



Research Paper

Post-Colonial African Security Governance: A Critical Look at the Relationships Between Military and Civilian Components in the Fight Against Security Threats in the Lake Chad Basin, on the Borders of Cameroon's Far North Region

Florent Guy ATANGANA MVOGO

Associate Professor in Political Science, University of Ngaoundéré (Cameroon)

Abstract

During the precolonial period, traditional chiefdoms in Cameroon's Far North region were the guarantors of the security of people and property living on their territories. The German colonial state, by creating a professional army, emptied them of this substantive function while instrumentalizing them. This desubstantializing instrumentalization was reproduced in the postcolonial state under President Ahmadou Ahidjo, with the creation of a professional army in 1959. From then on, relations of suspicion were established between the armed forces and the civilian component of society, of which the traditional chiefdom constituted the emblematic symbol of security. This suspicion was fueled by stereotypes maintained on both sides. It is in this context of mutual suspicion that new forms of insecurity such as terrorism emerge. Given the categorical imperative of fighting them effectively, how are the relationships articulated between the security forces and the civil society components — namely traditional chiefdoms and their affiliates, the vigilance committees — within the responsive apparatus of the Cameroonian state? Through theoretical and empirical investigations, it has become apparent to us that although the postcolonial Cameroonian state initially repressed the civilian component in the fight against insecurity, effective combat against new forms of security threats in Cameroon's Far North region requires a synergistic interlocking of energies between conventional security forces on the one hand, and traditional chiefdoms and their associated vigilance committees on the other. This interlocking takes various forms and, for greater effectiveness, calls for a revalorizing reconsideration of traditional chiefdoms.

Keywords: African security governance, traditional chiefdoms, vigilance committees, Far North Cameroon

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I. INTRODUCTION

In a speech delivered on August 15, 1970, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Cameroonian Joint Military Academy, President Ahmadou Ahidjo emphasized that "armies alone are not enough to save a nation (...)." ¹ Indeed, far from questioning the action and reaction capabilities of the military component in the event of a security threat, this remark rather highlights the necessary combination of the military component with the civilian component of society. The construction of security/insecurity is a complex phenomenon arising from diverse "rational" actors. Sometimes, for economic and/or political reasons, the actors of insecurity turn out to be the very same ones responsible for security on state territories. This operational strategic duplicity of actors forces the states of the Lake Chad Basin in general, and Cameroon in particular, to opt for a dual configuration of actors based on a convergence of defense forces and the civilian component of society.

The phenomenon of insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin clearly appears as a conflictual cocktail that, in many respects, surpasses the capabilities of any army alone, no matter how effective it may be. In light of this consideration, it seems important, in the strategy to combat this phenomenon, to associate the civilian component, notably traditional chiefdoms and the vigilance committees closely linked to them. Faced with contemporary security threats as experienced on the borders of Cameroon's Far North region, how is the

¹Quoted by HAMENI BIALEU (V), in *Politique de défense et de sécurité nationale du Cameroun*, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2012 p183

relationship articulated between the armed forces and the civilian components — namely traditional chiefdoms and their affiliates, the vigilance committees — within the responsive apparatus of the Cameroonian state?

Based on theoretical and empirical investigations, we will attempt to show that traditional chiefdoms and the vigilance committees they coordinate rely on a dual capital — past and present to establish themselves as indispensable actors in the fight against insecurity. With the diversification of threats, armed forces find themselves "overwhelmed" from an operational standpoint. In a context marked by the rise of asymmetric security threats and other protean threats such as that of Cameroon, the state can only count on its original dual military and non-military actantial anchoring. It appears that if the military component constitutes the benchmark in the fight against insecurity, it now relies on non-military components, particularly traditional chiefdoms and vigilance committees, which were previously excluded from this field in the name of the professionalization of armies proclaimed in the new postcolonial states. The initial antagonism between civilian and military components has gradually been replaced by operational complementarity in response to a critical juncture²

1. THE INITIAL REPRESSION OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT IN THE FIELD OF INSECURITY BY THE POSTCOLONIAL CAMEROONIAN STATE

In the field of security in sub-Saharan Africa, the establishment of a professional and conventional army was erected as a categorical imperative during the colonial period, and after independence the same pattern was reproduced. This process had the consequence of emptying traditional chiefdoms of a large part of their prerogatives as guarantors of the security of their members, and therefore as exclusive actors in the fight against insecurity. There was thus a kind of desubstantialization of these entities with respect to their security functions.

1.1. THE DESUBSTANTIALIZATION OF TRADITIONAL CHIEFDOMS FROM THEIR SECURITY FUNCTION

In precolonial Africa, the traditional chiefdom was the original repository of power within society. It was thus the guarantor of the security of populations, and therefore the mainstay of the fight against insecurity. The fight against insecurity was, in short, its responsibility. With the arrival of the colonizer, it was stripped of this sovereign mission, having been subjugated by the Westphalian model of societal organization. This led to the decline of the chieftaincy institution, coupled with its "denaturation"³ Unfortunately, this general reality in Africa did not spare the cultural area on which our study focuses, which falls within the territory of the historical Kingdom of Kanem-Bornu⁴. How did this transformation occur in Cameroon?

Indeed, after the signing of the German-Duala treaty in 1884, the German colonial state took possession of the coastal zone and, applying the principle of the hinterland⁵, launched the conquest of the interior. To guarantee the success of this enterprise, fraught with sometimes fierce resistance, it created a police force, the *Polizeitruppe*, as early as 1891, and then an army, the *Schutztruppe für Kamerun*, in 1895. These were the protection troops of Cameroon, composed of 15 officers, 23 non-commissioned officers, 318 men, and 150 police officers. Their mission was to establish, maintain, and defend German domination over Cameroonian territory. In 1914, when the First World War broke out, these troops numbered 1,550 soldiers under the command of 185 officers, and 1,200 police officers under the authority of 30 officers.

²In the Lake Chad Basin, we have observed two types of threats that guide states' actions: "crucial focalizing" threats and "crucial bifocalizing" threats. A "crucial focalizing" threat refers to any event assessed as a threat significant enough to warrant immediate and concerted decisive action. As for the "bifocal crucial threat," this refers to an event deemed a threat by states but requiring further examination by them; and which can be temporarily resolved through individual action, until it is deemed more urgent and requiring immediate action. Unlike the "bifocalizing critical threat," a critical threat deemed focalizing compels states to act immediately and in concert. On this point, see BLAMA (A.B.), "Identity and Security Engineering in the Chad Lake Basin," Doctoral Thesis/Ph.D. in Political Science, Specialization International Relations and Strategic Studies, University of Ngaoundéré (Cameroon), 2021; BLAMA (A.B.), "God, Man, and Fear: Reflections on the Causes of Terrorism in the Chad Lake Basin," *Africa and Science/Afrique et Science*, No. 00252, May 2021

³ MUENI WA MUIU & MARTIN (G.), « Repenser l'Etat, la démocratie et le développement en Afrique. Fundiwa Afrika » in PONDI (J.-E.) (dir.), *Repenser le développement à partir de l'Afrique*, Yaoundé, Afrédit, 2011, pp.125-137.

⁴ MAQUET (E.), KAKE (I.B.) & SURET-CANALE (J.), *Histoire de l'Afrique Centrale des origines au milieu du 20^e Siècle*, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1971, pp.85-99

⁵ Adopted at the Berlin Conference of 1884, this principle held that once a colonial power had occupied the coast, it was to advance inland until it encountered another colonial power. At that point, the two powers were required to reach an agreement to demarcate the boundaries of their territorial holdings.

To be sure, although relying on the colonial army, the colonial administration instrumentalized traditional chiefdoms by using their aura, their credibility in short, the power that traditional chiefs possessed to establish its authority and domination in the geographical areas of the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, the colonizer, realizing that he could not easily substitute himself for traditional authority, preferred to compromise with the latter in order to supervise populations, ensure their security, and maintain social peace⁶. However, the impoverishment of the *laamiibé*⁷ (traditional rulers) caused relations between the colonizers and the latter to degenerate into mutual suspicion and incessant complaints⁸

With the departure of the colonizer, new "black-skinned colonizers" emerged educated natives who instinctively reproduced the same configuration of relations between these two entities, hence their difficult collaboration. Given this tense relationship, the *laamiido* (traditional chief) in the northern part of the country adopted an ambivalent attitude toward crime⁹ that generates insecurity, behaving sometimes as an agent of repression of criminal acts, sometimes as a predator generating such acts. The postcolonial administration inherited this complex context. A circular from the Cameroonian Secretary of State for the Interior, Y.M. Lamine, dated February 22, 1962, on the role and power of traditional chiefs, reflects the tense relations between these two entities. The President of the Republic of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, himself originating from the northern part of the country, knew how to manage these "local powder kegs." He caused traditional chiefdoms to lose most of their prerogatives by turning them into civil servants, by means of a decree dated July 15, 1977¹⁰. Indeed, to channel the excesses observed among traditional chiefs, the Cameroonian state placed them under the control of administrative authorities. This option has continuously given rise to ambiguity in the northern part of the country. This situation creates an adversarial relationship between state authorities and traditional authorities in a balance of power unfavorable to traditional chiefdoms. With regard to security construction, the desubstantialization of traditional chiefdoms was accompanied by a monopolistic institutionalization of a professional army.

1.2. THE MONOPOLISTIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A RIGID ARMY

Classically, the role of military actors is to combat threats that affect the integrity of citizens and property, and which thus undermine the survival of their states. According to Mustapha Benchenane and Jean-Félix Ongoya¹¹, there are three types of armies in Africa: "neo-colonial armies," "liberation armies," and "revolutionary armies." The defense and security forces of the Lake Chad Basin, of which Cameroon is a part, fall into the first category. They share a common trajectory, given that they are heirs to colonial armies and are certainly in quest of professionalization. As a neo-colonial army, the Cameroonian army is an extension of the colonial army. As such, at its creation in 1959¹², it was perceived by the civilian component of society less as an instrument of population security than as a tool for dominating them. The relations prevailing between "uniformed men" and populations are thus structured by stereotypes each entity holds toward the other^{13,14}. These stereotypes are fueled by the fact that the army rests on a strongly corporate spirit conferred by military training; this training leads those who have undergone it to believe that they have shed their civilian spirit and that they are superior to civilians. Fortified by this spirit which shapes a stereotype, soldiers are perceived more by populations as oppressors¹⁵ rather than as protectors. This link between postcolonial armies and colonial

⁶SAIBOU (I.), « Laamiido et sécurité dans le Nord-Cameroun », *Annales de la FALSH l'Université de Ngaoundéré*, Vol. III, 1998 p.67.

⁷ idem

⁸ SAIBOU (I), *op.cit*, p.95.

⁹ SAIBOU (I), *op.cit*, p.64

¹⁰ SAIBOU (I), *op.cit*, p.95

¹¹Quoted by FOGUE TEDOM (A.), *Enjeux géostratégiques et conflits politiques en Afrique Noire*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008, p.335.

¹²It was established by Decree No. 56/57 of November 11, 1989, amid the violence caused by the war of independence, and aims to organize the national defense

¹³ SAIBOU (I), *op.cit*, p12

¹⁴For Hans de Marie HEUNGOU, this situation leads to the "erosion of the bond between the military and the nation" HEUNGOU (H-D-M.), « *Le BIR et la GP dans la politique de défense et de sécurité du Cameroun* », *Op. cit.*, , p. 126.

¹⁵In this region, there is a more or less consistent perception of men in uniform. The soldier is seen as an oppressor. According to popular prejudice, he is the one who brings chaos and causes harm. This can be seen in the psychological trauma that the colonial period instilled in people's minds regarding their relationship with soldiers. Indeed, whether during the colonial period or even afterward, soldiers have always been deployed to quell resistance. Violence—and even gunfire on certain occasions—was very often used to coerce populations and pacify areas with bellicose tendencies. The army became an instrument of coercion, sometimes unjustified.

armies is all the more significant given that postcolonial states have had to resort to the support of former colonial powers to accelerate the professionalization process of their armies. This is evidenced by the establishment of the French RECAMP program (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix), the American ACRF (African Crises Response Force) and ACRI (African Crises Response Initiative) and, the British BMATT (British Military Advisory and Training Team); the RECAMP program being the most effective in our spatial study area¹⁶

Over the years and with the emergence of new forms of security threats in the Lake Chad Basin such as terrorism, a collaboration between the civilian component and the military component has proved necessary in Cameroon for an effective fight against insecurity. This collaboration, which essentially¹⁷ involves traditional chiefdoms and vigilance committees, reflects the complementarity between civilian and military components in the fight against insecurity in the Cameroonian part of the Lake Chad Basin.

2. A CONSUMMATED OPERATIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY

Today, in the Lake Chad Basin, there are security threats of various kinds. Among these is terrorism, a threat recognized worldwide as stemming from violent extremism. Terrorism consists of groups or individuals using extreme violence against civilian populations, with the aim of creating a climate of terror or intimidation within those populations or of compelling a government for political, ideological, or religious purposes. It is an asymmetric threat that undermines the capabilities of conventional armies. Faced with this threat, which is expanding rapidly in today's world, the states of the Lake Chad Basin have become aware that the army-population link constitutes an effective approach to combating insecurity in general. They are therefore capitalizing on this complementary link, which presents considerable advantages and which should lead to the reevaluation of the civilian component, particularly traditional chiefdoms and vigilance committees, in the fight against insecurity.

2.1. A COMPLEMENTARITY WITH UNDENIABLE ADVANTAGES

The participation of the population in the security of their region requires the combination of social forces and technical skills to effectively combat the enemy¹⁸. It makes defense "total"¹⁹ and inclusive, and proceeds from the implementation of the "nation in arms"²⁰ approach. This approach proves salutary in a context of fighting terrorism, which is an asymmetric threat. Indeed, in the field of cross-border security, self-defense groups or vigilance committees constitute a specific category of organized groups, under the direction and control of administrative authorities and the "coordination" of traditional chiefdoms, which take a hyper-active part in the fight against insecurity²¹. Anchored in the legal framework of the state through the constitution,

This trauma was then passed down from generation to generation through the stories of the elders. The mere sight of a sooje, soojeejo (man in uniform in the Fulfulde language), or sooja (the Kirdi linguistic adaptation of the English word "soldier") sometimes triggers a panic in some people that an uninformed observer would find difficult to understand. Furthermore, whether in the crackdown on subversion under President Ahidjo, during the attempted coup d'état of April 6, 1982, or in the draconian measures to combat serious crime in the Far North, soldiers have consistently distinguished themselves through the use of violence—whether justified or not. Also cited as a source of this fear is the ambivalent role regarding security sometimes played by certain elements—the black sheep—of the Army, who occasionally extort the population. Through their actions, these elements tarnish the Army's reputation. The soldier is now perceived by the population as an oppressor, a predator.

¹⁶For details on all these Western military initiatives in support of Africa, see FOGUE TEDOM (A.), *Geostrategic Issues and Political Conflicts in Black Africa*, op. cit.

¹⁷There are other components of civil society, such as nongovernmental organizations, etc. For the purposes of this study, these other components are not included.

¹⁸This is understandable, given that terrorism remains "above all a method of struggle employed by civilian fighters." Their modus operandi seems to be dictated, first and foremost, by the environment in which they operate. (for more details, see DESMARETZ (G.), *Les armes du terrorisme. La vérité dévoilée*, Paris, Editions Chiron, 2014, 211p.)

¹⁹For more on this, see PEMBOURA (A.), « Les configurations de la culture stratégique camerounaise : Essai de caractérisation », *Polis/RCSP*, vol.20, n° 1-2, p.86.

²⁰The adoption of the "armed population" approach refers to the policy of popular defense. It reflects the involvement of the entire nation in national defense, which is conceived as a collective and joint resistance against any threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity.

²¹MBEGUELE (P.A.D.), « Les groupes non conventionnels et la lutte contre le terrorisme au Cameroun : le cas des comités de vigilance » in OLINGA (A.D.) (dir.), *Droit international, droits nationaux et lutte contre le terrorisme en Afrique, Actes du Colloque international*, IRIC, Yaoundé, 2016, p.526.

whose preamble establishes the principle of popular defense notably with the formula: "All citizens contribute to the defense of the homeland," and various regulatory and legislative acts²², vigilance committees are specialized forces for maintaining public order that act at the request and need of the competent authorities²³, and that respond to the principle of passive defense organization. The latter is "(...) a defense service whose mission is at all times and in all places to protect the civilian population, material resources, and various national wealth from the risks and effects of war"²⁴ These are groups of people organized in a mass levy to defend their villages against the abuses of insecurity actors such as the Islamist sect BOKO HARAM. With regard to this particular insecurity actor, Alain Didier Olinga considers that the immediate aim of vigilance committees "(...) is, to the extent that circumstances permit in practice, to avoid being surprised by the terribly deadly attacks of BOKO HARAM elements, to observe suspicious movements and behavior of terrorist accomplices, and to alert the combat units of the regular army,"²⁵ beyond the paramilitary roles they are also often called upon to play in many factual cases.

Regarding traditional chiefdoms, as highlighted above, one must go back in time, particularly to the precolonial period, to realize that traditional chiefs were the guarantors of the well-being and security of people and property living on their territories. They worked to secure their areas of command. The role of Lamidats, Sultanates, and other types of traditional chiefdoms in resolving security problems in the Lake Chad Basin is worth mentioning considering four sets of arguments.

First, we must start from the very status of traditional chiefs²⁶, notably responsible for relaying and ensuring the implementation of administrative decisions. Traditional chiefs are therefore intermediaries between the administration and the populations. In this respect, they prove to be intermediaries, transmission belts between the "top" and the "bottom."²⁷ This means that traditional chiefs are hybrid personalities. They are not completely administrators²⁸, nor are they ordinary members of the population. Traditional chiefs would thus be agents of conciliation between state and popular strategies, aiming to secure the state both internally and at the borders.

Second, traditional chiefs are effective agents of "preventive diplomacy"²⁹ The application of a preventive defense strategy has a "substantial advantage," in that it "saves taxpayer money compared to military action."³⁰ Seen in this light, traditional chiefdoms are of great contribution. The asset that traditional chiefs capitalize on at this level is the fluidity of cross-border relations existing between traditional chiefs on both sides of the Lake Chad Basin borders, a fluidity underpinned by millennia-old protean relationships based on ethno-religious brotherhoods and solidarities. These rationalizations thus proceed from an informal strategic organization, with the aim of securing their territories.

Third, traditional chiefdoms constitute structures that conjure conflict within society. Seen from this angle, traditional chiefs enjoy and use their practical functional duality as political chiefs and religious chiefs. The combination of both spiritual and temporal swords is an asset, insofar as the traditional chief is obeyed as much as a spiritual chief as a temporal chief. By speaking in favor of interfaith tolerance, the traditional chief becomes an artisan of peace and security.

²²Decree No. 68/DF/33 of January 29, 1968, defining the missions of the Regular, Auxiliary, and Support Forces; Decree No. 70/DF/264 of May 8, 1968, concerning the internal and external security of the State; and the Act of May 8, 1968, on the organization of civil defense.

²³See Decree No. 68/DF/33 of January 29, 1968

²⁴Section 1 of the Act of May 8, 1968

²⁵ OLINGA (AD); « De la lutte contre BOKO HARAM à la restructuration de la défense populaire » ; in « L'évènement », édition spéciale du 20 mai 2016, p13

²⁶ Au Cameroun, les chefs traditionnels ont un statut d'auxiliaire de l'administration depuis le Décret n° 77/245 du 15/07/1977, portant organisation des chefferies traditionnelles

²⁷ FOUTE (R.-J.), « Des auxiliaires de l'administration », in *Cameroon tribune*, n° 10722/6921 du 21 novembre 2014, p.7.

²⁸In the Weberian bureaucratic sense of the term

²⁹ "Preventive diplomacy, in its conflict-management sense, can be defined as the art of avoiding acts of violence and containing conflicts without having to resolve them through the use of force." In practical terms, preventive diplomacy involves organizing information or intelligence networks at both the local and multilateral levels to identify and assess conflicts or threats. See on this subject MELOUPOU (J.-P.) & TAMEKEN NGOUTSOP (M.), "Piracy and Psychosocial Defense Mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea," *Sociologies [Online]*, First Texts, published online on November 15, 2012, accessed on May 16, 2017 [URL :<http://sociologies.revues.org/4155>].

³⁰ Idem

Fourth, in the geo-cultural area of the Lake Chad Basin, a traditional chief is a military chief. As chief of traditional armies, the traditional chief heads the warrior structures of his *faada*.³¹ He defines, orders, and coordinates the strategies and actions of the *sarki*³² and *doogari*³³, who are responsible for ensuring security within the framework of the traditional chiefdom, which reveals itself to be a hierarchical architecture. In this logic, one can note the action of these structures, which greatly contributed to resolving the phenomenon of highway bandits by supporting the republican security forces of the Cameroonian state. Faced with the rise of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin, traditional chiefdoms have proven to be substantially pragmatic organs. They have ensured the coordination of vigilance committees.

The duo of traditional chiefs – vigilance committees in the dynamic of fighting insecurity in Cameroon's Far North region collaborates with conventional security forces through intelligence, surveillance, but also through confrontation on the ground during operations. It thus provides information dedicated to the operations of conventional security forces in intervention and in maintaining order on the portions of territory targeted by security threats. With regard to surveillance, the vigilance committees, in synergy with conventional security forces, secure populations and strategic installations, and participate in patrols and controls of sensitive areas. In many cases, they participate in the neutralization of suicide bombers and in clashes on the theater of operations. This was the case during the response following the attack on the village of Djalingo in 2018, on the eve of the Ramadan holiday, where members of the vigilance committee neutralized 11 members of the BOKO HARAM terrorist group.

2.2. A CIVILIAN COMPONENT TO BE REVALUED FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE FIGHT AGAINST INSECURITY

The traditional chiefdoms of the Lake Chad Basin possess undeniable assets in the face of the prevailing insecurity in this geographical area. However, in Cameroon, their "desubstantialization" is established, because traditional chiefs are suspected by the postcolonial state, whose quest for hegemony has been a constant since the country's independence. It is therefore important to revalue their status for a more effective contribution to the fight against insecurity, by entrusting them with more responsibilities than they currently have. In Nigeria, on the other hand, emirs, sultans, and other traditional chiefs benefit from greater attention from the state and their subjects, which allows them to easily maintain their rank and serve public causes with greater commitment. In contrast, the *laamiibé* of Cameroon, in particular, do not feel the duty to serve "zealously under authorities who look down on them, considering them an anachronistic institution, mere guardians of folklore." In financial terms, there has been progress, albeit insignificant, in revaluing the status of traditional chiefs with the decree of September 13, 2013, which grants an allowance to traditional chiefs, the amount of which varies according to the type of chiefdom. Nevertheless, Cameroonian traditional chiefs remain destitute. It is important to reform their status to allow them to be more effective "auxiliaries" in the fight against insecurity. Guaranteeing security and fighting insecurity have a cost, and given the modest means of the state, an option to revitalize traditional chiefdoms could be the creation of income-generating activities for their benefit. These could support traditional chiefdoms, enabling them to invest more fully in their security missions. For, having been largely desubstantialized, traditional chiefdoms struggle to fully express their security potential. The dynamic of pooling security forces in the Lake Chad Basin is expressed much more through Westphalian institutions.

II. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, a major observation is inevitable: the civilian component of security, embodied here by traditional chiefdoms and the vigilance committees they coordinate, has long been repressed and confined to contemplative actions regarding the prowess and weaknesses of the army. It has found itself, despite itself, on the "front line" in the anti-terrorist fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, the circumstances having compelled it. With the support of vigilance committees under the coordination of traditional chiefdoms, security is strengthened at strategic border crossing points and even within the territory. The enemy is considerably weakened, its incursions having less and less success. It should be noted, however, that the role of these actors engaged alongside the defense forces may, in some respects, prove to be a source of uncertainty. Indeed, the "ambiguous role of these actors on the ground raises questions." The study of the institutionalization process of "vigilance committees" shows that they rest on a flawed legal framework consisting of the opportunistic discursive mobilization of the concept of popular defense and recourse to very old and inadequate legislative and regulatory texts. The history of alternative

³¹A Fulfulde term meaning "the chief's court"

³²A term used to refer to the "Chief Court Ministers."

³³A Fulfulde term meaning "servant" or "slave of the chief."

security organizations in Africa highlights their propensity for racketeering and extrajudicial violence as a form of ordeal. Since the government does not exercise total control over their members, some may be enlisted in the ranks of criminal groups or turn to crime entrepreneurship. This is all the more true as some members of vigilance committees form an idea of the help they provide to the authorities and expect significant compensation, such as integration into the armed forces or police. They also expect to receive a retirement pension, employment, or training. If these expectations were to be disappointed, they could become a "double-edged sword," especially since some already show signs of discouragement; hence the imperative need for their judicious supervision by traditional chiefs.

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