intending to be the corollary of the previous battles. Since the conquest of Ceuta in 1415 the Portuguese have extended their presence on the north coast of Africa. The Spanish conquered mere El-Quibir (1506), Velez (1508), Oran (1509). Meanwhile, the Portuguese settled in Santa Cruz (1505). From 1530 the failure began and culminated with the fall of Santa Cruz in 1541. After an extended siege the Sadidas revealed to dominate all type of modern armament, including artillery assault

The Spanish had been in contact since 1569 with sheriff’s brother Abdalah Al Ghalib, Abdal-Malik, who in 1573 proposed an alliance to conquer Morocco. The fall of Tunis (1574) ended up giving advantage to Turkey that came to influence the eastern Mediterranean. This revived the power of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, where the Mediterranean coast of Europe was devastated from Sicily to Portugal. The XVI century marked a time for the Portuguese kingdom that needed a reinforcement to defend it from the assault of powers. A country that did not exceed one million inhabitants maintained an empire ranging from the North of Africa to China; it was a burden on the limited resources (Sousa, 2017: 11).

The lack of an heir to the Portuguese throne generated a great concern in the Portuguese crown. After a conflict, the rulers of Marrakesh extended their authority to the whole territory (Sousa, 2017: 113). Although the Sheriff power was unified, civil wars broke through. One of them arose from the succession crisis after Abdalah al-Ghalib’s death. In 1557 Muhamad el-Sheif died, having previously named Mulei Abdalah as his successor. For the expedition of 1578, it was assembled a fleet that “by the list of the warehouse were included seven hundred and fifty of all sort”, five galleons and fifty armed ships. The fleet left Lisbon on Wednesday, 25<sup>th</sup> June, in the morning. In the course of the actual combat, there seems to be a sequence of unfavorable circumstances, some of which are incidental and other of responsibilities of the army officers and commanders, including the king himself (Sousa, 2000: 232-243).

The total estimated force that participated in the battle of Alcácer-Quibir is of 17000 to 18000 soldiers distributed between the infantry and the cavalry. The itinerary of the Portuguese army is presented, in the table below. The Portuguese headed towards a valley situated to the south, probably the one that in the toponymy of the early twentieth century is called the ford of the Sultan. There was a difference between the design of the Portuguese in the battle and the devices adopted on 4<sup>th</sup> August. The initial design of the order of battle was

agreed in the council of war in Arzila, which should consist of four square squadrons, according to an idealized model with theoretical affiliation in the Spanish and Italian tratadistics. The square configuration was considered by captains and tratadistics as the ideal for the war in Africa.

Dom Sebastião, after brief words to the troops, settled before the first row of horses. Father Alexandre Valeraggio of the company of Jesus raised a crucifix, whose sight everyone fell on their knees. The men of the vanguard rose and the ranks of the “squadrons” of the vanguard resumed their march. The two lines, “Andalusian” and “gazulas”, seeing the Christians take initiative, imitated them.

Abd al-Malik was gathered in his hand-barrow when Mustafa Chibli artillery warden came to ask for permission to fire a bomb. The crash of the firing was the signal to the cavalry of the wings that had infiltrated the most exposed left flank to begin the attack against the rear. The soldiers at the front stopped in surprise. He came to give the king a “furrier” and another one knocked down some of the adventurers but this first volley ended up wreaking havoc among the ranks “because most of it was overlooked” after ordering the cannons to follow the “adventurers” the king visited the “squads” of the vanguard. He ordered no one to move until they were given orders to attack

The role of leadership in the condition of war is very important for the success of military operations and the materialization of the objectives and plans drawn up for military campaigns. Several theorists have written on the subject. Among them the focus is on Gordon A. Craig, who collaborated in Volume II “Developers of Modern Strategy” organized by Peter Paret and published by the Brazilian Army Library in 2003. According to Craig (2003: 2-28-29), the proper role of a political leader in the direction of the national war effort is difficult to establish in theory.

The legend of Dom Sebastião that survived the battle of Alcácer-Quibir ashamed by the defeat and disguised in order not to be recognized appeared on the very day 4 of August, 1578. That same night, Arzila’s ambush took place: four horsemen on the battlefield presented themselves before the gates of Arzila, asking for it to be opened, claiming that they were escorting the king. The death of the Portuguese monarch during the battle raises no doubts, if one reads the reports of the veterans and the last companions of king Dom Sebastião who withdrew towards the ford to the north of the battlefield.

They escorted him, Cristóvão de Távora and Count of Vimioso, Vasco da Silveira Dom Jerónimo Lobo and Dom Nunes de Mascarenhas, and had just joined a small column of soldiers who also fled in the same direction (Sousa, pot: 151). Quickly, the fugitives were surrounded by a troop of Muslim knights. The king offered resistance and in the heat of the dispute, he was mortally wounded in the head.

## **V. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES: EXPERIENCES AND ORGANIZATION**

This part is part of the armed struggle for national liberation in African countries. It focuses on the relationship and point of convergence between the battle of Alcácer-Quibir and the movements of National Liberation and makes a contextualization and systematization of the Mozambique liberation front movement in this point of the African continent. In this topic it seems atypical to relate Alcácer-Quibir with the liberation movements to verify that the period of conquest of the Europeans walked throughout the centuries especially Africa and America which were the most desirable territories.

The battle of Alcácer-Quibir is within this search for resources in Africa. The defeat of Portugal in Alcácer-Quibir in addition to the consequences mentioned above consolidated the position of the Islam in the kingdom of Morocco, which kept firm since Alcácer-Quibir until 1912, when they lost against France but, the cause remained perennial and ruled for 44 years, having lost in 1956, by a guerilla war that since 1921, had torn the forces of French occupation. There are some fundamental concepts that facilitate the understanding of the organization, structure and military organization. Throughout history, societies for military defense purposes have devised different instruments from laws and regulations.

The first fundamental concept is that of doctrine which is the set of rules for conducting war and military defence. During the Cold War period there were two military blocs: NATO which was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and represented the western military block and the Warsaw Pact which was the other military block essentially constituted by the Eastern European countries called the Socialist block.

It is important to highlight some aspects. The winds of change calling for an end to colonial domination were blowing stronger and unprecedented. The unit of effort of the colonized countries has avenged centuries of foreign domination in the sense that with the meager resources of all sorts, defeated the powerful armies, as in the case of Portugal with 38712 men in Mozambique, in 1970. The Moroccan collective memory that generated the spirit of solidarity with the colonized peoples was decisive in this process.

## **VI. FIELD STUDY: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE BATTLE OF ALCÁCER-QUIBIR**

This part aims to incorporate the preliminary analysis of the field work. The data collected in the field research allowed an analysis of the battle of Alcácer Quibir from an African perspective, where it was possible

to relate the tactics and strategy used and its influence on the African liberation movements that had direct contact with it. An analysis of the composition of the belligerents was made in order to perceive the contours of the battle and the main lessons about the battle of Alcácer-Quibir were systematized. The author, in the scope of the research to ascertain the truthfulness of the facts of the long year of 1578, August 4<sup>th</sup>, was in Alcácer-Quibir. Having been given a seminar and explanations of the phenomena that happened in that place by some historians of the place. The battle is described along the lines where Portugal in the sixteenth century faced a serious economic crisis. This crisis was associated with corruption in the recruitment of military personnel for the upcoming campaign.

The Arab army left in the direction of Alcácer-Quibir, to the pursuit of the Portuguese army. Its device was unfolded in half-moon, so a tactic of increasing, gave maneuverability during the battle which allowed to defeat the Portuguese army. The constant square of the Portuguese army could not resist and had to succumb and the king fell in full battle. The body brought to King Mansur, later delivered to King Filipe II who took it for deposit in the monastery of Jerónimos, in Lisbon, Portugal. In view of the bibliography consulted, the following can be said: for the economic situation of Portugal, the king assumed that he would change Portugal for the better with the conquest of squares in Africa. The king could not collect and systematize enough information to secure the victory. The king did not want to abide by any and all advice including the opinions presented in the different meetings of the war council.

This chapter concludes with a previous approach that the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, which occurred on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1578, left an indelible mark on the belligerents, on the side of Portugal and its allies, Spanish, Italian and German mercenaries. It was in fact a defeat whose consequences Portugal would become a Spanish colony, initial intention, Machiavellian way manifested by King Philip II of Spain, who at first seemed to want to protect the nephew, while his desire was to stab him as it happened. On the Arab side it was a well-deserved victory in the sense that it was worth their centuries-old experience of wars won and lost. It was revealed that they had some armament purchased in Spain and another captured in the previous combats against the Portuguese.

## **VII. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis and discussion of the findings of field research. Specifically, this chapter begins by giving an exhaustive presentation of the findings of the research carried out, then presents a systematic discussion of the research findings and concludes with the presentation of the main preliminary findings of the research. In relation to the research carried out, it is important to point out some results achieved. First the battle of Alcácer-Quibir happened on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1578, in the territory of Morocco, North Africa, between the Portuguese army and the Moroccan forces; in that year, Portugal was facing economic problems, including problems of sovereignty over the kingdom of Castile - now Spain. Dom Joao III, king of Portugal was old, without success, which troubled the Portuguese.

It is noted that the king D. Sebastião abides any and all advice. It confirms the Arab position that the Portuguese king was very young and without experience of war, he was nothing more than a mere adventurer who had fallen in battle. In terms of military principle, the fact that the king himself was involved in the fighting means that the squads and the thirds acted on their own account, that is, there was no single voice of command, although the king at some point disposed of couriers to transmit the order: in most cases, orders were not enforceable due to changes in the situation in the battle, especially when the Moroccans attacked behind the Portuguese army.

To sum up, this chapter corroborates with the findings of Gonçalo Feio when mentioning that “Dom Paulo de Lima Pereira deserved the labour of the pen of Diogo de Couto in this complete biography”. There are more than 400 pages portraying the life of the hero. After reading it deeply, impressed by what he had read, Manuel Faria de Sousa, the learned author who commented on the *Lusíadas*, wrote to him in 1639 to page 427 of the edition we have been quoting. But can we learn from the military practices of D. Paulo de Lima? Does his military action differ from what the time was? When we look at some eastern military operations over the course of the century, from Benastarim (1512) to Calecute (1525), the sieges of Diu (1538 and 1546), Mangalore (1568) Goa and Chaul (1570-71) we see no differences of the operations in which the biographer participated.

This research was based on a qualitative approach, using the comparative method and the method of participant observation. These research methods were aided by techniques that were aided by documentary techniques and technical visits that were operationalized by means of field study in the region of Alcácer-Quibir in February 2018 and several museums and historical archives in Lisbon. The documentary technique allowed to make the survey of several primary sources and original documents for the explanations of some aspects related to the outline of the battle, taking into account that the narratives about the outcome of the battle has many aspects of penumbra, especially that of the Portuguese side.



## VIII. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to close the study, recommend and, of course, make final considerations. The recommendations have the feature of bringing a relevant set of elements that can be part of research agendas for the future. The battle of Alcácer Quibir happened on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1578 in Morocco, North Africa. Portugal dealt with its serious economic situation and came to the conclusion in the face of previous experiences that Africa has resources that could contribute to strengthening the Portuguese economy. It should be noted that the King of Spain Filipe II seems to use Machiavellianism in the sense that he advised the Portuguese king not to go to Morocco, and appoint someone, instead, to command the operation.

It is noted that after the death of the king in the battle of Alcácer Quibir, Spain annexes Portugal from the year of 1580, therefore the loss of the independence that remained during sixty years until 1640. It is interesting to note that Portugal was a colony of Spain during sixty years; Morocco was a colony of France for forty-four years (1912-1956). The defeat of Alcácer Quibir stresses that, being able to listen is a virtue; in this case it is notable that all the advice that was given to the king in order to appoint a field general to command the battle did not work. In the different meetings of the war council the captains, for example, proposed that the advance should be from Arzila to Larache by land, along the coast in order to benefit from the fire of the navy. Once again the king did not accept and decided to enter the interior for Alcácer Quibir.

The nature of war is determined by the objectives involved, the political conditions and the vision of the adversary. It should be pointed out that this theoretical framework presents a conceptual contribution that is not exhausting but challenging on what war is, taking into account the different definitions and specific contributions. Strategy as a science that studies the organization, realization and use of the resources available in the war to achieve certain objectives, and its relation to the military issues of the battle of Alcácer-Quibir and the national liberation struggle in African countries, is taken into account in the analyzes.

In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the conception of theories of revolutionary war and guerrilla war, taking into account the contours of the armed struggle for national liberation carried out in several African countries, against the system of colonial domination established in the continent, is considered. Few times a battle had a decisive impact as the confrontation between Moroccan and Portuguese on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1578. The defeat of the Portuguese brought the annexation by the neighboring Castilian. The Portuguese society weakened by the human losses of 4<sup>th</sup> August and wounded in its own love, finally the formal military invasion. Contrarily, on the Islamic side, the Saudi dynasty consolidated its domination of the Muslim Northern Africa, beginning a period of affirmation on both the African continent and in relation to the European kingdoms.

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