



Research Paper

Rethinking Terrorism and Nigeria's National Security: a Study of Boko Haram Insurgency

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Abstract

Nigeria remains bedevilled by security challenges caused by the emergence and upsurge in the activities of terrorist Islamic extremists, "Boko Haram", a Hausa phrase which means "Western Education is Forbidden." The onslaught became popular in 2009 and operates mostly in the North-East axis of the country. This paper assessed how Boko Haram terrorist activities affected Nigeria's national security and the strategic responses deployed by the Nigerian Government to check the menace. The paper is descriptive and qualitative. It utilized published sources of data collection to access information for analysis. Findings indicate that attacks by the insurgency have destroyed lives numbering in thousands, and properties worth millions of dollars. The terrorist insurgency has negatively affected the economy, stunned the education sector, stirred humanitarian crisis, weakened the Nigerian security circle, and threatened the precarious sovereign existence of the country in myriads of ways, including the calculated attempt to Islamize the country. The Nigerian State has deployed efforts and resources in combating the terrorist insurgency since its violent escalation in 2009; however, the insurgency continues to unleash acts of terror on the country. The government's efforts seem far from achieving the urgently needed victory to put an end to the insurgency's carnages. This study thus recommends that to defeat this menace, the government should focus on creating employment, alleviating poverty, implementing community-centric strategy, international cooperation, border surveillance, security synergy, reconnaissance mission and effective judicial process.

Keywords: Terrorism, Security, National Security, Insurgency, Boko Haram

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I. Introduction

Terrorism is a major obstacle to human security in the 21st Century. It is not limited to regional or territorial conflicts but often relates to cultural and religious differences Francis Fukuyama described as *Clash of Civilisation*. Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States of America, highlighted the great damage such attacks could cause. Casualty lists have demonstrated the continuing vulnerability of people everywhere to terrorism. And more recently, concerns have grown that terrorists, who have grown in sophistication and style, might use weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear). All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. It has become a phenomenon that governments around the world have come to fear. It is a mistake to believe that terrorism is mindless violence, without purpose other than a release of pent-up frustration. Terrorist goals are political and involve a sense of grievance, real or imagined and the use of force to cause political authorities to accede to demands (Long, 2000).

Terrorism has metamorphosed into a global phenomenon and daunting threat to world peace and stability in the 21st century. Since the dawn of this millennium, the incidence of terrorism has been on a steady rise globally. Hitherto, terrorism was a national or regional affair within a defined geographical frontier such as Northern Ireland, the Basque Country in Northern Spain, and some areas in the Middle East (Okoli & Lortyer,

2014). The pervasiveness of terrorist acts with heightened feelings of insecurity across the world, especially after the attack on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, has stirred up anti-terrorism consciousness among people from all walks of life who are targets of terrorist attacks. As Oyeboade (2012) aptly noted, the global spread of acts of terrorism from Dar es Salam to Nairobi, Mali, Mogadishu, Moscow, London and Kandahar has stirred the human consciousness so much that the war against terror has compelled the international community to join hands against the menace. In the same vein, Rotimi (2011) submitted that going by the magnitude of the social and political upheavals around the globe, it will be right to assert that there is never a period in human history more turbulent than today. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, large scale international terrorism, in the context of highly complex and increasingly global networks, constitutes an entirely new challenge to the system of collective security as represented by the United Nations (Koechler, 2002).

The phenomenon of terrorism found expression in the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamic sect in the Northern part of Nigeria. The continued insulation of Nigeria from terrorism was punctured in 2002 with the spate of attacks unleashed on the Nigerian citizens by a group of criminal bandits called, Boko (Haram Salisu & Mohd, (2015). Since the emergence of the Islamic sect in the city of Maiduguri, Borno State, North East of Nigeria in 2002, the country has been subjected to forms of insecurity arising from suicide bombings, abduction and kidnapping, hostage-taking, armed robbery, cold-blooded murder and ethno-religious uprisings. The re-emergence of the group in 2009 came up with new tactics that include suicide bombing, kidnapping, and attacking places of worship with devastating negative implications on the polity. It is on the strength of the above background that this paper has examined the effect of terrorism on Nigeria's national security.

Effective strategies to combat terrorism cannot be developed by States in isolation of each other; thus, despite the pledge by the international community, such as the United States, France, China and Canada, to collaborate in intelligence gathering and sharing to combat global terrorism, these reported vows to assist Nigeria seems to be a hoax as they continue to backtrack by either not selling needed arms and ammunition to Nigeria, based on the unauthenticated pretext of human rights abuses and by withholding prima facie information that would enhance Nigeria's advancement against the security menace. Nigerians are on daily basis subjected to horrific experiences occasioned by the activities of the sect. With this situation, the Fund For Peace (FFP) in its 2012 report ranked Nigeria as one of the top ten (10) failed States in Africa and fourteenth (14th) in the world because of the growing wave of insecurity and violence (Tell, March 17, 2014).

II. Methodology

Frustration-aggression-displacement theory was utilized to explain how frustration, aggression and displacement of Boko Haram members led to terrorism and undermined Nigerian national security. Frustration-aggression-displacement theory was first proposed by Dollard, Doob Miller, Mowrer, and Sears in 1939 and by Houland and Sears in 1940. It gained prominence among academics and researchers in 1969 when Leonard Berkowitz further came up with a treatise on the theory. Essentially, this theory emanated from the field of Social Psychology and has since gained acceptance in the field of Political Science, Sociology and Strategic Studies. The philosophy behind the theory was the explanation of the factors that trigger aggressive behaviour, violence and terrorism. Aggression is the consequential result of obstructing, blocking or frustrating a person's persistent efforts to attain a goal that he set as a primary target (Miller et al 1939). It also attempts to expatiate why people are culprits and ruthlessly deal with innocent third parties who are unconnected with their source of stimulating frustration.

Frustration, aggression and the displacement of Boko Haram members resulted in terrorism and an attempt to displace Nigeria's secular government and democracy to enthrone Islamic State and Sharia law. Further frustration arose following Boko Haram's inability to achieve its aims. The failure led to aggressive behaviour against secondary sources such as attacks on innocent people: Abduction of Chibuk Girls, Kidnapping for ransom, destruction of churches. Unless the causes of frustration and displacement are tackled, terrorism would be a haven by many due to their displacement from the distribution of the country's wealth, lack of employment, economic crises, massive poverty, and general stringent living conditions in the country.

III. Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is fluid and dynamic especially as it continues to change with the pace of time. However, there is a near general agreement on what it is all about, and how it manifests itself. Terrorism is an attack, or threat of attack, against unarmed targets, intended to influence, change or divert major political decisions Radu (2002). Rethinking terrorism, Hoffman (2013) observed the purpose of terrorism as the demoralization of a civilian population to use its discontent as leverage on national governments or other parties to a conflict.

Ekaterina (2008), terrorism is a sort of violence that uses a one-sided violent approach against civilians. It also engages uneven violent confrontation against a stronger adversary which could be a state or a group of states. Chomsky (2011) further conceptualizes terrorism as, the use of coercive means aimed at populations to achieve political, religious or even other aims. For instance, the US State Department delineates terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. In the same vein, terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to the assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets (the United Nations in Siegel, 2007). For Whitaker (2001), terrorism refers to more threats of violence against non-combatants, calculated to instil fear in an audience beyond the immediate victims. He further stated that, because perpetrators of terrorism often horrifically strike symbolic targets, the psychological impact of an attack can exceed the physical damage. Thus, terrorism is a mixture of drama and dread. The endpoint of terrorism, Folarin & Oviasogie (2014), argued, is aimed at achieving social, political, religious, economic and even psychological goals through the use of coercive and intimidating acts outside the context of legitimate warfare activities that conveys some forms of messages to an audience.

It is important to advance our minds to the primary factor serving as an impetus for the success and escalation of terrorism which is the extent of technological advancement and availability; especially the proliferation of large arsenals and the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. Generally, the traits of this conceptualization relate to issues of distance and jurisdiction. The first trait, being *distance* may be deemed as a spatial artefact, often made salient by asymmetries of power between contending parties and established authorities. That is aggressors to a particular form of social order, aiming to take advantage of available technologies and the prevailing vulnerabilities associated with distance by exploiting available advantages in communication, information and mobility to identify and attack relatively distant and comparatively weak outposts of authority. For Laqueur (1996), this spatial component of international terrorism is well established and therefore, not unique. Furthermore, Victor (2000) strongly believes that in line with the above analysis, the agents of violence find it more effortless to organize limited or local attacks which are always strategically significant to demonstrate their capability to successfully mount attacks on relationally distant targets located in their opponent's heartland and breach of the security perimeter.

As further noted by Kegley (2003), the second trait has to do with possessive jurisdiction. He observed here that two contending groups rarely occupy the same political space, and even when they do share competing claims to authority over the same political space, their heartlands remain spatially distinct and separated even when their territorial/jurisdictional interests contend and overlap. For instance, the Tamils of Sri Lanka have struck targets both in Colombo (Sinhalese heartlands) and in India, including the May 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, the Irish Republican Army has also operated mainly in the British Province of Northern Ireland but has even launched operations in London at the nucleus of the British heartland; and Chechen militants have allegedly struck targets as far as Moscow. Thus, Crelinsten (2009) stated that the relatively recent internationalization of anti-authority terrorism may be simply a function of increased popular access to distance or technological reach. Friedman (1999) referred to this phenomenon as the "super-empowered individual".

The employed strategic behaviour is not confined to asymmetric power relationships or non-state actors. The US air raids against Tokyo in April 1942 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air raids against Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo war are similar demonstrations of the capability to mount distant attacks in the opposition's heartland (Paul (2001). Thus, Paul argued that the essential quality of terrorist jurisdiction is defining potential remedies to contestation between groups or individuals. They operate outside or across an established jurisdictional boundary, complicating remedial action (ameliorative or coercive) and limiting the range and effectiveness of institutional options.

According to Neumann (2009), lack of effective instruments for addressing or curtailing the problem of terrorist action in international law and institutions, ambiguities and uncertainties of juridical responsibility provide special opportunities and vulnerabilities for exploitation both by terrorists agents and affected authorities. In the absence of established institutional mechanisms, it can be expected that those entities that are most greatly affected and who enjoy the greatest capacity for direct action will act within such a political vacuum in their perspective unilaterally.

Diffuse and indirect actions often have very direct consequences, as Galtung (1969) argued with his concept of structural violence. Such structural violence, that is, violence embedded in the underlying structures of social relationships, is necessarily biased towards power and established authority and, thus, makes it particularly difficult to identify the interactive, reciprocal, and alternating qualities of "terrorist" and "terrorized". For example, psychotic and sociopathic terror has become more extreme and regularized in US society such that hardly a week goes by without news of another attack on a school or a multiple murder. This terror is closer to Americans and diffuse effects of political terrorism that have culminated on the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent war on terrorism declared by George Bush in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Terrorism, Bibes (2001) noted, as a political act, stands once at the nexus between individual and collective action; the emotional and the rational, the conventional and the unconventional. It can be the strongest form of protest or the weakest form of rebellion or a specialized tactic in warfare (Nwankwo, 2014, in NAJOPS). Thus, terrorism, above all else, is the most personal form of violence. It is generally due to one or two reasons stated below: Terrorism as a limited form of engagement more quickly and effectively overcomes collective action problems that may retard or thwart the mobilization of mass movements, in which case, terrorism may be the only available avenue for demonstration of dissent. Terrorist activity is the prelude to the transformation of non-violent protest movements to armed rebellion. This transformation of protest to armed conflict provides a tactical niche for acts of terrorism. The content of terrorist motivation makes it compatible with both political, as noted above, and spiritual rationalisation or justification.

IV. Security

National Security is the fundamental responsibility of any government as enshrined in the constitution and one of the primary objectives of any state is to cater for the security, social and economic well-being of its people or inhabitants. The goal of national security is to safeguard national values, and the fundamental value of the state's survival, self-perpetuation. Buzan (2007) examined security from the three perspectives of the international system, the state, and the individual, and argued that the most important and effective provider for security should remain the sovereign State. For him, where the state is assumed to be the main referent in the study of security, one has to first ask: what constitutes a state? What is the nature of a state? A state, for International Law, is a territorial unit, containing a stable population under the authority of its government, and recognized as being capable of entering into a relationship with other entities with international personality. Eminiue (2001) defined a state as a politically organized body of people occupying a definite territory, living under a government and incorporating sovereignty. Using the conventional interpretation, a state is made up of government, people, territory and sovereignty. A critical evaluation of these definitions shows that they maintained an affinity with the definition and constitution of statehood. The state cannot be secure if its constituent parts are insecure or unstable. At the same time, if the state as the institution representing its constituent parts is weak or is insecure with other states, its elements will also be affected by such weakness or insecurity.

Okon and Monday (2012), added that the ideas that hold the State together and on which political institutions are built on nationalism and political ideology. Thus, anything that threatens these ideas ultimately threatens the stability of political order. Such threats might be targeted at the existing structure of government or the territorial integrity of the State or at the existence of the state itself. Existential threats to a state are those that ultimately involve sovereignty because sovereignty is what defines a state as a state (Buzan et al, 1998). Thus, the territory of the state constitutes the physical base of the state, and most threats targeted at the physical base of the state must be military, economic and environmental. The basic institutions of the state comprise the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary. Buzan (2007) warned that political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose, he maintains, may range from pressurizing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state to weaken it; the idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology and the institutions which express them are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is essentially so if the target is in a weak state. He was to further advance the analysis of security beyond the traditional military-political dimension to a more comprehensive framework encapsulating both military and non-military aspects of security - military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

Furthermore, Buzan (2007) introduces the concepts of strong and weak states to show how the creation of a strong state is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for improved individual and national security, implying that the existence of strong states would not, by itself, guarantee security. Buzan also points out that the strength of a state is determined by the degree of its socio-political cohesion. Thus, the concept of strong and weak states is predicated on the degree of socio-political cohesion of a state, which is high for strong states and low for weak ones. While the strength of its powers refers to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their comparative military and economic capabilities, he acknowledges that almost all weak states are found in the South or developing world, where they find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which in turn, leaves them underdeveloped and, therefore, unable to muster the economic and political leverage necessary to build a stronger state. Buzan et al (1998) made some propositions that are true when applied to Nigeria. In a weak state, the authority of the government as such is contested to a much greater extent than in strong states, where the framework and thus some basic legitimacy of the government are usually accepted. In weak states, basic institutions, as well as ideologies, are often challenged, and political violence is extensive.

From the Postmodernist point of view, Booth (1994) maintains that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of human security and that non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, etcetera, should actively take part in coordinating security. Booth argues further that states and implicitly governments must no longer be the primary referents of security because governments which are supposed to be the guardians of their peoples' security have instead become the primary source of insecurity for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country.

From the Realist perspective, Smith (1997) contends that security is the capacity of a state to protect its territory and boundaries and its sovereign ability to act as it sees it best, concerning both internal and external issues. The above assertion is corroborated by the view that one of the primary roles of the state is to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside (Rugumanu, 1993). Booth (1994), added that traditionally, security was almost exclusively understood to refer to the security of States and military security. In this way, security came to mean national security and was synonymous with defence. However, Mijah (2007) maintaining the same line with Booth, contends that in modern society security means development; it is not solely traditional military exercises. For him, national security is holistic; that is, it is encompassing both military force and soft development. He further maintains that without development there cannot be secure. It cut across the personal and communal state of being secured from a wide range of critical and pervasive threats, including but not limited to all forms of violence, injustice and violation of human rights

From the above discussion, scholars have come to terms that national security covers a nation's vital interests and therefore, can be construed as a sacrosanct phenomenon in human society. This informed virtually why every President and Governor in Nigeria at the time of assuming the position of authority is requested to take an oath to provide security for the lives and properties of the citizens. To make sure that governments discharge this function creditably well, the chief executive of each tie of government is allotted a huge amount of money or resources called 'security vote' and is also allowed easy access to the state's security apparatuses. National Security thus, can be seen as the total efforts, energy, intelligence, commitment and the use of institutions and their products to enforce and ensure adequate protection of interests, people and properties of a state. It also entails the general protection of a nation's integrity and sovereignty. National security comprises the sum of what a nation does to safeguard itself as a sovereign entity and this includes every aspect of a nation's life and existence. This means that the national security of a state can extend to the well-being of its citizens, institutions, development, interests, plans, economy, etc. Aside from these, it involves the physical protection of a state's subjects, landscape and independence and even issues such as food security and national image. The concept of national security expresses the status of a state in terms of its standing in the globe, in areas like citizens' protection, freedom and well-being, property and intelligence safety, national integrity, sovereignty and protection of national interests. All these are tailored towards the stability and peaceful co-existence of the citizens of the nation as well as the global level.

V. Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Etymologically, the term *Boko Haram* developed in the city of Maiduguri, Borno State capital, where the group was formed. According to Mike (2013), the term itself originated from the Hausa word *boko* (pronounced bo-ko) figuratively translating to *Western education*. The name, loosely translated from Hausa language means "Western education is forbidden". The terrorist group earned this sobriquet due to its adverse and strong resentment to anything Western which it perceives as corrupt and variant to the practice of Islam. That Boko Haram is averse to Western Education is not in doubt as a series of videos and documentary evidence released by the leader of this terrorist group have always warned to deal ruthlessly with its adherents who embrace the system of education.

Boko Haram as an Islamic sect predated 2002 and dated back to 1995 when the group operated under the name, Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation with Mallam Lawal as the leader. When Lawal left to further his education, Mohammed Yusuf succeeded in his leadership and swiftly took over the affairs of the group. Yusuf's leadership opened the Islamic sect to political influence and popularity. The leadership of Mohammed Yusuf recreated the group by adopting a new operational orientation, tactics and strategies in reaching the Islamic world. The operational techniques of Boko Haram, was premised on *Salafism* (a literalist, strict, and puritanical Islamic doctrine founded by the earliest Muslim fanatics and extremists who anchored their beliefs on the fact that Islam should be holistically puritanical, with rigid morality). Salafist Jihadists were bent on deploying violent Jihad against infidels and non-believers as the Almighty Allah-approved, legitimate way of expressing their beliefs in Islam. In addition, the adherents of the earlier *Salafi* movement and modus operandi, followed every literal tenet of the sacred texts, as propagated by Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic theological faithful of the era of Mongol invasions, who himself had also received his instructions from extremist, literalist and puritanical Islamic school founded by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who also introduced his model of Jihad, that he named, *Hanbalism*.

Mohammed Yusuf did not only have a Western education (tertiary); speak proficient English, and remained his lifetime, a resounding and outspoken orator, he also lived a plush, lavish, and Western lifestyle, with his house built with modern technology and decorated with imported western ornaments. He questioned such double-standard as a true example of deceptive hypocrite and self-contradictory. Yusuf's demagogic charisma had enhanced the proliferation of his message outside Maiduguri enroute to its neighbouring states like Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Plateau, Sokoto, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, and beyond Nigeria's territorial frontier such as Niger, Chad, Cameroon, etcetera, forming branches with executive committees under commanders named Amirs.

Boko Haram was officially founded in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the principal agenda of establishing an Islamic State governed by Sharia law as was shortly practised in Gwosa town. Yusuf was to further establish a religious complex he named *Markas* that comprised of a large mosque and an Islamic school where many poor families from Northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries enrolled their children. Some influential Muslim families in the North also found solace in sending their wards to the school for Islamic education. This Islamic school was to serve as a breeding and fertile ground for recruiting future Jihadists who were to fight for the course of Islam, *Allah* and Prophet Muhammed.

The group was initially operating under the name, Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation under the leadership of Mallam Lawal (Chothia, 2012). Thus, when Lawal travelled to continue his education in Maina, Saudi Arabia, Yusuf became his successor. Cook, (2011), captured it clearly that the sect was known for carrying out its activities peacefully in the years preceding the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. Notwithstanding the above assertions, it is doubtful whether what was in existence in the pre-2002 version of Boko Haram because the group was hardly known or recognized at that time. The present Boko Haram crisis started and escalated in 2009.

The legislation was enacted by the then state government mandating motorcycle riders to wear protective helmets as a safety measure to reduce injuries arising from motorcycles accidents. This step was stringently opposed by the Boko Haram sect that eventually culminated in a bloody clash between them and the law enforcement agencies. The above face-off had angered Yusuf who subsequently, wrote an open letter to the Federal Government in which he threatened the government and urged it to respond within forty days with the view to proffering a truce between the warring parties, and that if his call was treated with levity, disdain and ignominy, Jihad operation in the country would be the implication of such negligence which would only be halted by Allah (Murtada, 2013).

Consequently, the ultimatum was not acted upon by the government until the forty days window elapsed. This, according to Murtada (2013), spurred the terrorist group into adopting strategies and tactical plans for war against the Nigerian State manifested as the Islamic sect in an open confrontation with the Nigerian Army, the Nigeria Police Force, and the State Security Service. It could, therefore, be gleaned from the above submission that Boko Haram had perfected their plans against the Nigeria State long before helmets' policy was introduced.

VI. Nigerian National Security

The checkered history of Nigeria's national security has been riddled with violence, upheavals, social unrest, wanton destruction of life and property and the glaring ineptitude of the government and security forces at putting under check, these myriads of violence, since the country's political independence in 1960. It has always been one form of violence or the other in Nigeria, with webs of complexity due to the demand of time and space. Nigeria witnessed its major political violence in 1964 western political upheaval followed by a coup d'état in 1966, and a civil war between the federal forces and the Eastern Region (Biafran Republic) between 1967 to 1970, which precariously sent the country to almost the precipice of disintegration. This crisis continues to metamorphose in intensity; with Nigerians losing their lives daily. In recent times, this crisis has found expression in the Niger-Delta Militant insurgency and the ruthless, morbid emergence of Boko Haram Islamic terrorist insurgency, and its deadly counterpart, nomadic Fulani herdsman. Even though Nigerian governments at various times, have tried to overhaul the state's security apparatuses to curb this violence, peace and security remain elusive in the shore of Nigeria. This is notwithstanding the astronomical budgetary mapping expended on the security sector since the inception of Nigeria as a politically sovereign state.

Security of life and property is a fundamental human right encoded in Nigeria's constitution which the state has the sole responsibility to guarantee as to its primary duty. Since the transition to democracy in May 1999, Nigerian governments have abysmally failed to ensure the security of life and property Eugene (2016). This proposition, he explained could be seen in the various political violence and assassinations, electoral violence, wanton ethnic, communal and religious conflicts, sectarian violence, Niger-Delta unrest, kidnapping, armed robbery, bomb blasts, etcetera, that have bedevilled the Nigerian State. The most appalling of it all is the security forces' show of brutal impunity and utter disregard and ignominy for human lives.

Nigeria continues to experience internal strife and insecurity not because its security forces were not living up to their constitutionally assigned responsibilities but because the guarantee of national security transcends strong, virile and viable security institutions to other soft but essential human factors which must complement the security sector to ensure internal security. Disdain for these factors, Eugene (2016) claimed, has stimulated or triggered unrest in the country which has inevitably threatened the country's internal security. In the same vein, it has been submitted that poverty in the land seems to be the most hydra-headed monster threatening Nigeria's national security and pushing it to the brink of a Failed State. Poverty has increasingly worsened since the 1980s. Poverty portends grave danger to Nigerian State and human security. In effect, therefore, poverty, both from subjective and objective contexts, accounts for the precarious security in Nigeria. On the strength of this, a combination of widening gap in income inequality, worsening unemployment situation and perception of group segregation, discrimination and marginalization based on ethnic, religious creed, and communal differences create rigid identity, divide premised on primordial identity, thus fanning the embers of parochial resentment are igniting tension and violent unrest. This situation creates, out of this dangerous vacuum, a vicious state of might is right among people which culminates in the Hobbiesian and Darwinian's survival of the fittest. The consequential damage of this is a fertile ground for insecurity to thrive (Eugene 2016).

Apart from poverty, a religious crisis has also become a centrifugal factor threatening the country's national security. It is submitted that religious unrest has manifested in different ways ranging from incitement of violence or riot and inter-faith clashes which have consequently bred terrorism has found expression in Boko Haram, Ansaru and Fulani Herdsmen. The religious fundamentalists have degenerated into high-level intolerant killings and maiming, especially in Northern Nigeria. Citing News Watch Magazine, Eugene (2016) observed that political and electoral violence, coordinated killing and assassinations were on the rise since the inception and return of democracy in 1999. According to him, between 1999 and 2006, 24 cases of political assassinations were recorded, which claimed the lives of many prominent Nigerians. They include former Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Mr Bola Ige, Marshall Harry, Aminasoari Dikibo, Funsho William, Ogbonnaya Uche, Barnabas Igwe and Abigail, his wife. Sadly, none of the perpetrators has been punished.

VII. Operations/Activities of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Boko Haram Islamic sect under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf's successor, continued to adopt different tactics and operational mechanisms to adapt to the changing military designs and operational strategies of the security forces. We observed that this has made the war against terror in Nigeria herculean. Boko Haram's operational tactics fell below the rules of engagement, with disregard for *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Thus, there is always a fatal disregard for conventional engagement. It was further pointed out that the Islamic terrorist group operations include, guerrilla warfare such as hit-and-run attacks, ambushing the Nigerian security forces, suicide bombing, human shield, child soldiers, kidnapping and attacking places recognized under the international law as *civilian zones*, such as churches, hospitals, mosques, markets, schools, etcetera. The barbaric concept of *inter arma enim silent leges* by which the terrorists based their operation has been proscribed by the United Nations Charter as falling short of civilized behaviour.

To support the above analysis, Murtada (2013) observed that since the new leadership of Shekau, Boko Haram attacks have escalated unabatedly in terms of frequency and intensity. The group, carried out its first attacks when it orchestrated large prison breaks in September 2010 in Bauchi which extricated more than seven hundred prisoners including its foot soldiers. Furthermore, on 16th June 2011, the group attacked a police headquarters with a suicide bombing. Recalling some of the heinous activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria Murtada (2013), observed that in August 2011, a car loaded with explosives was crashed into the United Nations building in Abuja that killed twenty-one and wounded sixty people. To him, the horrendous explosion was a clear message to Nigeria and the world that Boko Haram was out to wage a brutal Jihad against its perceived Western enemies and their associates. According to this account, the suicide bomber had driven the car loaded with explosives, crashed it through two security barriers, to the reception rear, in the diplomatic zone of the building, and detonated the explosive. The impact of the explosion had immediately devastated the building, destroying it to its lower floor and foundation. In the same vein, in January 2012, the sect coordinated and carried out a series of deadly bombings in Kano, the largest commercial city in Northern Nigeria. The attacks resulted in the death of more than one hundred and eighty people including a great number of security personnel and civilians which was believed to be among the highest death in a single day since the group launched its violent campaign in July 2009 (Imasuen, 2015). In 2013, there was an escalation of carnages unleashed by Boko Haram Islamic insurgency, and as a tactical measure to contain further carnages and incineration, the Federal Government of Nigeria under former President Goodluck Jonathan (2009-2015), declared the State of Emergency in three most affected states of the region in May 2013, thus, further extending the existing ones that have been declared in some parts of Borno and Yobe states in late 2011. This was in line with the provision of

section 305 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Blanchard, 2016). However, the then sitting Governors were retained in power.

The implication of the above was that not much was successfully done. Between 2013 and 2014, the frequency of attacks on the Nigerian State by the insurgents skyrocketed unabatedly. The operational tactics of the sect became unpredictable for the Nigerian Security outfits as it resorted to kidnapping of women and children, especially female students. Boko Haram kidnapped nearly three hundred female students from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, which was later tagged 'Chibok School Girls'. This action spurred the United Nations Security Council Committee to blacklist Boko Haram on 22nd May 2014 (Blanchard, 2016). Between 2013 and 2016, Boko Haram had slaughtered more than one hundred thousand Nigerians across the country. According to him, the Federal Government had refused to release the true figures of victims of Boko Haram. This is to avoid the wrath of the Nigerian citizens, and also for political purposes. He added that more than ten million Nigerians have been displaced or affected by the insurgents' brutal act of terrorism.

It is pertinent to infer that suicide bombing has been a major and effective operational method of warfare deployed by Boko Haram against the Nigerian State. For instance, the suicide attack on Kano Central Mosque in November 2014 where the Islamic terrorists set off three suicide bombs and fired sporadically at the worshippers, killing more than a hundred people and injuring more than two hundred- and twenty-people Mark (2015).

In the same vein, Adrian (2014), strongly believed that Boko Haram successes in its Jihad campaigns against the Nigerian State were not unconnected with the lack of motivation among the security personnel fighting the war against terror. Most of the weaponry needed to effectively combat the terrorist group was either outdated or was not available for the combatants, he said. He cited a situation whereby the Islamic sect could easily disarm the security forces and carry out their ruthless operations without reinforcement from the security personnel. To buttress this point, he quoted, verbatim, the voluntary confession of one of the most wanted leaders of the Boko Haram who was fatally injured by the combined team of the Nigerian Army, State Security Service and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (An American Secret Force) in Borno State during the failed rescue operation of the five kidnapped White expatriates by members of the sect and its splinter sister, Ansaru.

We agree with the above submission. The issue of lack of motivation among the security forces cannot be overemphasized as sometime in 2014, some young military officers resorted to an act of mutiny to vent their frustration at the fronts.

VIII. Boko Haram Insurgency and Nigerian National Security

There is no doubt that the Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram, does not only pose a serious threat to Nigerian national security, but such threats have manifested through different forms. The effects of the terrorist group are far-reaching with proven consequential damage that continues to threaten the country's precarious unity and existence. In effect, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2016) reported that the Boko Haram insurgency is taking the lead as one of the deadliest terrorist insurgencies in the world. It rated Boko Haram first and second deadliest Islamic terrorist sect between 2014 and 2015 respectively due to the group's high propensity for violence, and destruction of life and property. Thousands of Nigerian citizens and foreigners have been murdered, businesses have been forced to shut down in some parts of Northern Nigeria such as Borno, Yobe, Kano, Bauchi and Adamawa states, developments have been stagnated, humanitarian crises have risen to its crescendo, and schools have been closed down indefinitely since the inception of Boko Haram carnages in the wake of 2009. The effects posed by Boko Haram insurgence on Nigerian National security will be given special attention below.

(a) Security Challenges

The effect of the activities of the sect on the country's security is alarming and disheartening. Thousands of men of the Nigerian security forces from the Nigerian Army, State Security Service, Nigeria Police Force, National Civil Defence and Security Corps and their counterpart paramilitary, known as the Civilian Joint Task Force have lost their lives combating the Boko Haram's dastard and ruthless war against the Nigerian state. The Boko Haram Islamic insurgency has always carried the war to the security facilities, such as the military barracks, police stations, security checkpoints, and even the homes of some of the security chiefs and successfully overrode them. This has drastically reduced the numerical strength of the security forces over the years. The above submission was irresistibly corroborated by the Global Terrorism Index (2016) when it asserted that aside from the civilian population being Boko Haram's primary target of attacks, the security forces are not exempted or insulated from these ruthless attacks. It noted that the Nigerian Army has been the worst hit by Boko Haram, followed by the police force, and the operatives of the State Security Service. With this state of affairs, it is irrefutable to submit that there is near or total demoralization of the combatants in the front against the terrorist Islamic sect. We agree with the above view given the statistical rates of casualties of Boko Haram in recent times, and the implication is, primarily, loss of human capital development in the country.

With the inability of the government to guarantee the life and property of its citizens, especially in the northern part of Nigeria, Boko Haram now operates with audacious impunity, as they can go to any strategic place, such as places of religious worship, schools and markets to unleash terror. Some unscrupulous criminals have taken advantage of the Islamic group to unleash acts of terror. With President Buhari's new administration's efforts to contain and decimate the terrorist group, the sect has taken recourse to new operational tactics which makes the sect unpredictable, elusive and dynamic. The recent killing of top military officials, especially the finest in the security sector is an instance. This has reduced the confidence of the people in the capability of the security agencies.

The above scenario implies that the Boko Haram menace has had damaging security implications for Nigeria, such as giving signals to the international community that Nigeria is a haven and fertile ground for terrorist activities, which makes the country uneven to visit. With the widespread insecurity in the North, there is a substantial decline in the growth and development of the country; thus, stunting human, political, socio-economic and psychological security. Expenditures on security are essential components of the development process. With the huge resources yearly earmarked for security in Nigeria, it is logical to infer that insecurity has substantially drained the country's national resources to the detriment of other national projects.

(b) Economic Effects

Nigeria has been plunged into a serious economic crisis with far-reaching implications as a result of the Boko Haram attacks. With the observation of the Global Terrorism Index (2016), Nigeria is presently plunged into economic recession, partly, because Boko Haram attacks businesses and business installations in the country. The level of investment and growth of businesses in the areas affected by Boko Haram has dwindled over the years. For instance, Kano State which was the largest commercial city in the North has become desolate as a result of insecurity occasioned by Boko Haram activities. In Maiduguri, Borno State capital, Banks and other financial institutions, and their customers now transact under a difficult and hostile economic environment which has reduced their work hours to guard against rampaging Boko Haram terrorists. The implication of the above is that the Boko Haram insurgency has adversely become a cog in the wheel of economic progress in the country. Accordingly, every sector of the economy is disrupted in one way or the other by the insurgents' continued campaign of violence and insecurity in Nigeria. As Okereocha (2012) added, the World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that the domestic economy lost a whopping N1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment due to the escalated activities of Boko Haram. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2010 Annual Report showed that the total foreign capital inflow into the Nigerian economy stood at \$ 5.99 billion. The FDI represented a 78.1 per cent drop from \$3.31 billion in 2009. With this gloomy picture, our analysis shows that the possibility of economic recovery in Nigeria may take decades of visionary and assiduous efforts.

(c) It has also been observed that the security threat posed by the Boko Haram insurgency has precipitated the ruin of the economy by crippling major economic activities in the North. Non-indigenes who were known as the catalysts of economic growth in the region have been forced out, thereby withdrawing the contribution towards the economic growth and development thereof. Consequently, as the activities of Boko Haram continue to discourage foreign investment in the North; its effects have been extended to the South. For these analysts, the disheartening situation is compelling prospective investors to turn to stable economies and invest their money. When prospective investors hear news of daily violence and insecurity, they change whatever plans they had nurtured for Nigeria. Of recent, the North has suffered a major setback in agricultural produce as a result of insecurity in the region. This has led to food insecurity across the nation.

On the telecom industry as a major source of the economic driver in Nigeria, it has been submitted that the telecom sector in the country witnessed sporadic changes since 1999 and its contributions to the national growth very enormous. Okereocha (2012) noted that the telecom industry has increased the inflow of foreign direct investment from \$18 billion in 2009 to \$35 billion in 2012. However, the sector has come under serious attacks with the recent bombing of over thirty telecoms infrastructure in the Northeastern (Yobe, Kano Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Borno and Potiskum) part of the country, which Boko Haram terrorist insurgency continues to claim responsibility. For instance, Boko Haram launched a two-day coordinated attack on telecom masks and installation belonging to several telecom operators across some of the major cities in the North. This attack disrupted lots of businesses as the means of communication was rendered inoperative.

(d) Humanitarian Crisis

The emergence of the Boko Haram Islamic terrorist insurgency and its spate of violence on the Nigerian citizens, especially in the North-eastern part of the country has precipitated humanitarian crisis through forced displacements, protracted famine, diseases, poverty and food insecurity. Our analysis of the Global Terrorism Index (2016) report revealed that Boko Haram insurgency has led to a high rate of human casualties, as thousands of deaths have been recorded from 2009 to 2016. The probative effect of this is that majority of women have been reduced into widows and children into orphans in Northeast Nigeria. Hundreds of incidences

relating to Boko Haram activities in the North-East between 2009 to 2016, ranging from armed attacks, kidnapping, suicide bombing and explosions and mass murder of the non-combatant citizens (civilians) have been recorded. The humanitarian consequences of the above are; a decrease in population, gender and sexual-based violence increment, reportedly to be common at the internally displaced person camps, and malnutrition from 2009 to 2016. With special reference to the Northeast of Nigeria, declared to be the hotbed of Boko Haram insurgency, the implication of the analysis of this data is an increase in the displacement of people from Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Adamawa states in the form of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) fleeing to guaranteed havens within other parts of the country, and refugees fleeing into neighbouring states like Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Women and children are the primary or worst-hit victims of this displacement. Internally displaced persons in their various refugee camps are facing humanitarian crises such as shortage of food and water resulting in hunger and malnutrition; poor sanitary facilities resulting in contagious diseases among the IDP; and sexual abuse by those saddled with the responsibility of protecting the IDPs. This submission was supported, irresistibly by the National Emergency Management Agency (2016) when it observed that poor living conditions in the IDP camps have become worrisome and concern for all. This is unfortunate and it is disheartening that despite the huge financial and humanitarian aid to the government nothing much has been done as these resources are being diverted by some government officials to gratify their selfish interests.

(e) Effect on Education

The Economist (2016) reported that Boko Haram has been attacking educational institutions and students therein across the North with a ruthless ferocity over the past years. As a result of these attacks, which include primary, secondary and tertiary institutions, most of the schools have been shut down indefinitely, increasing the high rate of illiteracy across the country. Boko Haram has declared total war against any paraphernalia that relates to Westernization, and since Boko Haram terrorist insurgency perceived western education as the means of inculcating Western civilization and culture, systematic war must be deployed against it to exterminate the last vestiges of Western education. Going by the true meaning of Boko Haram which means that Western Education is a sin, it was not surprising that schools have become the primary target of the terrorist insurgency, especially in the North. Many students and teachers have lost their lives in the course of impacting and reception of knowledge through Boko Haram's violent attacks on them. This ugly trend portends an imminent danger, to the country's national security, being that Boko Haram's spate of attack will dissipate human capital development in the country, drive down or reduces the workforce needed to man the country's economic and industrial sectors, and further affect the chances of the country's sustainable development. The abduction of Chibuk Girls and other schoolgirls in North-East Nigeria are epitomes of Boko Haram's damage to the educational sector in Nigeria.

IX. Government's Responses to Boko Haram Insurgency

The Nigerian Government underestimated the threats of Boko Haram when the group first started unleashing brutal attacks against the Nigerian state in 2002. The Nigerian Government, however, began to build a coherent strategy to deal with Boko Haram terrorist insurgency after its violence had escalated in July 2009, specifically in Borno, Bauchi and Yobe states. This strategy primarily focused on a military approach to combating the surge of terrorism, through kinetic operations. As a result, a Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising of the Army and other security agencies, codenamed *Operation Restore Order 1 and 111* was commissioned in 2009 to conduct large-scale military operations in Borno and Yobe states where Boko Haram had strong bases. The government also established new permanent military units in the two states. To further reinforce this strategy, the government also constituted the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) in 2007, which came into operational effect in 2012. This military formation consisted of over a dozen security agencies and government departments responsible for the implementation of Nigeria's security agenda. The NFPT's activities were coordinated by the Office of the National Security Advisers (ONSA), while the National Security Council, superintended by the President, periodically met to review national security issues. The government's effort at tackling the menace of Boko Haram has also led to the temporary closure of the country's porous borders to curtail illicit movements of arms and ammunition. The government's effort to end Boko Haram has also led to the enactment of the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) in June 2011 as a legal measure to prevent and deter sponsors of terrorism in the country.

Like other members of the international community, Nigeria has felt obliged to put in place laws that would assist in reducing the incidence of terrorism. One of such laws is the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. This Act was a drastic response embarked by the government to checkmate the activities and operations of terrorism. The Act seeks to provide measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and prescribes penalties for violating any of its provisions. Accordingly, the Act contains 41 sections, arranged into eight parts with a schedule, listing relevant statutes. Part I defines acts of terrorism and related offences while Part II contains provisions relating to terrorist funds and property.

Part III is on mutual assistance and extradition and Part IV is on information sharing on criminal matters. Part V and VI set out investigative and prosecution processes, respectively while Part VII deals with charities and Part VIII contains miscellaneous provisions.

X. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Boko Haram deployed unconventional means in waging a brutal war against the Nigerian State. With the chronological history of Boko Haram, and the attacks prosecuted successfully, the country's national security is under heavy threat. In addition to the high rates of daily attacks, gross violation and abuses of the citizen's rights with impunity, other forms of unrest remain rampant across the country. This is despite the heavy concentration of Nigerian troops in the insurgents'-controlled areas. The operational approach of the Boko Haram insurgency has led to a war of attrition on the Nigerian State Security Forces. The spates of attacks in the northeast are a pointer to the country's structural defects, especially as it relates to the security apparatuses.

Findings showed that Boko Haram has had a great negative impact on the country's national security development. Nigerian national security development was not only dwarfed but retarded by the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency. Worthy of notes are destructive impacts on the security, economic, humanitarian, socio-religious strata of the country. The nation's educational system, especially in the North has been worst and the unity of Nigeria is precariously on a verge of disintegration. Lots of strategic responses were initiated by the government as measures to nib Boko Haram insurgency in the bud. Findings revealed that most of the measures were laudable and achieved some measure of success, but their inherent weaknesses resulted in the continuous Boko Haram terrorism. Internal sabotage contributed to this weakness otherwise Nigeria is a military giant at its level that it can comfortably end Boko Haram in the country.

Thus, this paper observed that Nigeria has not lived up to its primary responsibility of ensuring adequate security of its citizens by terminating Boko Haram operations. Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), states inter alia, that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government."

The paper thus considered these recommendations:

1. The Nigerian Government ought to initiate visionary, factual and achievable schemes, both short-term and long-term to alleviate poverty in the country by engaging jobless youths in meaningful programmes that will manifest their potential. Job seekers need to be engaged to avoid aggressive behaviours associated with frustration. This will discourage youth from enlisting in the Boko Haram Jihadist movement for just a token of money.
2. Government should build new primary and secondary schools other than Islamic Schools. Most local governments in the North-East have no single secondary school located within their confines. These schools should be funded and stocked with ultra-modern facilities for quick learning.
3. A community-centric strategy aimed at denying Boko Haram members safe bases for operations should be adopted.
4. Nigerian Government need to work with its neighbouring States to activate joint border patrols to control the influx of arms and prevent Boko Haram insurgency access to other terrorist affiliates. This will decimate its operational capacity as its means of communication will be blockaded.
5. Government must facilitate closer cooperation between domestic security agencies and other international security experts and countries for intelligence gathering and sharing, assistance and training. Nigeria must look beyond the United States for military assistance to fast track the prosecution of its war on terror.
6. Government should also sanitize and sensitize its security forces to be more people-friendly in their approach and relations with the civilian public. This will help them in gathering intelligence reports from civilians' support.
7. There is an urgent need for a reconnaissance missions, spies and high-tech intelligence-gathering technology to be deployed by the security forces to monitor Boko Haram logistic movements, supplies, and financiers or sponsors within and outside the shore of Nigeria.
8. Effective means should be deployed to prosecute Boko Haram suspects in the law courts as soon as investigations and proof of evidence are completed.

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