Quest Journals Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science

Volume 4 ~ Issue 11 (2016) pp: 65-72 ISSN(Online) : 2321-9467

www.questjournals.org



Research Paper

International Oil Companies Corporate Social Responsibility Failure as A Factor of Conflicts in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria

¹Amuyou, U.A, ² Kotingo. K. E. ³Maiyanga, E., ⁴Otop, O.O., & ⁴Ekwok, I.C.

¹Department of Geography, Federal College Of Education, Obudu-Nigeria.

² Department Of Environment Assessment, Ministry Of Environment Bayelsa State-Nigeria

³School of Geography, University Of Leeds, Leeds United Kingdom.

⁴Department of Geography & Environmental Science, University Of Calabar-Nigeria

Received; 28 October 2016 Accepted; 18November 2016; © The author(s) 2016. Published with open access at **www.questjournals.org**

ABSTRACT: Of all multinational companies in various sectors of global industries the oil and gas companies and the impact of theirs activities on the environment have been the subject of debate, especially on issues of their corporate social responsibilities (CSR). This could be due to the fact that oil and gas companies are major figures in global economy and their exploration /exploitation activities have strong environmental impact, consequently, community and public expectation of their CSR is very high. The situation is not different for the oil companies in the Niger delta region of Nigeria where crude oil exploitation has been on for over 60 years. The series of events in this exploited region of the country have obviously called for attention especially with regards to the age-long expression of dissatisfaction and tension coupled with the unending blame-game which has lingered between the companies, the host communities and the government. Extant literatures show that global spending by oil and gas and mining companies on community development projects as at 2001 is put at \$500 million. In Nigeria for instance, the contribution of Exxon Mobile in 2009 and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in 2011 amounted to the sum of N29, 908,285,941 and \$73.8 million respectively for each company. These contributions were said to address various infrastructural and community development projects such as building of schools, health centers, local roads, community water projects, youth development skill acquisition projects etc. Despite these contributions, the impact of CSR initiative is questioned by the communities, stakeholders and international observers. This could be attributed to the large extent of environmental degradation and increasing rate of poverty in host communities. The paper puts forward recommendations that could help to reduce the on-going deterioration of the system.

Keywords: Niger delta region, corporate social responsibilities, International oil companies.

I. INTRODUCTION

The discovery of crude oil in any part of the world is considered a precursor to socioeconomic emancipation; however this is often not the case as sooner than later the celebration will be cut short as the 'black gold' becomes a curse rather than a blessing (Africa Today, 2002). This syndrome is peculiar with developing economies where civil strife, administrative inefficiency and corruption, weak government institutions and regulatory framework become the order of the day. Klitgaard (1998), Volg (2004), Ewoye and Bissessar, (2014) have contended that these issues particularly public sector dishonesty remains a clog in the wheel of the socioeconomic development of African nations endowed with hydrocarbon resources.

The oil and gas industry of Nigeria remains one veritable means of huge foreign direct investment (FDI) as international oil companies (IOCs) invest billions of dollars to develop the sector (Ibi-Ajayi, 2006). For instance, in the United Nation conference on Trade and Investment Development report of 2012 it was revealed that Nigeria receives 70 % sub-regional FDI and 11% of the continents total with the oil and gas sector getting 90 % of the total FDI (Donwa, Mgbam & Ezeani, 2015). The huge investment in the sector by IOCs clearly revealed attractiveness of oil and gas business in Nigeria.

IOCs activities often negatively impacts on the environment which have continued to raise fundamental questions on the sustainability of their processes (Ogbuagu & Akubue, 2016). It is in view of this that Volg (2004) posited that for successful business operations, oil and gas companies need to prioritize

*Corresponding Author: Amuyou, U.A¹

^{65 |} Page

corporate social responsibility (CSR). The essence of CSR according to Milenko (2013) is to improve the wellbeing of the communities through socioeconomic interventions. Although CSR is a polysemous term, McShane and Glinow (2003) sees it as the moral responsibility of a company towards the communities whose activities affects their normal way of life. This entails that IOCs are ethically bound to provide some level of social leverage to their host communities.

However, this respite is yet to be sustainably pursued in the Niger delta region (NDR) of Nigeria as the exploitation of crude oil in the region in the past sixty years or so has left indelible imprint on the socioeconomic and environmental life of the host communities. Lives have been lost (Oyebamiji and Mba, 2013) means of livelihood destroyed (Kotingo & Amuyou, 2015), pristine environment made unwholesome (Nwosu, 2013). These problems have resulted in environmental and socioeconomic crisis in the region making most of the communities desolate (Abosode, 2010) and the people perpetually living in abject poverty (Aloku, 1999). Human Rights Watch, (1999) and Omofonmon and Odia, (2009) studies revealed that crude oil exploration, exploitation and subsequent transportation have seemingly intractable negative effects in the different environmental media and worst still, IOCs that largely caused these problems often fail to timely correct these litany of issues.

The failure of IOCs to remedy the impact of crude oil on the environment swiftly remains a source of crisis in the NDR. Communities' members have continued to have hostile relationship with IOCs and their installation (Nwuso, 2013). With the huge revenue made from the region, the people's expectations are high. This was alluded to by Onwuchekwa (2002: 9) when it was stated that 'the expectation of social service from corporate firms has become very high in Nigeria especially in the oil producing areas and the negligence of the expectations by those companies has resulted to a very turbulent environment'.

Some IOCs are reluctant to carry out social intervention projects in their host communities due to the cost implications; hence they have continued to indulge in stick and carrot behavior towards their host communities (Akindele, 2011). However, no study has been conducted to find out if recurrent conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria have anything to do with corporate social responsibility failure. It is this lapse that informed this review. It is in view of this that this study using content analysis is focused to achieving the following objectives;

- To examine the contributions of IOCs to socioeconomic development in the Niger Delta region from 2005-2010.
- 2. To assess factors militating against CSR efforts of IOCs in the study area.
- 3. To examine the community development trends with respect to CSR in the study area
- 4. To assess community members expectations from IOCs operating in the region
- 5. To analyze indices of CSR Failure as perpetuating variable of conflicts in the Niger Delta.

Contributions of IOCs to the socioeconomic development of the NDR

With the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1955, Nigeria joined the international League of Nations blessed with crude oil. Government total revenues from crude oil sales constitute about 90 percent of its income earnings which is 80 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 95 percent of the national budget (Chorkor, 2000). This revealed that the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) economy is dependent largely on crude oil. The huge revenue made from crude oil sales in the country has not translated into development of pertinent sectors especially in the Niger Delta (Ayuba, 2015).

Worst still, Haggins (2014) reports that the 'there is a significant disconnect between the wealth the region generates for the Nigerian Federation and the transnational oil companies extracting oil from the region, and the region's human development progress'. The World Bank (2008) in her country analysis report about Nigeria concludes that 'perhaps more than anywhere in the world, the Niger Delta (ND) exemplifies the paradox of low development in an environment of rich resources'. Such sad commentaries have continued unabated to this day.

The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP, 2006) analysis of poverty and other human development indices in the region revealed that the Niger delta states have a population of over 30 million people majority of who live in deplorable conditions occasioned by incidence of poverty which continues to spiral (Table 1). UNDP further observed that the Human Development Index of 0.564 for the ND is below her fellow oil producing regions of the world like Venezeula (0.772) and Indonisia (0.697). This is pathetic given that the means of livelihood of the people of the region has been spoiled by many decades of crude oil related activities in the area.

Table 1: Incidence of Poverty in the Niger Delta, 1980-2004

STATES	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004
Nigeria	28.1	46.3	42.7	64.6	54.4
Delta/Edo	19.8	52.4	33.9	56.6	54.4
Cross river	10.2	42.9	45.5	66.9	41.61
Imo/Abia	14.4	33.1	49.9	56.2	27(Imo), 22.27
					(Abia)
Ondo	24.9	47.3	46.6	71.6	42.15
Rivers/Beyalsa	7.7	44.4	43.4	44.3	Rivers 29.09
					Beyalsa 19.98

Source: National Bureau of Statistics in Higgins (2009)

The abysmal level of development indices in the region is not only blamed on the government as IOCs also share in the blame. The destruction of the means of livelihood of the inhabitants of the ND by IOCs received little or no concern from the then governments, IOCs and the international communities (Aghalino, 2013). But increase in the siege mentality of the youths and the subsequent militarization leading to high rate of crime and onslaught on oil installations in the region drew the attentions of both government and IOCs to the plight of the ND communities. These factors forced IOCs to commence some veneer of the so called 'gift policy' interventions in the oil bearing communities of the ND (Osisuoma et.al, 2015).

To this day, IOCs with businesses in the NDR have continued to argue that it is the responsibility of government of the host communities to develop these communities (Adati, 2012). It follows from the fact that, IOCs have not fail in their obligation to the government in form of payment of taxes and royalties and that any efforts to provide any development intervention to the immediate communities is out of good will (Idemudia, 2007). This long held believe may not be unconnected to the lack of strong regulatory framework on the responsibility of IOCs to the oil bearing communities. The three percent IOCs are mandated by law to contribution to NDDC for community development is seen to be too small compare to the revenue made from crude oil sales and the level of destruction of the landscape (ibid). It is in order to meet international best practices that IOCs now upheld the social objective as part of its policy thrust.

In a study by Ite (2007) on the contributions of IOCs to the socioeconomic development of the ND region, it was clearly stated that transnational oil companies are yet to attain the goal of community development interventions as what has been provided in the region in the last five decades leave much to be desire. This concern was recently expressed by George (2012) when opined that IOCs with businesses in the Niger Delta are not taking the issue of CSR seriously rather they are involve in 'corporate philanthropy'. This has made IOCs in the region to be irresponsible in its operations as revealed in the incessant oil spillage (Idemudia, 2009).

Table 2 is the corporate partnership efforts of IOCs with communities in the NDR. From the table, it can be observed that IOCs do engaged in strategic alliance and programme partnership, and programme implementation partnership. Both instruments provide an opportunity for IOCs to contribute to the socioeconomic development of the NDR. Some of the core areas the IOCs contributes to the development of the NDR is in infrastructure provisions in education, health water and sanitation, road development, micro credit schemes, skill acquisition, provision of agricultural inputs among others.

Table 2: Corporate partnership focused on CD in the Niger Delta

Type of partnership	Name of partnership	Key partners	Partnership focus	Location of partnership	
Strategic efferice (SA) and programme partnership (PP)	SPDC/MODIC	Oil TNCs and Federal Government of Nagerie (PGN)	Various; mostly a provision of social infrastructure	Niger Delta Asvice Chorn state	
•	Integrated CD großect	MPN(Alose Ition state government (ANASG)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)- murrain Development Fund (HDP)	Social infrastructural microcradit scheme/skill development		
PP	Born rice project	MPN/UKWSG/Midland Rice of Arkenses	Agriculture	Aliws Ibom state	
Programme implementation partnumhip (PIP)	MPTVSupport and Training Extrepreneurality Programme (STEP)/GEP gartnership	MANUSTERFORE	Microcredit scheme and capacity building	Akwa Ibom state	
PiP	MPTQTUSEF partnership	MPRUSME Health		Akwa Ibom state	
PP	EPNL/River state government partnership	EPNL/Niver state government	infractructure and health	River state	
PIP	Niger Delta Initiative	EPNL/OII Mining Lease (OML) 58 communities/United Nations Volunteers (UNV)/UNOP	VINOLE	Naver state	
PIP	Eastwen Oboko Community Development Poundation	EPNL/Pro- Natura/Castern Oboks Communities	Vertical	Aliwa Ibom state	

Source: Idemudia (2006)

Contributions of SPDC and Exxon Mobile to Community Development Projects in the Niger Delta

Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is the first IOC to commence oil exploration in the Niger Delta. It has been in the region for more than fifty years (Ayuba, 2012). It has 30 percent stakes in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and produce 40 percent of the nation crude oil. Besides, majority of its activities are offshore making her in direct contact with communities (Ite, 2007). SPDC claimed to foster community development through 'efficient and ethical pursuit of its core business activities in a way that maximizesbeneficial spin-off for host countries and communities, and the second is through social investment that goes beyond philanthropic grants to actual technical and financial support for local development initiatives (SPDC 2004a)'. It is evident that the company has made financial contributions to both the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as part of its regulatory requirement.

SPDC is known to have made significant strides in the area of agriculture, education, trainings, health care, capacity building and oversea sponsorship of research programmes in geosciences in about five universities in the region (Lugard, 2014). In line with its CSR global strategy of '...enterprise development, road safety and energy access, and on locally tailored programmes covering community development, disaster relief, education, health and biodiversity (SPDC, 2004a)' spent the sum of \$207.3 million between 2011 and 2012 on the different sectors highlighted above in the region.

In addition, in 2011, the company gave out the sum of \$73.8 million for community development through her Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) with communities in the region for the provision of development projects. More so, in River State alone, the contributions from IOCs have aided NDDC to implement about 122 projects in the zone. The projects executed includes 85 class room blocks, 40 roads of different distances, 29 water projects, 11 electrification projects, 3 canalization projects, 3 jetties and one bridge (This Day News, 2006). More so, SPDC imitative of Youth Development Scheme (YDS) has helped to trained thousands of youths on various skill acquisition ventures (Aghalino, 2004).

However, Exxon Mobile unlike SPDC does not outline specific amount spent on CSR and on what sector but often makes a general statement regarding what it has spent in a region. For instance, in her 2007 annual report, it was stated that the company spent 31.6 Million on CSR in Africa without giving the specifics on the location and type of the projects. The inability of the company to give a break down cast doubt on her commitment to CSR in her host communities.

It was in recognition of this lack of details that Jon et al (1980) concluded that Exxon-Mobil pays less attention to CSR than does Shell. However, in terms of its statutory contributions to NDDC, Table 2 indicates that in 2007, the sum of N6, 150,937600 was given to the body for the development of the Niger Delta. But the company contributed it highest amount in 2009 as the sum of N29, 908, 285, 941 was given to NDDC between 2007 and 2011.

In a study by Ukwaji, Eja and Ojong (2012) on the contributions of Exxon Mobile in infrastructural provision in Akwa Ibom State, it was reported that the company contributes in the airport development, building of class room blocks, hospitals, seaports, roads, electrification among others (Table 4)

Oil Company 11,503,901,672 11,991,948,984 13,260,813,255 16,596,531,610 32,436,592,660 HEVRON MO 4,568,180,598 4,694,432,150 8,761,021,322 12,140,533,456 11,743,520,928 6,150,937,600 5,821,637,940 29,908,285,941 18,118,738,073 12,914,589,581 3,161,132,000 1,689,351,578 1,817,931,833 4,243,412,388 2,485,830,398 TOTALFINA 2,863,577,064 13,146,954,742 15,705,720,469 15,806,277,258 2,014,465,268 1,667,907,736 32,701,619 4,560,000,000 3,480,761,976 ADDAX OIL 3,497,000,000 4,355,672,560 13,771,790,100 AGIP ENERGY 843,691,223 386,184,125 495.528.000 895,850,956 2.564,973,380 3.867.751.573 48.472.550 1.206.987.437 NIG PET DEV AGIP EXPL 804,765,583 2,411,119,753 2,725,501,400 807,032,722 MNI OIL COY 190,500,000 509,029,572 125,800,000 112,497,750 3,951,341,565 1,617,576,554 1,275,275,126 828,197,361 1,053,313,964 3,819,878,385 5,121,908,574 PAN OCEAN 98,992,954 360,096,700 483,154,862 139,997,200 251,613,172

Table 3: Overview of revenue from IOCs from 2007 to 2011

Source:

Out of the 93 head of household sampled in Mkpanak, 25.81 percent of them are of the view that the company provided all of the infrastructures listed above while in Upenekan 26.85 followed similar trend. To ensure peace and stability in the region, it has been argued by Idemudia and Ite (2006a) that IOCs must continue to invest in the socioeconomic development of the Niger Delta region.

Table 4: provision of infrastructures by Exxon Mobile in Akwa Ibom State Nigeria

Infrastructures	Mkpanak	Percentage	Upenekang	Percentage	Percentage total
Building of air port	9	9.68	5	5.37	7.52
Provision of electricity	14	15.05	15	16.13	15.55
Building of class room block	15	16.13	17	18.27	17.20
Road construction	11	7.52	13	13.07	12.90
Building of seaport	11	11.83	10	10.75	1290
Building of hospital	9	9.67	8	8.6	9.14
All of the above	24	25.81	25	26.85	26.34
Total	93	100	93	100	100

Source: Ukwayi, Eja & Ojong (2012)

Factors militating against CSR efforts of IOCs in the Niger Delta

The goal of IOCs is to provide development projects is often bedeviled by several factors. In a study on the challenges of CSR by IOCs in the ND by Dekpose and Abaye (2014) it was observed that many of the oil companies are confronted with the problems of poor business environment, insecurity, instability in the price of crude oil in the international market, corruption of government officials among others. Enabling environment according to Idemudia (2006a) is where hindrances to the implementation of CSR are reduce to a nominal minimum while the community and government provides the incentives to encourage CSR practices with an opportunity for feedback. However, in Nigeria, the prevailing business environment does not encourage corporate performance. For instance, the high rate of insecurity in the country, constant feud between ethnic regions, the menace of the Fulani herdsmen, kidnapping, political strife, sabotage of oil installations, and other social unrest impedes smooth business operation. This according to Adati (2012) often discourages investment in an already capital intensive and volatile energy industry.

The attitude of the youths in the NDR is one that will perpetually limit IOCs interest in providing development projects. For instance, it is a norm in the ND that contractors must pay the community youths a certain amount of money locally called *HEVE* before they can be allowed to implement any development project meant for the very same youths. This is a very bad situation that has continued up to this day. They have become so monetized that any stranger in their land is a veritable source of income. Other factors that militates against the effective delivery of CSR projects to the Niger Delta communities include but not limited to:

- ➤ Corruption which discourages the implementation of CSR in the ND. Nigeria government officials are known to be very fraudulent. A case in point is the NDDC which has become a conduit pipe for the siphoning of public funds (CIA, 2014).
- Absence of contractual agreement between host communities and IOCs on the responsibility to the communities
- ➤ Lack of coordination and synergy among government agencies
- ➤ Absence of guidelines on CSR adoption in the country
- > Transfer of western made strategies of CSR implementation to a developing economy like Nigeria
- ➤ Government inability to meet her own part of the bargain as in provision of infrastructures and statutory contribution to NDDC
- Volatility in oil prices in the international market which discourages shareholders interest in approving any spending
- ➤ The problems of increasing community expectations from IOCs on CSR.

Evolution of community development strategy by IOCs in the Niger Delta

In recognition of the many years of neglect and worrisome deplorable conditions of the people, as parts of her CSR, IOCs have tried many models of community development in the region. Starting from 1956 when oil was discovered in Oloibiri by the then Dutch Shell petroleum, different models have been tried and abandoned. Some of the models of community development attempted in the region include:

Community Assistance (CA): This is one of the earliest models put forward by SPDC and other IOCs in an attempt to give back to society some of it gains from crude oil proceeds. This policy of Shell was invoked in the 1960s and it was conducted without consultation with community members (SPDC, 2004; Idemudia, 2009). Whatever was deemed fit by the company was given to the natives in form of gifts. This philanthropic approach came with many setbacks. For instance, educational infrastructures were developed but not put in use because the community considered them not to be their priority at the time. Idemudia (2007) described the CA model as pay-as-you-go. However, in the 1990s, the incessant complains from community members and series of other events like Ogoni crisis and the Brent Spar brouhaha in the international community forced SPDC to change from CA to Community Development (CD).

Community Development: It involved a bottom-top approach where welfare packages were put in place to ensure community development. More so, SPDC (2004a) report that the CD model empowered the people and boosted their social welfare indices, healthcare services were also provided using internationally acceptable practices. However, one pitfall of the CD model was that it rather increases the expectations of community members as SPDC and IOCs did not manage community expectation properly (Idemudia, 2007). In addition, the community did not have total ownership of the process and the challenge of sustainability loomed in the horizon hence the transition to Sustainable Community Development (SCD) in 2003.

Sustainable Community Development: It was under the regime of SCD that SPDC sought for expanded involvement of all stakeholders in the delivery of community development projects in the NDR (Obugo, 2015). According to SPDC (2004a) the core of the SCD was to 'promote agriculture, diversify the local economy, decrease conflicts and job creation through business development, education and good governance'.

However, Ite (2007) observed that the proactive measures of SPDC created a dependent mentality among community members especially the youths. More so, limited involvement of all the communities became a source of conflict in the region. It was in recognition of this lapse that the IOCs introduced the global memorandum of understanding model.

Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU): The GMoU is a documented statement in form of an agreement between an IOC and clusters of communities on the role of each stakeholder in the identification, funding and implementation of community development project. Okoro (2014) noted that it is a holistic and participatory process meant to address socioeconomic development challenges. The principal precept of the model is collective involvement of group communities.

This new model has become an integral part of IOCs policy especially SPDC that has gone into joint venture with NDDC, NNPC and the community. With the model powers of administration is wholly in the hands of community members. It merits lies in the fact that it encourages symbiotic relationship between communities and IOCs, accountability and transparent is cultivated which in turn reduces ill-feelings and conflicts in the region as it offers synergy among the stakeholders.

Community member's expectations from IOCs operating in the region

It is imperative to note that community-company relation is often tarnished by distrust due to too many failed promises which often culminate in violent eruption (Idemudia & Ite, 2006). In fact Nwosu (2013) noted that in an attempt to express the dehumanizing conditions of their life, revolt becomes sacrosanct. The Niger Delta community for a very long time has expressed their dissatisfaction of IOCs corporate irresponsibility in different forms. Several litigations have been instituted against oil multinational companies, demonstrations have been staged leading to lost of lives and properties worth millions of naira on both sides (Nwosu, 2013). The strain relationship with it concomitant multiplier effects have often lead to fall in economic returns to IOCs and the government.

However, social commentators (Idemudia, 2007a; USCRS, 2012) have argued that participation and social inclusion of stakeholder through continuous engagement often reduce strained relationship to the barest minimum and it engenders stewardship from them. Specifically, Ogula (2012:2) reports that

'Corporations that align business interests with community interests in terms of CSR objectives can minimize the risks and liabilities associated with operating in culturally different regions from their home countries' it was further stated by Ogula (p3) that 'An understanding of local community expectations will aid companies operating in rural communities to integrate community expectations into CSR strategies, and align company and community interests in developing countries'.

The Niger Delta communities recognized efforts made so far by the IOCs operating in their land. However, due to the prolong negligence and the extent of deprivation in the region many community members view the impacts of social interventions by IOCs as 'palliative and tokenistics' in nature (Lugard, 2014). Analysis of the situation by Ogula (2012) identified four key factors that are pertinent to community expectations in the ND which includes development, economic empowerment, participation and transparency.

Indices of CSR Failure as perpetuating variable of conflicts in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta has continued to suffer from many years of neglects by government and the IOCs. Promises have often been made but never kept. Efforts made so far are yet to achieve the desired results. The hike in destruction of oil installations by the Niger Delta Avengers clearly revealed a gap in the reconciliation and amnesty programme of the Federal Government. More so, from review of published works on the subject in the region, the following identified factors are the embers of distrust and conflicts in the area:

- The colonial masters established the foundations for the underdevelopment of the region by focusing on resources exploitation, sought and paid for cheap labour and create markets for their produce.
- ➤ IOCs refused to depart from this obnoxious policy by destroying the natural environment through responsible exploitation of crude oil in the region. Between 1970 and 2000 conservative estimates revealed that about 7000 cases of oil spills and 70m cf of gas has been flared and it is continuous.
- > The projects developed by IOCs and government agencies did come with maintenance strategies hence most of them are now monuments
- The relationship between IOCs and the host communities is exploitative as only little is invested in the communities huge sums of dollars are carted away.
- ➤ In all, IOCs activities have rather excluded the people from economic, social and political scheme of things hence the increase level of poverty in the region.

All of these have created appalling socioeconomic development indices in the region. Watts (2008) opined that the ND have only 2% of the total roads in Nigeria, in states like Delta and Bayelsa, the doctor to patient ratio is 1:27,000 and 1:282,000 respectively. The infant mortality rate is 120 per thousand which is higher than the national figure of 100 per thousand. UNDP (2006a) report also indicated that only 25% of the population may live up to 40 years before the die and the literacy rate is very low compared to other oil bearing communities outside Nigeria.

Fadiora (2010:24) argued that these development challenges are linked to 'threats, hijack kidnappings, ransom takings, extortions, stoppage, blockage disruptions, destruction and vandalism of flow stations and MNOC equipment and staff' in the ND.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It has been observed from content analysis of published works on international oil company's corporate social responsibilities in the Niger delta region of Nigeria that despite the respective programmes introduced to correct the decades of neglects, the expectations from the host community is still very high. This is one fundamental precursor to conflict in the Niger Delta to this day. The community members expect IOCs to involve them in the management of the revenues derived from their land. The management of these resources according to the natives should revolve around four themes; development, economic empowerment, effective participation and transparency.

In view of the observations made above, it is apposite that the following recommendations be put forward:

- 1. The statutory contribution of IOCs to NDDC now the Ministry of the Niger Delta should be increased from 3 percent to 10 percent.
- 2. All IOCs should be made to declare in clear terms their specific contributions to community development and the sectors such interventions were provided.
- 3. The Federal Government, State Government, the Local Governments, Civil Society Organizations, local institutions and representatives of IOCs should form a verification team. Their task should be annual verification of CSR claims by IOCs operating in the region. This is to ensure that what is in the books is on ground.
- **4.** A skill acquisition programme for the youths should be initiated and funded by the IOCs. The participating youths should be selected on a quota basis from each of the oil producing state. Upon completion of their training, they should be gainfully employed by the respective oil companies with transactions in the area.
- 5. Environmental monitoring and remediation committee should be form with representatives from the National Assemble, civil society organizations and the members of the communities. Their

reasonability among others should basically involve the tracking of oil spills and quick response to spill incidences with the goal of remedying the situation.

REFERENCES

- [1]. Abosode B. (2010) The Impact of oil exploitation on the socioeconomic life of the Ilaje-Ugbo people of Ondo State, Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12 (5).
- [2]. Adati. A. K. (2012b) Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Civil and Environmental Research, 2(3), 38-51.
- [3]. Akendele, d. (2011) an assessment of the impact of corporate social responsibility on Nigerian ociety; Universal Journal of Marketing and Business Research. Volume one.
- [4]. Aluko, M. A. (1999) Social Dimension and Consequences of Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Suggestions for the next Millennium: In Osuntokun A.ed. (1999) Environmental Problems of the Niger Delta. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
- [5]. Aghalino, S. O. (2000). British colonial policies and the oil palm industry in the Niger delta region of Nigeria, 1900-1960. African Study Monographs, 21(1), 19-33.
- [6]. CIA The World Factbook, (2011) Nigeria country information. Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/gh.html
- [7]. Congressional Research Service. (2012, July). Nigeria: Current issues and U.S. Policy. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf
- [8]. Chokor, B., (2000): "Appraising the Structural Aspects of the Crises of Community Development and Environmental Degradation in Niger Delta" in Osuntokun, (ed) 2000: Environmental Problems of the Niger Delta. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Dokpesi, A.O.& Abaye, O (2012) Human capital development and youth restiveness in the Niger Delta. In A.Osuntokun and V. Ukaogo (Eds.) NigerDelta: Politics of despair, deprivation and desperation, Lagos, ICS Services. Pp.114-134.
- [9]. Donwa, S, Mbgam, G. & Ezeani, 1 (2015)resource control, revenue allocation and petroleum politics in Nigeria: the Niger Delta
- [10]. Ewoye, K. & Bissar, H (2014). Multinational oil companies' CSR initiatives in Nigeria. Managerial Law, 49(5/6), 218-235.
- [11]. Fadiora, A (2010) Un-heard voices: the socioeconomic impact of oil dependent growth inNigeria and the plight of the Niger Delta people Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies'. International Affairs 81 (3), 581-598
- [12]. George, O. J., Kuye, O. L., & Onokala, U. C. (2012). Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) a
- [13]. catalyst to the Niger Delta crisis: The case of Nigerian oil multinational companies versus the militants of Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Journal of Management Research, 4(2), 187-205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jmr.v4i2.1186
- [14]. Human Rights Watch (1999) The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing communities. London: HRW. bi-Ajayi, S. (2006). Foreign direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, targets, impact and potential. African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Report.
- [15]. Idemudia, U. (2009). Rethinking the role of corporate social responsibility in the Nigerian oil conflict: The limits of CSR. Journal of International Development, 22(7), 833-845.
- [16]. Idemudia, U (2007)Corporate Partnerships and Community Development in the Nigerian Oil Industry Strengths and Limitations Markets, Business and Regulation Programme Paper Number 2 March 2007
- [17]. Idemudia, U., & Ite, U. E. (2006a). Corporate–community relations in Nigeria's oil industry:
- [18]. \challenges and imperatives. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 13(4), 194-206.
- [19]. Jone, M.T.(1980) the institutional determinants of social responsibility, journal of business ethics, 20:163-179
- [20]. Kotingo, E.K & Amuyou, U.A (2016) Correlate of oil exploitation & livelihood distortion in Oloibiri community, Bayelsa State-Nigeria. International J. of Applied Research & Technology 4(10)60-68
- [21]. Lugard, C.B. (2014) stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility: recipe for sustainable peace in the Niger Delta region? Afe Babalola University: Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 4 (1) 155-173
- [22]. Mcshane, S. L., & Glinow V. (2003). Organizational Behaviour; (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Education, University of Port Harcourt.
- [23]. Milenko, C. (2013) 'Analysis of the Application of the Concept of Corporate Social Resposnibility in Local Businesses'. Singidunum Journal of Applied Sciences 10 (1), 1—10
- [24]. National Bureaux of Statistics (2010) Review of the Nigerian Economy (Abuja: FCT) Nwosu, J.E (2013) Environmental degradation: the impact of oil exploration in the Niger-Delta region, Nigeria 504. 5: [622. 276: 622. 323] (609)
- [25]. Obugu, M. (2015)the rule of oil: petro-politics and the anatomy of an insurgency, oil and politics. oil and politics conference, goldsmith college, university of london, uk. Ogula, D., Rose, J., & Abii, F. E. (2012) 'A Phenomenological Study of Corporate Social Responsibility in the Niger Delta, Nigeria'. Journal of Leadership Studies 6 (2), 32-47
- [26]. Omofonmwan, S. I., & Odia, L. O. (2009) Oil exploitation and conflict in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology, 26(1), 25-30.
- [27]. Onwuchekwa O. (2009) "5,400 spills threaten Niger Delta-Ugochukwu." Daily Champion. 24 November. http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200411240494.html, accessed on 25 March 2016 Osisioma, H, Nzenwi, h & Nwoye, P (2015) Corporate social responsibility and performance of selected firms in Nigeria
- [28]. Oyebamiji, M.A. and Mba, C.I., 2013. Effects of oil spillage on community development in the Niger Delta region: Implications for the eradication of poverty and hunger (Millennium Development Goal One) in Nigeria. World Journal of Social Science, 1(1), p.p27.
- [29]. SPDC (2004a.) "Should oil-companies directly finance development for local communities? The case of Shell-Nigeria." In R. Traub-Merz and D. Yates (eds.), Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development. Friedrich-
- [30]. Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn.
- [31]. The World Bank. (2008). Nigeria Country Brief. Ufumiyede et.al, (2011) Effects of Oil Spillage on Community Development
- [32]. in the Niger Delta Region: Implications for the Eradication of Poverty and Hunger (Millennium Development Goal One) in Nigeria. World Journal of Social Science 1(1) p27.
- [33]. Vogel, D. (2004) The Market for Virtue, The Potentials and Limits of Corporate Social\Responsibility, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- [34]. Watts, P., Holme, L., Tinto, R., & Shell International (2008) Corporate Social Responsibility:
- [35]. Meeting Changing Expectations. Conches-Geneva, Switzerland: World Business Council for Sustainable Development. available from: http://oldwww.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/hbdf19Txhmk3kDxBQDWW/CSRmeeting.pdf [Dec, 10 2015]