



Research Paper

Combating Insurgency Against Boko Haram: Impact Of Troops' Morale On The Operational Efficiency Of The Nigerian Military

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ABSTRACT

The broad objective of this study was to establish the impact of troops morale on the operational efficiency of Nigerian military in combating insurgency against Boko Haram. To achieve this, three objectives were stated and three research questions were raised. A descriptive research design was used to carry out the study. The population of this study was 13,500. 13,200 of this population was the strength of the Nigerian Military troops participating in the counterinsurgency operation in North-Eastern Nigeria at the time of the research. 200 were members of Civil Society Organizations, and 100 Retired Security Personnel from the different states covered by the study. The sample size was 744 respondents, obtained through purposive sampling technique. 720 of the respondents were Soldiers, 15 Civil Society Organizations, and 30 retired security personnel. The study obtained its data from both qualitative and quantitative primary sources, and were triangulated using the mixed method. A researcher-design questionnaire tagged Troops' Morale and Operational Efficiency Questionnaire (TMOEQ) was used for the data collection for the study. A reliability index of 0.86 determined through Pearson Product Moment Correlation, was used to validate and test for reliability. Frequency counts, percentage mean and standard deviation were used to analyze quantitative data obtained from questionnaire. The key findings of the study identified that; affective morale significantly relate to the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. It further established that goal morale significantly relates to the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, as well as interpersonal morale, among other findings. The study concluded that there is need for the Nigerian military to review its counterinsurgency strategy to reflect the human dimension of military operations, which has been long neglected. The study recommended that the government should as a matter of urgency, address the issues bordering on the morale of soldiers.

KEY WORDS: Boko Haram, Troops Morale, Insurgency, Operational Efficiency, amongst others.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, has resulted to the death of over 10,000 persons and has led to the displacement of over 2.5 million people since 2009 to date, as reported by the Amnesty International. The socio-economic impact of the activities of this vicious group had been a major security challenge to the Nigerian Government, posing significant threat to national security and thus impede on national development. According to Forest, (2012), the Nigerian Government adopted a multidimensional counter terrorism approach to address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency conflict as well as suppress the violent activities of the terrorist group. These include the use of counter-violent extremism, economic, alternative dispute resolution, and military measures to address the menace across various layers and fronts. Unfortunately, all military operations conducted by security agencies since the violence started had little success despite the massive budgetary allocation to the Nigerian Military. Nevertheless, Umar, (2013), and Onah, (2014) had posited that systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism have been cited as some of the issues that enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by Boko Haram to linger (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).

The threats posed to the Nigerian government and citizens by Boko Haram has been debilitating given the extensive loss of lives and properties resulting from the indiscriminate terrorist attacks by the group. These

attacks have created an atmosphere of civil siege and volatility, with critically dire implications for public peace, safety, and security (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). Although the Nigerian government had employed various strategies to end the attacks by Boko Haram, such as hard politics, military mobilization, and an emphasis on repressive state security (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012), these approaches have been inadequate deterrence against Boko Haram because of the government's focus on militarized responses. One would imagine the ability of the military-driven strategy to combat the group, or if on the other hand, the Nigerian Military does not receive, the huge sums 'purported' to have been allocated for the defence of the Nation's territory against any internal and external insurgency. More so, the persistent dominance of some communities especially in the North East, showcased by the Boko Haram sects has exposed the security agencies to accusations of highhandedness and allegations of atrocities, both of which have initiated an action-reaction cycle of violence. If such allegations are something to go by; what then would motivate the Nigerian Military troops to counter the Boko Haram insurgency?

For every insurgency that threatens the peace and security of a nation, there is always a motivating force behind its persistence to linger. On the other hand, for every military counterinsurgency that is successful, there is always a motivating force propelling the strategies adopted and the goals accomplished. This motivating force in the context of this study is what has been termed; 'troops' morale'. Morale, also known as *esprit de corps* is the capacity of a group's members to maintain belief in an institution or goal, particularly in the face of opposition or hardship.

Morale is often referenced by authority figures as a generic value judgment of the willpower, obedience, and self-discipline of a group tasked with performing duties assigned by a superior. According to Leighton (1949), cited in Lutfi, Ma'ruf, Dedi, and Muhammad, (2019) defined "morale as the capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common purpose". Morale is important in the military because it improves unit cohesion. Without good morale, a force will be more likely to give up or surrender. Morale is usually assessed at a collective, rather than an individual level. In wartime, civilian morale is also important. *Esprit de corps* is considered to be an important part of a fighting unit. However, military morale is in a large sense inseparable from civilian morale because each reacts upon the other and both are in large measure based on fidelity to a cause. But there is a certain kind of morale that is distinctly military. It begins with the soldier's attitude toward duty. It develops with the soldier's command over himself. It is a spirit that becomes dominant in the individual and also in the group. Whether the soldier has physical comforts or suffers physical hardships may be a factor but is seldom the determining factor in making or unmaking his morale. A cause is known and believed in; knowledge that substantial justice governs discipline; the individual's confidence and pride in himself, his comrades, his leaders; the unit's pride in its own will; these basic things, supplemented by intelligent welfare and recreation measures and brought to life by a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, combine to weld a seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation (Ullo, 1941, cited in Lutfi, Ma'ruf, Dedi, & Muhammad, 2019). Poor morale can lead to failure, even when odds favour victory. At a basic level, good morale allows soldiers to overcome fear.

Troop' morale has been studied since ancient times, and early modern military leaders like Frederick the Great understood such notions thoroughly; defeat, he observed, resulted more from discouragement than casualties. Napoleon's famous aphorism, "In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one," brings into focus the pivotal importance of troop morale, and he frequently tried to motivate his troops by rewards, medals, or promotion. His views, along with those of the other "great captains," underscore the complex relationship between morale and success in combat.

Before the twentieth century, commanders attentive to their soldiers' morale mainly attended to their physical well-being. As long as an army was reasonably well-fed, had adequate clothing and shelter, and could expect to be paid more or less regularly, its morale might be considered adequate to the task at hand. Modern notions of troop morale arose out of the horrific casualties generated by the trench warfare of World War I. Some military historians suggest that stress-related casualties were almost unknown earlier. Evolution of weapons technology, mass armies, and General Staff leadership increased the scale and magnified the intensity of warfare, levying terrific burdens on a soldier's mental fitness. Accordingly, troop morale attracted the detailed attention of military and medical authorities. In general terms, researchers understood that men subjected to severe combat conditions for prolonged periods would have to be relieved at regular intervals. Men unable to continue in combat were either deemed cowards or thought to be victims of a debilitating physical condition, "shell shock."

Lord Charles Moran, a former World War I medical officer, wrote the first systematic explanation of troop morale. *Anatomy of Courage*, first published in 1945, postulated an explanation for troop morale and explained how it might be managed. Moran argued that;

Courage had measurable limits and could be expended as easily as water can be poured from a beaker. Commanders had to determine how much bravery soldiers possessed and not allow them to exceed those limits without replenishment. Moran also believed courage was largely a function of a man's character. Cowards simply lacked moral strength (p. 23).

Events of World War II only partially supported Moran's notions. By then, psychiatrists and psychologists had more fully investigated the components of morale, and come to recognize that all troops, not just the weak or morally flawed, were subject to the effects of unrelenting fear and anxiety. Only a sense of duty allowed men to overcome their fears; thus duty—devotion to a cause or comrades—joined the traditional factors—food, clothing, training, discipline, and leadership—as a defining component of morale.

Based on the foregoing, Buratai (2016) at a recent 'transformational leadership' workshop organised by the military for its middle cadre officers, attributed the latest round of operational setbacks in the battle against the Boko Haram insurgents to sabotage, low morale and lack of commitment on the part of officers. Although Buratai has withdrawn the statement, following a barrage of criticisms, the damning verdict on his men has nonetheless raised a lot of pertinent questions

Consequently, morale, in the context of this study adopted the three dimensions of Hardy (2010), who opined that morale incorporates three components – affective, goal, and interpersonal morale. Affective dimension includes; praise, recognition and an emphasis on the intrinsic value of the individual. The prospects for the future and particularly progress towards the future are also important and effect on the future/goal dimension of morale, while the Interpersonal morale entails the motivation that is directed toward other people. Therefore, relating the foregoing dimensions of morale to find answers to the numerous questions raised on the reason behind the present level of morale of the Nigerian troop, and the effect of morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigeria military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is the motivation behind this study.

Statement of the Problem

In its fight against Boko Haram, facts have emerged on the conditions of the Nigerian troops in battle. On several occasions, troops have protested the deplorable state of the mission area, inferior firepower compared to the adversary's, and unfair treatment by the Nigerian military authorities. Shortly after the attack by Boko Haram on Nigerian military camp at Metele in Borno on State in 2019, several troops went online to berate the Nigerian military authorities over obsolete and inferior weaponry and the poor working conditions they face in the fight against Boko Haram. In September 2014, over 400 Nigerian troops fled the frontlines to Cameroun after they came under Boko Haram's attack in what the Nigerian Military tagged "tactical manoeuvre" (BBC News, 2014). More worrisome is the realization of the outstanding performance of Nigerian soldiers in foreign missions which is in sharp contrast with the case of counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.

While it is believed that the capacity for havoc by Boko Haram has been degraded by the military whose officers and men deserve commendation for their sacrifices, it is also true that the policy put in place to win the war in recent years, in particular, is ineffective and inadequate and it is draining the army and the authorities of the goodwill of most Nigerians. Again, this study assumes that part of the reason is that many of the officers and men in the frontlines are not adequately taken care of and properly psyched to do their job. Even though the army chief recently relocated to Maiduguri for a pep talk with his men in the frontlines in the face of recent losses, it is not a once-in-a-while thing.

Every anti-insurgency war is first a psychological operation. The troops on the battlefield must themselves be constantly motivated and 'drunken' adherents and advocates of the national spirit. Therefore, when the source of troop morale in any war is reportedly in short supply or missing, there is likely to be a problem. In the current phase of the war against insurgency, food and other welfare items are reportedly rationed, besides issues of outstanding payments and entitlements to families of fallen officers and men. This is not to mention guns and ammunition vital for the successful prosecution of any war. But even more important is leadership. Strong indications have emerged that senior military officers and the fighting troops hold serious grudges against the continued stay in office of service chiefs who have outlived their usefulness.

The status of troops' morale can be assumed to be one of the most significant elements of operational efficiency in any military engagement. This further suggests the need to examine the level of morale the Nigerian military have in their counterinsurgency against Boko Haram to find practicable and research-based solutions that will improve troops' morale for enhanced operational efficiency in its fight against Boko Haram and other future operations. It is against this background, the study seeks to examine the effect of troops' morale on operational efficiency in the Nigerian military's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aims to examine the effect of troops' morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. To achieve this, the objectives of this research are to:

1. Ascertain the effect of affective morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.
2. Ascertain the effect of goal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.
3. Determine the effect of interpersonal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.

Research Questions

The following research questions were raised to guide the study;

1. What is the effect of affective morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?
2. What is the effect of goal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?
3. What is the effect of interpersonal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?

Significance of the Study

This study will benefit Non-Governmental organizations that research conflict studies and conflict resolution. This is due to the paucity of empirical studies and literature on the subject matter been investigated.

The findings of this study will stimulate the need for sensitization of the citizenry on the state of the security of the nation and the need to engender peaceful co-existence along community-lines and across the states of the federation.

Other countries that have experienced, or are still experiencing insurgency and terrorism would benefit from the findings of this study as they understand the critical factors or forces that motivate troops to perform efficiently during field operations to combat/stem terrorism or insurgency.

The findings from the study will also enable the Nigerian Military High Command to address issues bothering on troops' morale and to improve on the operational and military strategies adopted in the engagements with the insurgency.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory

The study adopted the Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory and the Vroom's Expectancy Theory. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a motivational theory in psychology comprising a five-tier model of human needs, often depicted as hierarchical levels within a pyramid. It was propounded by Abraham Maslow in 1954. Maslow (1954) stated that people are motivated to achieve certain needs and that some needs take precedence over others. Human's most basic need is for physical survival, and this is the first thing that motivates human behaviour. Once that level is fulfilled the next level up is what motivates human, and so on.

In relations to the present study, the Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory points out five human ought that to be met, to engender military operational effectiveness. The prolongation of the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is an indication that soldiers are not well financially motivated which killed the spirit of the armed forces and culminated in strings of losses. They are placed on half salaries and are tried in a General Court Martial for every act. They are allegedly buried in mass graves. Sometimes, the superiors give them wrong orders that end up in disastrous offensives and lead to their ambush, as have been widely reported in the ongoing war on terror in Nigeria. Thus, the physical and psychological welfare of military personnel is paramount to their operational efficiency and needs to be considered so that they can be dedicated to their job and not be vulnerable to corrupt practices. Therefore, accomplishing the goal of eliminating the Boko Haram insurgency depends greatly on the extent to which the Nigerian Government meet the needs of the troops who are countering the Boko Haram sect.

Conceptual Review

Concept of Insurgency

Technically speaking, the insurgency is a form of violent opposition to the actions and activities of a stronger force. Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources.

Other terms that describe insurgency according to Fearon and Laitin (2013) includes:

- a. **Counterinsurgency**—frequently referred to by the acronym COIN—is the combination of measures undertaken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
- b. **Guerrilla warfare** is a form of warfare in which small, lightly armed groups use mobile tactics against a stronger opponent. Guerrillas employ small-scale attacks, such as ambushes and raids, to harass their enemy rather than to win a decisive victory in battle.

c. **A militia** is a body of armed fighters' often representing specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other community groups or political parties. Militias may serve the government directly or indirectly, operate independently to combat other militias or insurgent groups, pursue a criminal activity, or support an insurgency.

Counter-Insurgency

According to Moore, (2002), counter-insurgency is an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability. Counter-insurgency only exists as a form of warfare because of its reciprocal relationship with the insurgency. Counter-insurgency is, therefore, a war waged within a state by a government using the instruments of state power in a combination of military, political, economic, civil, legal, and psychological means (Battjes, 2012).

Morale and Operational Efficiency

Hocking (2008), he states that: What condition is to the body, morale is to the mind. Morale is condition; good morale is the good condition of the inner man; state of will in which you can get the most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression and hold out for the longest time. Richardson (1978) summarized personal morale as being sustained by physical factors, such as good health, good food, rest, and amenities, he believed that a good morale is made-up of three major elements: the soldier's personal or individual morale, his morale as a member of a small group, and the morale of the unit as a whole.

Empirical Framework

Azama (2017) carried out a critical analysis of Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency first appeared in Maiduguri in Borno State, northeast Nigeria around 2002. The group's objective was to establish an Islamic state and institutionalize Sharia law in Nigeria, particularly the northeast region. Boko Haram activities in the northeast of Nigeria have created a serious security threat to Nigeria and its neighbours in the Lake Chad region. The research analysis revealed that the Boko Haram insurgency has closely adhered to Mao's theory of revolutionary war since its inception. This means that Mao's theory of revolutionary war can be applied to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria to find more effective methods than have been used so far by the government of Nigeria to fight Boko Haram.

Hardy (2009) carried out a study on Morale: definitions, dimensions, and measurement. The research identified several deficiencies in the current understanding of morale. These range from elision with other concepts to disagreement about whether it is an individual or group phenomenon. Morale could be readily differentiated from other concepts and emerged as a phenomenon with three dimensions: affective, future/goal and interpersonal. It was also viewed as a single phenomenon which was generalizable across situations and rooted in the individual although perceived members of the group exerted considerable influence. The antecedents of morale impact on the three dimensions outlined above. Its consequences were the zeal with which tasks are undertaken, creativity and engagement. The nomothetic element of the research developed several measurement scales, grounded in the qualitative phase. This allowed morale to be differentiated from other phenomena and offered insights into individual and group perceptions of morale and the influence of personality variables. Further quantitative research confirmed the three-dimensional structure of the concept. The results of these two phases were then integrated to provide a picture of the phenomenon of morale, differentiate it from other concepts and elucidate its antecedents and consequences. An appraisal of the limitations of the research is also made. Finally, the implications of this research for both academic researchers and practitioners are discussed along with suggestions for future research.

Motowidlo and Borman (2008) investigated the relationship between military morale, motivation, satisfaction, and unit effectiveness. Behaviorally anchored rating scales, developed to measure morale in military units, were used to examine correlates of officers' ratings of morale in the U.S. Army. Sixteen company-sized units in the Army and 47 constituent platoons were rated by Army officers with the morale scales. Several self-report measures of motivation and satisfaction with various facets of Army life were completed by 614 enlisted personnel in these companies and platoons. Also, information about administrative indexes reflecting company effectiveness was obtained. Ratings of platoon morale correlated most strongly with mean self-report of overall satisfaction and somewhat less strongly with self-report of satisfaction with narrower facets of Army life. At the company level, morale ratings were most strongly correlated with the number of reenlistments and several congressional inquiries into company conditions associated with complaints from individual soldiers.

Phillips (2006) examined the phenomenological impact of military Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) on individual and troop readiness. This study found that participation in MWR during OIF does

positively impact soldiers in several ways. However, it did not support the link between MWR and readiness, and several alternate models are developed and proposed to replace the original.

Williams (2002) investigated the importance of morale in the modern New Zealand Army. The modern New Zealand (NZ) Army faces several challenges and changes that will place increased demands on limited army resources, one of which is soldiers. In the final analysis, the study then analyzed whether morale would indeed be critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army from a collective viewpoint and against the modern NZ Army environment. The study concluded that morale was critical to the modern NZ Army, as it will play a key role in overcoming some of the changes and challenges that face the army. It also noted that morale was the foundation upon which the Army of the future may rely upon. The analysis mandates that an increased focus on the morale of soldiers will be required to ensure that the Army can meet these challenges or a reduction in the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army may result.

III. METHODOLOGY

This study was a descriptive survey. The population of the study consisted of 13,500 comprising troops serving in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States, as well as registered Civil Rights Groups (CRG) and Retired Service personnel (RSP) with expert knowledge on the Boko Haram insurgency and the Nigerian military counterinsurgent against Boko Haram (Table 1). The sample size for this study comprised of 720 soldiers were selected through random sampling across strategic military locations in the area of study; 13 CRGs within the axis of visited troops deployment were considered for FGD, to save cost as well as obtain relevant data based on their active encounter on the field and video conference session (FGD) was conducted with the 11 selected RSP to obtain vital information. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the respondents for the study.

The instruments for data collection was a set of structured questionnaire. A standardized questionnaire title, "Troops' Morale and Operational Efficiency Questionnaire (TMOEQ)" was used as the instrument of the study. The instrument consisted of two sections; A and B. Section A elicited bio-data information from the respondents, while section B, addressed the subject matter of the study. A total of 744 copies of questionnaires were administered to the respondents. While 740 copies were completed and retrieved, four (4) copies of the questionnaires were not returned by the respondents.

Adopted questionnaire was subjected to face and content validation. The instruments were validated by the research supervisor and three experts from the Measurement and Evaluation in the University of Lagos. It was subjected to modification for the current study. The reliability of the instrument was determined through a test-retest method for a measure of its stability. 20 security personnel who had been engaged in the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram Insurgency, but are currently not in the camp were used for the reliability testing. The initial and the retest scores of the sample were correlated using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. The correlation yielded a reliability index of 0.86, which indicated a high internal consistency of the instrument. Data was collected and analyzed using the statistical package for social science (SPSS) version 23.0. Bar charts and pie charts were utilized to analyze the socio-demographic factors of respondents, percentage and frequency were used to answer the research questions, whilst Linear Regression Analysis at the 0.05 level of significance was employed to test the hypothesis.

IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Age of the Respondents




Figure 1: Chart of the age distribution of the respondents

The result of figure 1 shows the age distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 340(47.2%) were aged 18-30 years, 280(38.9%) were aged 31-42 years, while 100(13.9%) were aged 43 years – above. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 16(66.7%) were aged 43 years – above, while 8(33.3%) were aged 31-42 years.

Gender of the Respondents




Figure 2: Chart of the gender distribution of the respondents

The result of figure 2 shows the gender distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 560(77.8%) were male, while 160(22.2%) were female. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 17(70.8%) were male, while 7(29.2%) were female.

Marital Status of the Respondents




Figure 3: Chart of the marital status distribution of the respondents

The result of figure 3 shows the marital status distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 400(55.6%) were single, 220(30.6%) were married, 70(9.7%) were divorced, while 30(4.2%) were widowed. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 11(45.8%) were married, 6(25.0%) were single, 5(20.8%) were divorced, while 2(8.3%) were widowed.

Level of education of the Respondents




Figure 4: Chart of the level of education distribution of the respondents

The result of figure 4 shows the level of education distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 370(51.4%) possess WAEC, 280(38.9%) possess NCE/OND, while, 70(9.7%) possess Degree/HND. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 12(50.0%) possess Degree/HND, 9(37.5%) possess Master’s degree, while, 3(12.5%) possess, PhD degree.

Location of the Respondents




Figure 5: Chart of the location distribution of the respondents

The result of table and figure 4.6 shows the location distribution of the respondents. For the soldiers; the result indicates that majority of the respondents 320(44.4%) were camped at Borno State, 220(30.6%) camped at Adamawa State, while 180(25.0%) camped at Yobe State. On the other hand, for the CRG/RSP; the result indicated that majority of the respondents 10(41.7%) reported from Borno State, 7(29.2) equally reported from Adamawa and Yobe States.

Research Question One: What is the effect of affective morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?

Table 1: Mean score and standard deviation of the effect of affective morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.1	The positive experience encountered in the combat field boost my morale in the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram insurgent	3.14	0.68	Accept
.2	The fact that there is a political undertone to the fight against the Boko Haram I feel negative about the operational efficiency of my troop success	3.00	0.79	Accept
.3	My morale is tied to the passion I have for the Nigerian Army’s responsibility on the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram insurgent	2.65	0.79	Accept
.4	My level of morale in the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram Sect is dependent on the assumption my fellow combatants express on this issue.	2.08	1.03	Reject
.5	I am not discouraged in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency by the manner my fellow combatant perceive our chances of succeeding.	2.88	0.69	Accept
.6	I am not discouraged in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency by the manner of the role high ranking officers’ play in support of this counterinsurgency.	2.89	0.72	Accept

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean \geq 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 1 shows the responses of the respondents on the effect of affective morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to items 11-13, and 15-16 with their mean scores \geq 2.50 (criterion mean). On the other hand, majority of the respondents disagreed to item 14, with the mean score less than the criterion mean (< 2.50).

Research Question Two: What is the effect of goal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?

Table 2: Mean score and standard deviation of the effect of goal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.7	The experiences I am gaining in the counterinsurgency is a morale booster for operational efficiency	3.03	0.82	Accept
.8	The allowance and wages received for engaging in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency is very reasonable and up to my expectations	1.31	0.76	Reject
.9	My involvement in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is an opportunity for me to develop my career target	2.82	1.03	Accept
.10	My involvement in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is an opportunity for me to be promoted to a higher rank	2.93	0.79	Accept
.11	The goals I have achieved in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is a morale booster for operational efficiency	2.85	0.60	Accept
.12	The fact that I can get in touch with my family, in the course of the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram frequently, is satisfactory to me	2.76	0.64	Accept

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean \geq 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 2 shows the effect of goal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to items 17, & 19-22, with their mean scores \geq 2.50 (criterion mean). On the other hand, majority of the respondents disagreed to item 18, with the mean score less than the criterion mean (< 2.50).

Research Question Three: What is the effect of interpersonal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram?

Table 3: Mean score and standard deviation of the effect of interpersonal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

S/N	Items	Responses (n=720)		
		Mean	Std. Dev	Decision
.13	In our troop, we fight as a unit, which has enhanced our operational efficiency in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram	2.06	1.17	Reject
.14	The mutual relationship established among fellow combatant enhance the operational efficiency of the troop's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram	2.35	1.21	Reject
.15	The self-control and discipline exercised among fellow combatant of the troop enhance the operational efficiency of the troops' counterinsurgency against Boko Haram	2.81	0.80	Accept
.16	The troop members are willing to pay the ultimate sacrifice in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram	2.22	1.09	Reject
.17	Troops members collaborate before taking decisions in a combat situation for the safety of members in the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram	2.43	0.99	Reject

(Criterion Mean = 2.5, Mean \geq 2.5 = Accepted, Mean < 2.5 = Rejected)

Table 3 shows the effect of interpersonal morale on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram. The result indicated that majority of the respondents agreed to item 25, with the mean score \geq 2.50 (criterion mean). On the other hand, majority of the respondents disagreed to items 23, 24, 26-27; with their mean scores less than the criterion mean (< 2.50).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that the Nigerian nation is at the precipice of becoming a failed state going by the indices of the Boko Haram insurgency. More worrisome is the inability of the Nigerian military to effectively suppress these flames of insurgency. The root cause of the the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria remains the failure of government to address basic issues of education, employment,

economy, leadership, health, and development among others. As long as these loopholes exist, rebellions in form of insurgencies and other violent vices will erupt. However, the Nigerian military has an important stake in ensuring the physical manifestations of the Boko Haram insurgency is adequately degraded to allow the government to deploy the requisite soft approaches needed for development.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings above, the research therefore recommends the following:

1. The Nigerian and other West African governments should join forces and share intelligence in the fight against terrorism, Nigeria alone cannot fight this threat and curtail its spread within and outside her borders.
2. Considering the factors impeding on troops' morale in the Nigerian military counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, government should support the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) by offering training, equipment and other aid that boosts their capacity to monitor, investigate and prosecute corruption and human rights abuse in the defence sector more effectively.
3. Lastly, in consideration of the various suggestions on tackling the challenges of the Nigerian troops in the counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram, it is time for the Nigerian government to scrutinize military leadership nominees more thoroughly to ensure that only competent officers are appointed to head the defence ministry and the services.

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