



Research Paper

Three Decades of Disinvestment in India: Policy Shifts, Outcomes, and Challenges

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ABSTRACT

Over the past three decades, India's disinvestment policy has evolved as a critical instrument of economic reform, aimed at reducing fiscal burdens, enhancing efficiency, and fostering competitive markets. Initiated in 1991 alongside structural liberalisation, disinvestment has undergone significant policy shifts, transitioning from cautious minority stake sales to aggressive privatisation and strategic asset monetisation. This paper examines the trajectory of disinvestment in India, analysing its phases, outcomes, and persistent challenges. Using statistical data from government reports and academic studies, the study evaluates the fiscal, economic, and operational impacts of disinvestment, including its contribution to deficit reduction, GDP growth, and public sector enterprise performance. However, challenges such as political resistance, bureaucratic inertia, valuation disputes, and social equity concerns have constrained its effectiveness. The paper argues that while disinvestment has yielded mixed results, its long-term success hinges on transparent processes, stakeholder engagement, and complementary reforms. The findings contribute to ongoing debates on public sector restructuring in emerging economies.

KEYWORDS: Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs), Privatisation, Sectoral Analysis, Fiscal Consolidation, Strategic Sales, Non-strategic Sectors.

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I. INTRODUCTION

India's disinvestment journey, spanning three decades, is inextricably linked to its post-1991 economic liberalisation. Confronted with a balance of payments crisis, the Government initiated market-oriented reforms, dismantling the license-permit raj and redefining the state's role in the economy. Disinvestment—partial or full sale of public sector enterprise (PSE) stakes—emerged as a strategy to curb fiscal deficits, improve efficiency, and unlock capital for infrastructure and social spending (Ahluwalia, 2019). While proponents argue that disinvestment enhances competitiveness and governance, critics highlight job losses, asset undervaluation, and diluted welfare objectives. This paper traces the policy's evolution, evaluates its outcomes using empirical data, and identifies structural challenges. The paper is descriptive in nature. By synthesising fiscal records, sectoral and temporal analyses, and socio-political critiques, it offers a comprehensive assessment of India's disinvestment experience.

II. POLICY SHIFTS IN DISINVESTMENT

2.1 Phase 1: Incremental Reforms (1991–2000)

The initial phase, marked by caution, focused on minority stake sales in profitable PSEs to signal market-friendly intent without ceding control. The Rangarajan Committee (1992) recommended limiting government equity to 26% in non-strategic sectors, but implementation remained tepid. Between 1991 and 2000, only ₹20,000 crore was raised, primarily through public offerings in firms like Maruti Udyog and VSNL (Ministry of Finance [MoF], 2001). Political opposition, exemplified by trade union strikes and parliamentary resistance, hindered progress. For instance, the Disinvestment Commission's 1997 proposal to privatize 47 PSEs was shelved due to coalition pressures (Jenkins, 2004).

The cautious approach during this phase was also influenced by the socio-political context. The Government was wary of backlash from labour unions and the public, which had historically viewed PSEs as symbols of

national pride and economic sovereignty. The initial disinvestment efforts were thus characterized by a reluctance to fully embrace privatisation, leading to a piecemeal approach that often fell short of achieving significant fiscal or operational improvements.

2.2 Phase 2: Strategic Sales and Privatisation (2000–2014)

The Vajpayee Government (1998–2004) accelerated disinvestment, introducing strategic sales—transferring management control to private entities. Landmark transactions included Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) and Hindustan Zinc, generating ₹54,000 crore (MoF, 2005). However, controversies over undervaluation, such as the BALCO sale at ₹551 crore against a disputed valuation of ₹2,000 crore, sparked criticism (Goyal, 2005). The UPA regime (2004–2014) adopted a contradictory stance, halting strategic sales but continuing minority divestments, raising ₹1.7 lakh crore (MoF, 2014).

During this phase, the Government attempted to balance the need for fiscal consolidation with the political realities of a coalition government. The strategic sale of PSEs was often met with fierce opposition from labour unions and political parties, leading to protests and strikes. The government's attempts to privatize major entities like Air India and BSNL faced significant hurdles, reflecting the complexities of navigating public sentiment and political opposition.

2.3 Phase 3: Aggressive Monetisation (2014–Present)

The Modi government prioritized disinvestment as part of its “Minimum Government, Maximum Governance” agenda. This phase marked a significant shift in the approach to disinvestment, characterized by aggressive monetisation strategies and a renewed focus on privatisation. The introduction of the National Monetisation Pipeline (NMP) aimed to unlock value from public assets across various sectors, including roads, railways, and power. The Government set ambitious targets, aiming to raise ₹1.75 lakh crore through disinvestment in the fiscal year 2021–22 alone (MoF, 2021).

Key transactions during this phase included the strategic sale of Air India, which was finalized at ₹18,000 crore despite the airline's accumulated debts of ₹60,000 crore, highlighting the challenges of asset valuation and the complexities involved in privatising loss-making entities (Choudhury, 2022). The sale of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) and the initial public offering (IPO) of Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) were also significant milestones, with LIC's IPO raising ₹21,000 crore in 2022, making it one of the largest in Indian history (MoF, 2023).

Despite these efforts, the Government faced criticism for the perceived undervaluation of assets and the lack of transparency in the bidding processes. The privatisation of Air India, for instance, was marred by allegations of favoritism and inadequate scrutiny of the bidders, raising concerns about the long-term implications for competition in the aviation sector (Kumar, 2022). Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the disinvestment agenda, leading to delays and a reassessment of targets.

III. OUTCOMES OF DISINVESTMENT: SECTORAL AND TEMPORAL

Disinvestment has been a cornerstone of India's fiscal strategy since the economic liberalisation of 1991, aimed at mobilising resources, reducing fiscal deficits, and improving public sector efficiency. The revenue generated through disinvestment varies significantly across sectors and years, influenced by economic conditions, policy priorities, and market sentiment. In this section, we shall try to analyse the sectoral contributions and temporal trends in disinvestment proceeds, highlighting key transactions and their fiscal implications.

The *energy and natural resources sector* has been a focal point of disinvestment, contributing significantly to total proceeds. Major undertakings include the divestment of shares in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), and Coal India Limited (CIL). For instance, the 2015 offer-for-sale (OFS) of Coal India raised approximately ₹22,557 crore, marking one of the largest single disinvestments (Department of Investment and Public Asset Management [DIPAM], 2021). Similarly, the 2022–23 fiscal year witnessed a major disinvestment in ONGC, contributing ₹3,000 crore to the exchequer (DIPAM, 2023). The energy sector's prominence stems from its capital-intensive nature and the government's aim to reduce subsidies while attracting private investment for technological upgradation. However, critics argue that such sales often prioritize revenue generation over long-term energy security (Virmani, 2019).

The *manufacturing and heavy industries sector*, encompassing steel, chemicals, and engineering, has also witnessed substantial disinvestment. Companies like Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) and Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) were partially privatized in the early 2000s, with the Government exiting HZL completely by 2003. The privatization of Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) in 2002–03 generated ₹769 crore marked an early success (Gupta & Sivaraman, 2020). However, the sector's contribution has been uneven, with years like 2016–17 seeing minimal activity due to global commodity price volatility. The strategic sale of Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEM) in 2021–22, yielding ₹1,244 crore, reflects renewed efforts to monetize underutilized assets

(Ministry of Finance, 2022). These sales aimed to revive underperforming units through private management. However, outcomes have been mixed; while BALCO improved productivity post-privatisation, sectors like steel faced challenges due to cyclical demand and global market volatility, limiting investor interest (Mishra, 2018).

The *financial services sector* emerged as a critical revenue source in recent years, particularly after the landmark initial public offering (IPO) of Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) in 2022. The LIC IPO alone contributed ₹20,557 crore, representing over 60% of the ₹33,000 crore disinvestment target for 2022–23 (DIPAM, 2023). Earlier, the partial disinvestment of public sector banks like Indian Bank and Central Bank of India in 2017–18 added ₹10,000 crore to the treasury, driven by reforms to meet Basel-III capital adequacy norms (Rao & Dhar, 2021). The Government also has reduced its stake in other public sector banks like IDBI Bank to meet Basel-III norms and improve governance. However, resistance from employee unions and concerns about private monopolies in essential services have slowed progress (Rao & Dhar, 2021).

The *transportation and logistics sector*, including aviation and shipping, has seen targeted disinvestment efforts. Air India's strategic sale to Tata Group in 2021, valued at ₹18,000 crore, marked a milestone in privatising loss-making enterprises (Press Information Bureau, 2021). Similarly, the Government divested stakes in Container Corporation of India (CONCOR) to enhance port infrastructure efficiency. Conversely, delays in the privatization of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), initially slated for 2020–21, resulted in missed revenue targets, highlighting sector-specific challenges like regulatory hurdles and investor apprehensions (Economic Survey, 2022–23). Nonetheless, challenges such as high debt burdens and regulatory complexities have deterred faster execution in this sector (Chakraborty & Chakraborty, 2022).

A notable trend is the prioritisation of “non-strategic” sectors under the 2021 Public Sector Enterprise Policy, which classifies sectors into strategic and non-strategic. While the Government retains a minimal presence in strategic sectors like atomic energy and defense, non-strategic sectors such as hospitality and tourism are slated for complete privatisation (Ministry of Finance, 2021). This policy aims to unlock capital for social sector spending but faces criticism for potential job losses and reduced control over critical assets (Jha, 2022).

Temporally, disinvestment revenues have fluctuated based on political will and market conditions. The period between 2014–15 and 2017–18 saw robust activity, with annual averages of ₹40,000 crore, driven by OFS in energy and financial sectors (DIPAM, 2021). However, 2020–21 witnessed a sharp decline to ₹32,000 crore due to pandemic-induced market volatility, despite ambitious targets of ₹2.1 lakh crore (Ministry of Finance, 2021). The post-2021 recovery, fuelled by the LIC IPO and Air India sale, underscores the role of high-profile transactions in bridging fiscal gaps.

It has been witnessed that the government's reliance on minority stake sales—rather than strategic exits—has limited revenue potential. For example, between 2016 and 2023, over 70% of disinvestment proceeds came from OFS and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which do not transfer management control (Jha, 2022). This contrasts with strategic sales like HZL and BALCO, which generated long-term efficiency gains alongside revenues. Moreover, sectors like tourism and hospitality, classified as “non-strategic” under the 2021 Public Sector Enterprise Policy, remain under-monetised due to bureaucratic inertia and low investor interest (Virmani, 2019).

Despite progress, challenges persist. The over-reliance on minority stake sales, rather than strategic exits, has limited the transformative impact of disinvestment. Additionally, bureaucratic delays, political opposition, and valuation disputes often hinder transactions. For instance, the repeated deferral of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) privatisation highlights systemic inefficiencies (Economic Survey, 2022–23). Moreover, the social implications of disinvestment, including labour unrest and reduced access to public services, necessitate balanced policymaking.

IV. OTHER OUTCOMES OF DISINVESTMENT

4.1 Economic and Operational Efficiency

Privatized entities often exhibit improved profitability and operational efficiency. For instance, Hindustan Zinc's net profit surged from ₹700 crore in 2003 to ₹8,000 crore in 2022 post-privatisation (Vedanta Resources, 2022). Similarly, Maruti Suzuki dominates India's auto sector with a 43% market share, showcasing the potential benefits of privatisation in enhancing competitiveness and innovation (Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers [SIAM], 2023). The operational efficiency of privatized firms is often attributed to better management practices, increased accountability, and a focus on profitability.

Conversely, retained PSEs lag in innovation and efficiency. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) reported cumulative losses of ₹1.5 lakh crore by 2023, reflecting the challenges of operating in a competitive environment without the necessary reforms (Department of Telecommunications [DoT], 2023). The contrast between the performance of privatized and retained entities underscores the need for a strategic approach to public sector management, focusing on enhancing efficiency and competitiveness.

4.2 Sectoral Employment Effects

While disinvestment spurred growth in sectors such as telecommunications and aviation, strategic sectors like energy and infrastructure saw limited gains. Post-BPCL's privatisation, fuel pricing efficiency improved, but rural LPG penetration stagnated at 75%, indicating that privatisation alone does not guarantee equitable access to essential services (Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell [PPAC], 2023). The benefits of disinvestment have not been uniformly distributed across sectors, raising concerns about the long-term implications for public welfare.

Employment in central PSEs has also declined significantly, from 1.7 million in 2010 to 1.3 million in 2022, exacerbating informal sector absorption and raising concerns about job security (Labour Bureau, 2022). The reduction in employment opportunities in PSEs, coupled with the challenges of job creation in the private sector, has led to increased unemployment rates, particularly among youth and marginalized communities. The social implications of disinvestment, particularly in terms of job losses and the erosion of social safety nets, warrant careful consideration in future policy formulations.

The impact of disinvestment on employment is multifaceted. While privatisation can lead to job losses in the short term, it can also create new opportunities in the long run through enhanced efficiency and competitiveness. For instance, the privatisation of airlines has led to the emergence of new players in the market, resulting in job creation in the aviation sector. However, the transition has not been smooth, with many former employees of privatized entities facing challenges in re-entering the workforce. The Government must address these transitional issues through retraining programs and social safety nets to mitigate the adverse effects of disinvestment on employment.

V. CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS

5.1 Political and Bureaucratic Hurdles

Opposition from unions and populist rhetoric often stalls reforms. The 2003 strike against HPCL and BPCL disinvestment involved 40,000 workers, delaying sales by a decade (Sharma, 2004). Bureaucratic aversion to accountability further impedes transparent processes. The political landscape in India is characterized by a complex interplay of interests, where disinvestment often becomes a contentious issue. Political parties, particularly those with a strong labour base, have historically opposed privatisation, viewing it as a threat to job security and public welfare.

The Government's attempts to navigate this political landscape have often resulted in compromises that dilute the effectiveness of disinvestment policies. For instance, the reluctance to fully privatize loss-making entities like Air India reflects the challenges of balancing fiscal imperatives with political realities. The bureaucratic inertia in implementing disinvestment policies further complicates the situation, as decision-making processes are often slow and mired in red tape.

5.2 Valuation and Transparency Issues

Asset undervaluation allegations plague transactions. The Hindustan Zinc sale faced litigation over undervaluation, with the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) estimating a ₹25,000 crore loss (CAG, 2012). Weak institutional frameworks, such as opaque bidding processes, erode public trust. The lack of transparency in the valuation of public assets raises concerns about the integrity of the disinvestment process. Critics argue that undervaluation not only results in significant losses for the exchequer but also undermines the credibility of the government's commitment to fair and transparent privatisation.

The Government's approach to asset valuation has often been criticized for favoring private bidders at the expense of public interest. The controversy surrounding the sale of BALCO and the subsequent legal battles highlight the need for a more robust and transparent valuation framework. Establishing clear guidelines and independent valuation mechanisms can enhance the credibility of the disinvestment process and build public trust.

5.3 Social Equity Concerns

Disinvestment disproportionately impacts marginalized communities reliant on PSE reservations. Post-privatisation, Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) employment in BALCO dropped from 22% to 8% (Thorat, 2010). Regional disparities persist; 60% of disinvestment proceeds originate from Maharashtra and Delhi, neglecting eastern states (NITI Aayog, 2021). The social implications of disinvestment extend beyond employment; they also encompass issues of equity and access to essential services. The privatisation of public assets can exacerbate existing inequalities, particularly in regions that are already economically disadvantaged.

The Government must adopt a more inclusive approach to disinvestment, ensuring that the benefits of privatisation are equitably distributed across different regions and communities. This can be achieved through targeted policies that prioritize the needs of marginalized groups and promote inclusive growth. Additionally,

the establishment of social impact assessments as part of the disinvestment process can help identify potential adverse effects on vulnerable populations and inform policy decisions.

VI. CONCLUSION

India's disinvestment policy reflects a complex interplay of economic pragmatism and political compromise. While it has alleviated fiscal pressures and enhanced sectoral efficiency, structural challenges—valuation disputes, labour displacement, and equity gaps—undermine its transformative potential. The mixed outcomes of disinvestment underscore the need for a balanced approach that prioritizes not only economic efficiency but also social equity and public welfare.

The experience of disinvestment in India highlights the importance of transparent processes and stakeholder engagement. Future disinvestment strategies should incorporate comprehensive stakeholder consultations to address concerns from labour unions, civil society, and affected communities. This engagement can foster a more inclusive dialogue around the objectives and implications of disinvestment, ultimately leading to more sustainable outcomes.

Sectoral analysis of disinvestment reflects that while energy and financial services dominate proceeds, manufacturing, and transportation sectors illustrate both successes and setbacks. Temporal trends highlight the impact of macroeconomic stability and political resolve. Future strategies must address structural bottlenecks, prioritise strategic exits, ensure transparency, and align with socio-economic objectives to optimise outcomes.

Moreover, the Government must prioritise the establishment of robust regulatory frameworks that ensure fair valuation practices and transparent bidding processes. By enhancing the credibility of the disinvestment process, the Government can build public trust and mitigate opposition from various stakeholders. Additionally, implementing social safety nets and retraining programs for displaced workers can help address the adverse effects of disinvestment on employment and livelihoods.

As India aspires to achieve a \$5 trillion economy, strategic disinvestment must balance efficiency with inclusivity, ensuring that public assets catalyze equitable growth. The lessons learned from three decades of disinvestment can inform future policy directions, emphasising the need for a holistic approach that integrates economic, social, and environmental considerations.

In conclusion, while disinvestment has the potential to drive economic growth and improve public sector efficiency, its success hinges on a commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and social responsibility. By addressing the challenges and criticisms associated with disinvestment, India can harness the benefits of privatisation while safeguarding the interests of its citizens.

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